Skip to main content

Full text of "DTIC ADA400589: Process Safety Management Guidelines for Compliance"

See other formats

enTTi ra miac* f ti 

Compl i an t 

U.S. Department of Labor - 

Occupational Saf e ty and Healt h Admini s tration 

OSHA3133 - 

1994 (R e print e d) - 

Report Documentation Page 

Report Date Report Type 

00001994 N/A 

Dates Covered (from... to) 

Title and Subtitle 

Contract Number 

Process Safety Management Guidelines for Compliance 

Grant Number 

Program Element Number 


Project Number 

Task Number 

Work Unit Number 

Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) 

U.S. Dept of Labor Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration 200 Constitution Avenue Washington, 

DC 20210 

Performing Organization Report Number 


Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and 

Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) 


Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) 

Distribution/Availability Statement 

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 

Supplementary Notes 


The major objective of process safety management (PSM) of highly hazardous chemicals to prevent 
unwanted releases of hazardous chemicals especially into locations that could expose employees and 
others to serious hazards. An effective process safety management program requires a systematic 
approach to evaluating the whole chemical process. Using this approach, the process design, process 
technology, process changes, operational and maintenance activities and procedures, nonroutine activities 
and procedures, emergency preparedness plans and procedures, training programs, and other elements that 
affect the process are all considered in the evaluation. 

Subject Terms 

Report Classification 


Classification of this page 

Classification of Abstract 


Limitation of Abstract 


This informational booklet provides a generic, 
non-exhaustive overview of OSHA standards- 
related topics. This publication does not itself 
alter nr determine compliance responsibilities, 

which are set forth in OSHA standards them¬ 
selves and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act. Moreover, because interpretations and 

onfnrr<ampnt nnlirv/ mpv rh;^nnA ovpr timP fnr 

I. W. ..w. -..— 

additional guidance on OSHA compliance 
requirements, the reader should consult current 
administrative interpretations and decisions by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Review 
Commission and the courts. 

Material contained in this publication is in the 
niihlic domain and mav be reoroduced. fuliv or 
partially, without permission of the Federal 
Government. Source credit is requested but not 

This information will be made available to 
sensory impaired individuals upon request. 
Voice phone; (202) 219-8045; 
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (TDD) 
message referral phone; 1-800-326-2577 

Procsss Sststy 


1^1 i o n 

v#v/i I ipiioii I 

U.S, Department of Labor 
Robert B. Reich, Secretary 

Occupationai Safety and Health Administration 
Joseph A. Dear, Assistant Secretary 

OSHA 3133 
1994 (Reprinted) 


K^\Jl lid liO 



■ 'i“ I-- 


Process Safety Information. 

Hazards of the Chemicals Used in the Process 

Technology of the Process. 

Equipment in the Process. 

Emolovee Involvement. 

— I' - ^ - 

Process Hazard Analysis. 

Operating Procedures. 

i;^iii|yPiwy^^ iiaiiiiii^ . 












I w 

Dr-a-Qtartim Rc^vipiUf 

----- ^ ^ j ■ ■ w « ■ • • 

I W ' 


Mechanical Integrity of bquipment.13 

Process Defenses.13 

Written Procedures.14 

Inspection and Testing.14 

Quality Assurance.15 

Nonroutine Work Authorizations.15 

Managing Change.16 

incident Investigation.17 

Emergency Preparedness. 

Compliance Audits. 



Conductino the Audit. 

— ^ 

Evaluation and Corrective Action 







" T r - 

States with Approved Plans. 

OSHA Consultation Project Directory 


WWI mi WlllWd^ 








Figure 1. Process Flow Diagram.4 

Figure 2. Request for Change Form.18 

Figure 3. Incident Investigation Report.20 


The major objective of process safety management (PSM) of highly 
hazardous chemicals is to prevent unwanted releases of hazardous 
chemicals especially into locations that could expose employees and 
others to serious hazards. An effective process safety management 
nrnnram renuires a svstematic aooroach to evaluatino the whole 

-— ” ^ J ---- - -- - ^ . 

chem.ical process. Using this approach, the process design, process 
technology, process changes, operational and maintenance activities 
and procedures, nonroutine activities and procedures, emergency 

nrandfo/Hnoee nianc anH rirnroHiiroc traininn nronramc anri nthpr 
Qlamante that affopt the nrpr>aoe ara all ppnciHprorl in tho o\/aliiatinn 

I IV>I ILv? LI UltWUL L* IV^ WVi/\.RS^V^ Ul Ull WW • «W14-1 W I W lit 41 iW W v 4-4i W VA4i W i ■ • 

n|i./pilWCll.lWI I 

The various lines of defense that have been incorporated into the 
design and operation of the process to prevent or mitigate the 
release of hazardous chemicals need to be evaluated and strength¬ 
ened to ensure their effectiveness at each level. Process safety 
management is the proactive identification, evaluation and mitigation 

or prevention of chemicai releases that could occur as a result of 
failures in processes, procedures, or equipment. 

The process safety management standard targets highly hazardous 
chemicals that have the potential to cause a catastrophic incident. 
The purpose of the standard as a whole is to aid employers in their 
efforts to prevent or mitigate episodic chemical releases that could 
lead to a catastrophe in the workplace and possibly in the surround¬ 
ing community. 

To control these types of hazards, employers need to develop the 
necessary expertise, experience, judgement, and initiative within 
their work force to properly implement and maintain an effective 
orocess safetv manaoement orooram as envisioned in the Occuoa- 

tional Safetv and Health Administration fOSHA) standard. 

- — _ — - .. . . ^ ^ 

The OSH.A standard is required by the Clean Air Act Amendments, 
as is the Environmental Protection .Agency’s Risk Management Plan, 
which will be proposed in 1992. Employers who merge the two sets 

nf roni lirnmontc intn thoir nrnr'occ cafot\/ mananomont nrnnram will 

S-ri IV-'4-|UIIVi.RillVi.#ll IlitW 4114^11 4i/4/4-f WlW 4^UI4«r4j it 14A> >4A^ WtltV^ltS 4««i • • Will 

Kattar acciiro ft ill r'nmnlianr'o »AMth aar'h ac \Aroll ac onhanr'd thoir 

lki/L;;> LIV> I Uv7v9U I V-a 1 4411 4i/4i/l I 1^1 lUI l\.^4>' VV I LI I Vm> UWI I U4.7 VV 4.r 11 U44 4.^ < it 14-41 l4i/4./ 41 14/11 
I C^iClLlUi lOI yvILlI LI 1^ IWOUI I 11 1 I U I IILJ . 

A !+l-»rsi /^OL-JA IJ //-trt rvx-i t-t orv^lAfllt ra 

/niiiiuuyii ir\ uciiovoo oaioiy iiianay^iiicsiu win iicavc? a 

•-ilk--k• 4 'i<i /<k iPN I/>•« 1 «^tAfSIl 

puijilivc? uii Lilt? tiaiciy ui eiiipiuyctJt) aiiu win uiit;i uiiici [juLt?ii- 

tial banefits to ernpioysrs, such as incrGased productivity, smalisr 
businsssGS that may havG iimitGd rssourcGS availabiG to thorn at this 


time, might consider alternative avenues of decreasing the risks 
associated with highly hazardous chemicals at their workplaces. 

One method that might be considered is reducing inventory of the 
highly hazardous chemical. This reduction in inventory will result in 
reducing the risk or potential for a catastrophic incident. Also, 
employers, including small employers, may establish more efficient 
inventory control by reducing, to below the established threshold, the 
quantities of highly hazardous chemicals onsite. This reduction can 
be accomplished by ordering smaller shipments and maintaining the 
minimum inventory necessary for efficient and safe operation. When 
reduced inventory is not feasible, the employer might consider 
dispersing inventory to several locations onsite. Dispersing storage 
into locations so that a release in one location will not cause a 


in another location is also a practical way to reduce the risk 

or potential for catastrophic incidents. 


The PSM standard does not apply to the following: 

• Oil or gas well drilling or servicing operations; 

• Normally unoccupied remote facilities; 

• Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for workplace consumption as a fuel 
(e.g., propane used for comfort heating, gasoline for vehicle 
refueling), if such fuels are not a part of a process containing 
another highly hazardous chemical covered by this standard; or 

• Flammable liquids stored in atmospheric tanks or transferred, 
which are kept below their normal boiling point without benefit of 
chilling or refrigerating and are not connected to a process. 

Process Safety Information 

Hazards of the Chemicals Used in the Process 

Complete and accurate written information concerning process 
chemicals, process technology, and process equipment is essential 
to an effective process safety management program and to a pro¬ 
cess hazard anaivsis. The comoiled information will be a necessary 

resource to a variety of users including the team performing the 
process hazard analysis as required by PSM; those developing the 



training programs and tha operating procedures; contractors whose 
Amployees will be working with, the process; those conducting the 
pre-sta.hup reviews; as well as local emergency preparedness 

nlannorcs anH inciiranro and AnfArrAmAnt AffiAialc 

II IS..-.*.* .*.*.. * 

Ml IM II ISp/MI mi 

I WW Ml IM VmT I i I M I WM lilMllb W(t I S^IMIW • 

“THri infr»rmo+lnn fn K/a oK/m it fhz:^ inr^li iriinn 

i I 1^ II 11 Wl I I iUllWI I LW WWI i Cll^WUt II IC? Wl 1^1 I llOdlO) 11 IWIUWII 1^ 

rsrr\/-i#-\r*r* ii«i+/^rrri#rsr4i<af^•r^r nr% 

1^.11 UUC700 M lid i I I^\JICILC70, 1 i^^VJO IW UO 11 i^l OI lOI lOI V O C^liWU^il IWi dll 

duoui aio aoooDoi i id ii ui ii ixs iii c di lu CApiucjiui i ui lai auid idliuo, 

«tHk« » « * fysk 

lectuiiviiy iiaz.aiuo, me aaiciy emu ncdim iid^ctiua lu wuir\eia, ai lu me 

corrosion and erosion effects on the process equipment and monitor¬ 
ing tools. Current materia! safety data sheet (MSDS) information can 
be used to help meet this requirement but must be supplemented 

with process chemistry information, including runaway reaction and 
over-pressure hazards, if applicable. 

I echnoiogy of the process 

Process technology information will be a part of the process safety 
information package and should include employer-established 
criteria for maximum inventory levels for process chemicals; limits 
beyond which would be considered upset conditions: and a qualita¬ 
tive estimate of the consequences or results of deviation that could 
occur if operating beyond the established process limits. Employers 
are encouraged to use diagrams that will help users understand the 

A block flow diagram is used to show the major process equipment 
and interconnecting process flow lines and flow rates, stream 
composition, temperatures, and pressures when necessary for 
claritv. The block flow diaaram is a simolified diaaram. 

Process flow diagrams are more com.plex and show all main flow 
streams including valves to enhance the understanding of the 
process as well as pressures and tem'^eratu.''es on all feed a.nd 

nrnHi lAt linoc vwithin nil mnlAr \/accaIc nnrl in nnrl ai it At hAnrlArc nnri 


hAnt AYAhnnAore nnrl nnintc nf nmcei ira nnrl tnmncirnti iro AAntrnl 

I iWMt S../^WI IMi Ml IVi^ Ml UI fM VMI I I I M L M I M MS/lltIWI 

fcc^ck Pini ir^ i fr^r rlionrom\ Alerx Jn^r^rmotinn 

I I M 1 I Ml U MUl I lyiM ^1 MMMOO i IM VV MIU^I UI I • /~\i«3M) II 11 Ml 1 I I dll Ml I 

r\r\ r'rNno+n lr»+l/^r^ ir/^ 

Mil MMI lOli UMLIMI 1 I I IdlOl ICllO, ^UII 1 |J Maf^dOHI^O dl lU |JldOOUId I IddUO, 

r* r^K/^z^rK irz^z^ +z^ 

MMiiipidooui I luioc/fjuvv^i, di lu vcooci piiTdouicro anu LCiiijJdd" 

luico die oiiuwii wild I I ic?oci>iacii y lui uictiiiy. in duuiuuii, }jiuv^C 5 »i> iiuw 

uidyrduis LisUdlly show majOf compORGnts of control loops along with 

i\fc?y uiiiiutJb. 





Equipment in the Process 

Piping and instrument diagrams (P&IDs) may be the more appropri¬ 
ate type diagrams to show some of the above details as well as 
display the information for the piping designer and engineering staff. 
The P&IDs are to be used to describe the relationships between 
equipment and instrumentation as well as other relevant information 
that will enhance clarity. Computer software programs that do P&IDs 
or other diagrams useful to the information package may be used to 
help meet this requirement. 

The information pertaining to process equipment design must be 
documented. In other words, what codes and standards were relied 
on to establish good engineering practice? These codes and 
standards are published by such organizations as the American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, the American Petroleum Institute, 
American National Standards Institjjte, National Fire Prot^tion 
Association, American Society for Testing and Materials, The 
National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel inspectors. National 
Association of Corrosion Engineers, American Society of Exchange 
Manufacturers Association, and Model Building Code groups. 

For existing equipment designed and constructed many years ago in 
accordance with the codes and standards available at that time and 
no longer in general use today, the employer must document which 

cooes ana stanoaros were useo ana tnat tne aesign ana construction 
along with the testing, inspection, and operation are still suitable for 
the intended use. Where the process technology requires a design 
that departs from the applicable codes and standards, the employer 

iiiust document that the design and construction are suitable for the 
intended purpose. 

■>«>%■■« I I l« # A A 

c.iiipiuycc IIivuivc;iiic;iIt 

nr\A Alt* A/%+ A o + o + +l*%<^+ rvi 

ocuiiu! I OUM- LHC? v-/icai I rMi r\i \ ic?i iuh toi no oiaioo ii lai c;i i o 

•ryrr\ -frs ili mrvl/^\tKr\ir rr%rNrrir‘r\n+*5ti\//^r> rr\r^*^rr\ 

ai o lu Im'Uiiouii vviui iiioij ai iiioii i iiaii voo i^^ciiu" 

II oiiwilo hi cii ii i i uii li pi 

orx<3/-tQrriz=iri+ tr\rr\nr'^m onW KoTOrH oc‘C‘£ac»c‘m£ir^tc‘ Irxrx 

II lai ici^c;u lOi ii pivj^iciiii oi ivu noooooi i loi no. i 

QH/I nlorx roni iir/iio Qmrvlrw/cxrc tr\ train onH csHi matn thair amr\lnv/n£ic 

\J\J~T CllOW l-OpUll'CzO I ipiw jr O (igAllf CAI IViJ kl IX^II I ipiwy 

anri trv in-fnrm affcintoH ^mnln\/QQC rxf finHinnc from inniHont 

Ckl lO kW IlilWitil QAI IV>VzkWV.4 I I I piw jr W Wl VI IX.,/ MWIII i I IX^(V,4V.^ I IV 

in\/oetirfotlrxne rdniiiraH K\/ tho nrnnoce cafcat\/ mananomont nmnram 

IIIV\^v7VI^VALIXiyilv:7 IV.'Vn.JSKlIlWVi.* K/jr V1IV«> Vjr l l IMI I ilWIIV piV/^IVAIII. 

K^anv/ omnln\/£src i inrior th^^ir ovictinn oafotx/ anH health nrnnramc 

I V I UVI ijr SMrllipiWjrV,i>>iW) WImVI ’•J V«V< ISm* I I W VI I p I I VAl I I} 

alroarlw ha\/c» octahlichoH mathnrlQ tn koon omninx/ooc and thoir 


r 0 pr 0 C 0 ntgti\/ 0 s informed about relevant safety and health issues and 
may be able to adapt these practices a.nd procedui'es to meet their 
obligations under PSM. 


Employers who have not implemented an occupational safety and 
health program may wish to form a safety and health committee of 
employees and management representatives to help the employer 
meet the PSM obligations. Such a committee can be a significant 
ally in helping the employer implement and maintain an effective 
process safety management program for all employees. 

Process Hazard Analysis 

A process hazard analysis (PHA), or evaluation, is one of the most 
important elements of the process safety management program. A 
PHA is an organized and systematic effort to identify and analyze the 
significance of potential hazards associated with the processing or 
handling of highly hazardous chemicals. A PHA provides information 
that will assist employers and employees in making decisions for 
improving safety and reducing the consequences of unwanted or 
unplanned releases of hazardous chemicals. 

A PHA analyzes potential causes and consequences of fires, explo¬ 
sions, releases of toxic or flammable chemicals, and major spills of 
hazardous chemicals. The PHA focuses on equipment, instrumenta¬ 
tion, utilities, human actions (routine and nonroutine), and external 
factors that might affect the process. 

The selection of a PHA methodology or technique will be influenced 
by many factors including how much is known about the process. Is 
it a process that has been operated for a long period of time with little 
or no innovation and extensive experience has been generated with 
its use? Or, is it a new process or one that has been changed 
frequently by the inclusion of innovation features? Also, the size and 
complexity of the process will influence the decision as to the appro¬ 
priate PHA methodology to use. All PHA methodologies are subject 
to certain limitations. For example, the checklist methodology works 
well when the process is very stable and no changes are made, but it 
is not as effective when the process has undergone extensive 
change. The checklist may miss the most recent changes and 
consequently they would not be evaluated. Another limitation to be 
considered concerns the assumptions made by the team or analyst. 
The PHA is dependent on good judgement and the assumptions 
made during the study need to be documented and understood by 
the team and reviewer and kept for a future PHA. 

The team conducting the PHA needs to understand the methodology 
that is going to be used. A PHA team can vary in size from two 
people to a number of people with varied operational and technical 
backgrounds. Some team members may be part of the team for only 


a limited time. The team leader needs to be fully knowledgeable in 
the proper implementation of the PHA methodology to be used and 
should be impartial in the evaluation. The other full or part-time team 
members need to provide the team with expertise in areas such as 
process technology: process design; operating procedures and 
practices; alarms; emergency procedures; instrumentation; mainte¬ 
nance procedures, both routine and nonroutine tasks, including how 
the tasks are authorized; procurement of parts and supplies; safety 
and health; and any other relevant subjects. At least one team 
member must be familiar with the process. 

The ideal team will have an intimate knowledge of the standards, 
codes, specifications, and regulations applicable to the process 
being studied. The selected team members need to be compatible 
and the team leader needs to be able to manage the team and the 
PHA study. The team needs to be able to work together while 
benefiting from the expertise of others on the team or outside the 
team to resolve issues and to forge a consensus on the findings of 
the study and recommendations. 

The application of a PHA to a process may involve the use of 
different methodologies for various parts of the process. For ex¬ 
ample, a process involving a series of unit operations of varying 
sizes, complexities, and ages may use different methodologies and 
team members for each operation. Then the conclusions can be 
integrated into one final study and evaluation. 

A more specific example is the use of a PHA checklist for a standard 
boiler or heat exchanger and the use of a Hazard and Operability 
PHA for the overall process. Also, for batch-type processes like 
custom batch operations, a generic PHA of a representative batch 
may be used where there are only small changes of monomer or 
other ingredient ratio and the chemistry is documented for the full 
range and ratio of batch ingredients. Another process where the 
employer might consider using a generic type of PHA is a gas plant. 
Often these plants are simply moved from site to site, and therefore, 
a generic PHA may be used for these movable plants. Also, when 
an employer has several similar size gas plants and no sour gas is 
being processed at the site, a generic PHA is feasible as long as the 
variations of the individual sites are accounted for in the PHA. 

Finally, when an employer has a large continuous process with 
several control rooms for different portions of the process, such as 
for a distillation tower and a blending operation, the employer may 
wish to do each segment separately and then integrate the final 


Small businesses covered by this rule often will have processes that 
have less storage volume and less capacity and may be less compli- 

K^aiKsu if lai i |jiuuc7doc;o ai a laiyc; lauiiiiy. 

*T“t^»•/% /^OLJA 
I licioiwtc;, ir\ vvuuiu 

anticipate that the less complex methodologies would be used to 
meet the process hazard analysis criteria in the standard. These 
process hazard analyses can be done in less time and with fewer 
peopie being involved. A less complex process generally means that 
less data, P&lDs, and process information are needed to perform a 
process hazard analysis. 

Many small businesses have processes that are not unique, such as 
refrigerated warehouses or cold storage lockers or water treatment 
facilities. Where employer associations have a number of members 
with such facilities, a generic PHA, evolved from a checklist or what- 
if questions, could be developed and effectively used by employers 
to reflect their particular process; this would simplify compliance for 

When the employer has a number of processes that require a PHA, 
the employer must set up a priority system to determine which PHAs 
to conduct first. A preliminary hazard analysis may be useful in 

ooiLiM^ ^iiuiiifob lui iMc; pivjoooooo ii id.i it lo i iGo 11 m lou 

are subject to coverage by the process safety management stan¬ 
dard. Consideration should be given first to those processes with the 
potential of adversely affecting the largest number of employees. 

This priority setting also should consider the potential severity of a 
chemical release, the number of potentially affected employees, the 
operating history of the process, such as the frequency of chemical 
releases, the age of the process, and any other relevant factors. 
Together, these factors would suggest a ranking order using either a 
weighting factor system or a systematic ranking method. The use of 
a preliminary hazard analysis will assist an employer in determining 
which process should be of the highest priority for hazard analysis 
resulting in the greatest improvement in safety at the facility occur¬ 
ring first. 

W Q+^ r pn I ^/-i 

Detailed guidance on the content and application of process hazard 
analysis methodologies is available from the American Institute of 
Chemical Engineers’ Center for Chemical Process Safety, 345 E. 
47th Street, New York, New York 10017, (212) 705-7319. Also, see 
the discussion of various methods of process hazard analysis 

r'nntainQrl in tha AnnonHiv tr> thic ni ihlinatinn 

V/WI IVVAII iWV4 II I bl IW t bW/ bl I^CfK/IIVi^Mbl Wi i* 

Operating Procedures 

Operating procedures describe tasks to be performed, data to be 
recorded, operating conditions to be maintained, samples to be 


collected, and safety and health precautions to be taken. The 
nrocfidura.s need to be technicallv accurate, understandable to 

j_ _______ ___ — - . 

employees, and revised periodically to ensure that they reflect 
current operations. The process safety information package helps to 
ensure that the operating procedures and practices are consistent 
with the known hazards of the chemicals in the process and that the 
operating parameters are correct. Operating procedures should be 
reviewed by engineering staff and operating personnel to ensure 
their accuracy and that they provide practical instructions on how to 
actually carry out job duties safely. Also the employer must certify 
annually that the operating procedures are current and accurate. 

Operating procedures provide specific instructions or details on what 
steps are to be taken or followed in carrying out the stated proce¬ 
dures. The specific instructions should include the applicable safety 
precautions and appropriate information on safety implications. For 
example, the operating procedures addressing operating parameters 
will contain operating instructions about pressure limits, temperature 
ranges, flow rates, what to do when an upset condition occurs, what 
alarms and instruments are pertinent if an upset condition occurs, 
and other subjects. Another example of using operating instructions 
to properly implement operating procedures is in starting up or 
shutting down the process. In these cases, different parameters will 
be required from those of normal operation. These operating 
instructions need to clearly indicate the distinctions between startup 
and normal operations, such as the appropriate allowances for 
heating up a unit to reach the normal operating parameters. Also, 
the operating instructions need to describe the proper method for 
increasing the temperature of the unit until the normal operating 
temperatures are reached. 

Computerized process control systems add complexity to operating 
instructions. These operating instructions need to describe the logic 


OT irie soiiware as wen as [ne reiauonsnip oexween me equipmeru 
and the control system; otherwise, it may not be apparent to the 


Operating procedures and instructions are important for training 
operating personnel. The operating procedures are often viewed as 

ii ic; Diaiiuaiu ufjciaiiiiy |jiauuucc> iv^i upciauuiicd. ouiiiiui 

luui 11 pcyi dui li ic;i ai lu am oian, ii i ic;i ai, i loau lu i lava a luii 

I i %rr\r* \hir\rWr\re^ 

ui ivjai oiai luiii ly ui upoiaiiii^ piwoavjuioo. li vvuir\aio ai a i iwi iiuaiii iii 

Cnnlic'K ircic* f^riH inc*tri nrcirmr^iiiW in o 

I—I i^iioi I, LI lai i pi wwavjui ai ivji ii ioli uwiiwi lo i pi ^pai ii i a 

oannnH lonni ira/m/ii iinH/aro+nnH K\/ xA/nrU/iare* In 'arlHI+lnn nn/arofinn 

iw lai ui Kfy li vvwirs^io. iii a\yiviiLiWi wp^iaiiii^ 

nrnnorfi irae naari fn Ka nhcannaW LA/Kan thara le q nhanna In fha 

pi WV^ Vyvi7 I I^V^V.4 LW Wl lUI VV I I LI I ^ LA Wl ILAI I^Vy II I Li iV> 

nrnnooc Thn nnneani lannoc nf nnaratinn nrnnoHi ira nhssnnae noaH 


tr» ha fiill\/ a\/aliiataH anH tha infnrmatinn nnn\/a\/aH tn tha noronnnal 


Fnr AYamnIci rriAnhanir'al Ahannoc tr> tho nm^occ marlo h\/ tha 

...ffMflWy I I IWWI IWi Iiww* Wl iwi t^WW fcW 41 IW pi WWWWW I I IWWW *mfj 41 iw 

wy^4 w< 


maintenance department (like changing a valve from steel to brass 
or other subtle changes) need to be evaluated to determine whether 
operating procedures and practices also need to be changed. All 
management of change actions must be coordinated and integrated 
with current operating procedures, and operating personnel must be 
alerted to the changes in procedures before the change is made. 
When the process is shut down to make a change, then the operat¬ 
ing procedures must be updated before re-starting the process. 

Training must include instruction on how to handle upset conditions 
as well as what operating personnel are to do in emergencies such 
as pump seal failures or pipeline ruptures. Communication among 
operating personnel and workers within the process area performing 
nonroutine tasks also must be maintained. The hazards of the tasks 
are to be conveyed to operating personnel in accordance with 
established procedures and to those performing the actual tasks. 
When the work is completed, operating personnel should be in¬ 
formed to provide closure on the job. 

Employ66 Trsiniiiy 

All employees, including maintenance and contractor employees 

iiivuivt^u wiui Hiyiiiy iia^^aiuuu:) iiecu lu luiiy uiluctoiailu 

the safety and health hazards of the chemicals and processes they 

v¥wir\ vviiii ov^ II loy woi i u loiiuvv i ipi\^y 

and the citizens of nearby communities. Training conducted in 
compliance with the OSHA Hazard Communication standard {Title 

2Q nf Forloral Roniilatinnc Part 1010 1900^ will infnrrn 

em.ployees about the chem.icals they work with and familiarize them 
with reading and understanding MSDSs. However, additional 

traininn in .«;nhiflr:tc; siioh a?? nneratinn nrnraHiirp*? and work 

.C? —J -- p,. -- 

oractices. emeraencv evacuation and resoonse. safetv orocedures. 

I-»- ’if -V --- ----,---^ i- ----» 

routine and nonroutine work authorization activities, and other areas 
pertinent to process safety and health need to be covered by the 
emolover’s trainina orooram. 

In establishing their training programs, employers must clearly 
identify the employees to be trained, the subjects to be covered, and 
the goals and objectives they wish to achieve. The learning goals or 
objectives should be written in clear measurable terms before the 
training begins. These goals and objectives need to be tailored to 
each of the specific training modules or segments. Employers 
should describe the important actions and conditions under which 
the employee will demonstrate competence or knowledge as well as 
what is acceptable performance. 


Hands-on training, where employees actually apply lessons learned 
in simulated or real situations, will enhance learning. For example, 
ooeratino oersonnel. who will work in a control room or at control 
oanels. would benefit bv beina trained at a simulated control oanel. 

W I 

Upset conditions of various types could be displayed on the simula¬ 
tor, and then the employee could go through the proper operating 
procedures to bring the simulator pane! back to the normal operating 
parameters. A training environment could be created to help the 
trainee feel the full reality of the situation but under controlled 
conditions. This type of realistic training can be very effective in 
teaching employees correct procedures while allowing them also to 
see the consequences of what might happen if they do not follow 
established operating procedures. Other training techniques using 
videos or training also can be very effective for teaching other job 
tasks, duties, or imparting other important information. An effective 
training program will allow employees to fully participate in the 
training process and to practice their skills or knowledge. 

Employers need to evaluate periodically their training programs to 
see if the necessary skills, knowledge, and routines are being 
properly understood and implemented by their trained employees. 
The methods for evaluating the training should be developed along 
with the training program goals and objectives. Training program 
evaluation will help employers to determine the amount of training 
their employees understood and whether the desired results were 
obtained. If, after the evaluation, it appears that the trained employ¬ 
ees are not at the level of knowledge and skill that was expected, the 
employer should revise the training program, provide retraining, or 
provide more frequent refresher training sessions until the deficiency 
is resolved. Those who conducted the training and those who 

ro/^oi\/oH tho traininn alcn chniilH ho rnnciiltoH ac tn hnw hoct tn 


imnrnvo tho traininn nrnoocic; If thoro Iq a lanniiano harrior tho 

. .jj .. ^ •'-■••a—a'' . .. 

language known to the trainees should be used to reinforce the 
training messages and information. 

Careful consideration must be oiven to ensure that emolovees. 
includina maintenance and contract emolovees. receive current and 

w I y ' 

updated training. For example, if changes are made to a process, 
affected employees must be trained in the changes and understand 
the effects of the changes on their job tasks. Additionally, as already 
discussed, the evaluation of the employee’s absorption of training 
will certainly determine the need for further training. 



Employers who use contractors to perform work in and around 
processes that involve highly hazardous chemicals have to establish 
a screening process so that they hire and use only contractors who 
accomplish the desired job tasks without compromising the safety 
and health of any employees at a facility. For contractors whose 
safety performance on the job is not known to the hiring employer, 
the employer must obtain information on injury and illness rates and 
experience and should obtain contractor references. In addition, the 
employer must ensure that the contractor has the appropriate job 
skills, knowledge, and certifications (e.g., for pressure vessel weld¬ 
ers). Contractor work methods and experience should be evaluated. 
For example, does the contractor conducting demolition work swing 
loads over operating processes or does the contractor avoid such 

Maintaining a site injury and illness log for contractors is another 
method employers must use to track and maintain current knowledge 
of activities involving contract employees working on or adjacent to 
processes covered by PSfvi. injury and illness logs of both the 
employers employees and contract employees aiiow the employer to 
have full knowledge of process injury and illness experience. This 
log contains information useful to those auditing process safety 
management compliance and those involved In incident investiga¬ 

Contract employees must perform their work safely. Considering 

thot r>Qrfr\rm \/£^r\/ or^^r*!lallTcaW ranW rarv+on+foll\/ 

1.1 lUl WUI III OVLV./I O Oil 1V.4 I III 04.11 

ha'^iarWriMe tacLre eimh ae r»nnfin^H enar'o ontr\/ ar*ti\/itiQC qhH 

I I OXWI II 11 lO.'V 4 VI V « VAIIS<« 

nnnrnntino ronair artix/itioe thoir mi ict ho pnntrnlloH \A/hiio thov 


are on or near a process covered by PSM. A permit system or work 
authorization system for these activities is helpful for all affected 
employers. The use of a work authorization system keeps an 

employer informed of contract employee activities. Thus, the em¬ 
ployer has better coordination and more management control over 
the work beino oerformed in the orocess area. A well-run and well- 

W I I 

maintained orocess. where emolovee safetv is fully recoonized, 

I ' I ^ ^ ^ w * 

benefits all of those who work in the facility whether they are employ¬ 
ees of the employer or the contractor. 

Pre-Startup Safety Review 

For new processes, the employer will find a PHA helpful in improving 
the design and construction of the process from a reliability and 
quality point of view. The safe operation of the new process is 
enhanced by making use of the PHA recommendations before final 


rnctallatinnc aro 

IW bV« 4 l IMfci W I iw Ml M WM • 

PAIHc chniilH ho rnmnlotoH 

*... ... .......-- .... ....... j 


tho nnorat- 

VI IW Wf^WI w«v 

ing procedures put in place, and the operating staff trained to run the 
process, before startup. The initial startup procedures and normal 
operating procedures must be fully evaluated as part of the pre¬ 
startup review to ensure a safe transfer into the normal operating 

For existing processes that have been shutdown for turnaround or 
modification, the employer must ensure that any changes other than 
“replacement in kind” made to the process during shutdown go 
through the management of change procedures. P&IDs will need to 
be updated, as necessary, as well as operating procedures and 
instructions. If the changes made to the process during shutdown 
are significant and affect the training program, then operating 
personnel as well as employees engaged in routine and nonroutine 
work in the process area may need some refresher or additional 
training. Any incident investigation recommendations, compliance 
audits, or PHA recommendations need to be reviewed to see what 
affect they may have on the process before beginning the startup. 

Mechanical integrity of Equipment 

Employers must review their maintenance programs and schedules 
to see if there are areas where “breakdown” maintenance is used 
rather than the more preferable on-going mechanical integrity 

piuyiciin. cquipiiitti iL ubfcju iu pfuuwyb, biurt?, ui iiciiiuitJ iiiyniy 

hazardous chemicals has to be designed, constructed, installed, and 

mciiniciinBu lu ilui ihu 1 15r\ ui iOi buun ui i@ii iludiS. 1 1 ilS 

requires that a mechanical integrity program be in place to ensure 

II ^UIIIIIIU^U llll^^iliy piWOOOO I II. 

Pliamiante ni a m£i/^hQnir>' 5 l int/ 3 nrit\/ nronrom ir>r>li iHo iHontif\/in/-i anH 

I—.IWi I IV./I IVv7 Wi M I I IMMI IMI IIWMI lltLW^Illjr IIIWIWMW (W W I I VI > ^ J ■ ■ ^ MIIW* 

categorizing equipment and instrumentation, inspections and tests 

anH thair fronnannw maintonanra nmraHitrac traininn nf mainta- 

ViAl IW VllWfl liw^wwiiwy^ II I W.I I I V W I • V.VI IWW ^IWWWWWIWWf VI M.I I I I I 1^ W • II ■ Vi>VI I • V w 

na.nce personnel; criteria for acceptable test results; documentation 
of test and inspection results; and documentation of manufacturer 
mnommanriationfi for enuinmont and in.«;trtjmentation. 

Process Defenses 

The first line of defense an employer has is to operate and maintain 
the process as designed and to contain the chemicals. This is 
backed up by the second line of defense which is to control the 
release of chemicals through venting to scrubbers or flares, or to 
surge or overflow tanks designed to receive such chemicals. This 
also would include fixed fire protection systems like sprinklers, water 

r\r rlr^li nrio i-*i irnr* r^iL^QC» ricic*rlr'aim^/^/n 

o|jiciy, ui ucjluyc; oyotcjiiio, iiiwiitiwi ^ui lo, wirv^o, u^oi^i ic7v^ vuiciiiici^o 

systems, and other systems to control or mitigate hazardous chemi- 

i^ole nn^Q Qn tmu/antoH rolosca nr'r'iire 

\/l IV/Sm' V<l I V I ■ V* Wil • VV'V^ I N.^lV'ViOi.^S.^ V/WN^^l W* 

Writton PrnroHiir^Q 

«*ia%«w«a • ■ w w%r« ^ ■ ^iir%iir 

THa first stp»n nf an affantiva manhanirial intanritv nrnnram is tn 
nnmnile and oateoorize a list of nrocess eouioment and instrumenta- 

--I-— - -- ^ ~ - ---- I--1— I--- -*--- -—--- 

tion to include in the program. This list includes pressure vessels, 
storage tanks, process piping, relief and vent systems, fire protection 
svstem comoonents. emeraencv shutdown systems and alarms, and 

J I ' w ^ ^ 

interlocks and pumps. For the categorization of instrumentation and 
the listed equipment, the employer should set priorities for which 
pieces of equipment require closer scrutiny than others. 

Inspection and Testing 

The mean time to failure of various instrumentation and equipment 
parts would be known from the manufacturer’s data or the 
employer’s experience with the parts, which then influence inspec¬ 
tion and testing frequency and associated procedures. Also, appli¬ 
cable codes and standards—such as the National Board Inspection 
Code, or those from the American Society for Testing and Materials, 
American Petroleum institute. National Fire Protection Association, 
American National Standards institute, American Society of Me¬ 
chanical Engineers, and other groups—provide information to help 
establish an effective testing and inspection frequency, as well as 
appropriate methodologies. 

The applicable codes and standards provide criteria for external 

II Id^J^UllUI lO lUI OUUI I KOI i lO 0.0 l\JUI lUOllUI I Oi lU OU|J|.^UI lO^ Ol lUI IWI 

r\r /^i ix/ rc* rMr%Q 

V^UliUiCLO UI Ol^^l OU}^|JUllO, ^uy VVII^O, l lU^^lOO OMU opi II ir\lUI O, 

/>rxofin/^o onH ir»oi 

1 lOi Oy UUI lull 1^ UUI II lUUliUI lO, pi UlUUll VU UUOLII 1^0 Ol lU 11 lOUIOLIUI ly 

and external metal surfaces of piping and vessels. These codes and 

ctanrlarrlc alor\ nrnv/irlo infnrmatinn nn mothn/Hnlnnioc fnr intornal 

«^LOI iV,.<Oi VIW II ii W I I I I V>'i • V/ii I I i-s-^Vi iwawiwy iww »wi iiiwiiiViAi 

inspection and a frequency formula based on the corrosion rate of 
the materials of construction. .Also, i.nternal and e.xterna! erosion 
must be considered along with corrosion effects for piping and 
vfllvpc; Whpirfl thft cnrrn.«;inn ratp i.c; not known, e maximum insoec- 

tion frpouencv is recommended (methods of develooino the corro- 

-.... 1 _— —.. . _ -- _ ^ 

sion rate are available in the codes). Internal inspections need to 
cover items such as the vessel shell, bottom and head; metallic 
linings; nonmetallic linings; thickness measurements for vessels and 
piping; inspection for erosion, corrosion, cracking and bulges; 
internal equipment like trays, baffles, sensors and screens for 
erosion, corrosion or cracking and other deficiencies. Some of these 


inspections may be performed by state or local government inspec¬ 
tors under state and local statutes. However, each employer must 
develop procedures to ensure that tests and inspections are con¬ 
ducted properly and that consistency is maintained even where 
different employees may be involved. Appropriate training must be 
provided to maintenance personnel to ensure that they understand 
the preventive maintenance program procedures, safe practices, and 
the proper use and application of special equipment or unique tools 
that may be required. This training is part of the overall training 
program called for in the standard. 

Quality Assurance 

A quality assurance system helps ensure the use of proper materials 
of construction, the proper fabrication and inspection procedures, 
and appropriate installation procedures that recognize field installa¬ 
tion concerns. The quality assurance program is an essential part of 
the mechanicai integrity program and wiii help maintain the primary 
and secondary lines of defense designed into the process to prevent 
unwanted chemical releases or to control or mitigate a release. “As 
built” drawings, together with certifications of coded vessels and 
other equipment and materials of construction, miust be verified and 
retained in the quality assurance documentation. 

Equipment installation jobs need to be properly inspected in the field 
for use of proper materials and procedures and to ensure that 
qualified craft workers do the job. The use of appropriate gaskets, 
packing, bolts, valves, lubricants and welding rods needs to be 

vorifiorl in fho fiolH Alcn nrnnorli iroc fnr inctallinn cafcit\/ rlo\/inoo 

V V./1 i I is^VhI 111 li i\«/ ii>^i\.4. ^1 Vi^O iv«ii li tO li I 1^ %.7<^iv^i.jr \.<iv^vivxwO 

nood tn ho \/orifipH ci irh ac tho tnrniio on tho hnitc nn riintnro Hicn 
inctallatinni; imjfnrm tnrniio nn flanno hnltQ and nrnnor incitallatinn nf 

I I 1V V liwy VIIIIWIIII V*l l WI»V) ^^1 'V P^IV^VI fiiv hMI I VII VI 

pump seals. If the quality of parts is a problem, it may be appropri¬ 
ate for the employer to conduct audits of the equipment supplier’s 
facilities to better ensure orooer ourchases of reauired eouioment 

suitable for intended service. Anv chanoes in eouioment that mav 

-- - _ -- - — _____ __ _ .. — 

become necessary will need to be reviewed for management of 
chanae orocedures. 

Nonroutine Work Authorizations 

Nonroutine work conducted in process areas must be controlled by 
the employer in a consistent manner. The hazards identified involv¬ 
ing the work to be accomplished must be communicated to those 
doing the work and to those operating personnel whose work could 
affect the safety of the process. A work authorization notice or 
permit must follow a procedure that describes the steps the mainte- 


nance supervisor; contractor representative, or other person needs 
to follow to obtain the necessary clearance to start the job. The work 
authorization orocedures must reference and coordinate, as aoDli- 

I * I I 

cable, lockout/tagout procedures, line breaking procedures, confined 
space entry procedures, and hot work authorizations. This proce¬ 
dure also must provide clear steps to follow once the job is com¬ 
pleted to provide closure for those that need to know the job is now 
completed and that equipment can be returned to normal. 

Managing Change 

To properly manage changes to process chemicals, technology, 
equipment and facilities, one must define what is meant by change. 
In the process safety management standard, change includes all 

moaiTications to equipment, proceoures, raw materials, ano process¬ 
ing conditions other than “replacement in kind.” These changes 
must be properly managed by identifying and reviewing them prior to 
implementing them. For example, the operating procedures contain 

\irr\ 'rr\}r\nr\e^ 

LI 1 C upciaiiiiy paiaiMcicid ^{jicoouic iiinuo, iciii}jci aiuic laii^co, iiwvv 

rates, etc.) and the importance of operating within these limits. While 

+h^ mi let ha\/n fhz:i flnviKilit\/ +r\ mQin+ain eofo r\r\oratir\n 

il QilVi/l MlUOi IIUV^ kl I IW I I ICail ItUiil I OUIW ULiWI I 

within the established parameters, any operation outside of these 
parameters requires review and approval by a written management 
of change procedure. Management of change also covers changes 
in process technology and changes to equipment and instrumenta¬ 
tion. Changes in process technology can result from changes in 
production rates, raw materials, experimentation, equipment unavail¬ 
ability, new equipment, new product development, change in cata¬ 
lysts, and changes in operating conditions to improve yield or quality. 
Equipment changes can be in materials of construction, equipment 
specifications, piping pre-arrangements, experimental equipment, 
computer program revisions, and alarms and interlocks. Employers 
must establish means and methods to detect both technical and 
mechanical changes. 

Temporary changes have caused a number of catastrophes over the 
years, and employers must establish ways to detect both temporary, 
and permanent changes. It is important that a time limit for temporary 
changes be established and monitored since otherwise, without 
control, these changes may tend to become permanent. Temporary 
changes are subject to the management of change provisions. In 
addition, the management of change procedures are used to ensure 

+ i r\r 

Li lai LI ic; I loi iL ai lu pi u^c:;uui oo aic; ic;lumiou lu Liic;ii wii^iiiai ui 

designed conditions at the end of the temporary change. Proper 

imontati/^n anri m\/i£i\A/ nf thoco r^hanncio Jnx/csli iqKIo in 

WV/V>V^I I IWI li.Ci.LIV/1 I i\jt IV^^VIWW Wl lUI ^ II i V III 

ensuring that safety and health considerations are incorporated into 


operating procedures and processes. Employers may wish to 
develop a form or clearance sheet to facilitate the processing of 
changes through the management of change procedures. A typical 
change form may include a description and the purpose of the 
change, the technical basis for the change, safety and health consid¬ 
erations, documentation of changes for the operating procedures, 
maintenance procedures, inspection and testing, P&IDs, electrical 
classification, training and communications, pre-startup inspection, 
duration (if a temporary change), approvals, and authorization. 

Where the iiiipact of the change is minor and well understood, a 
check list reviewed by an authorized person, with proper communi- 

uauuH Lu uuicio wiiu aic? aiicuicu, 

oaiiipio lov^uooi lui 
pi UUOVJUl o.y 

Ul 10.1 1^0 lUi II 1 

Midy ouiiiot?. (occ; riyuid lur d 

♦ ^\y^ ^\y*\lr^^i li I y^i iiWir^y^ + 1 - 1 !/^ 

u loi uoi I uc? i loipiui 111 yululi ly ii ii;d 

Pr>r a mnr£i r'nmnlciv nr einnifi^ont Hcioiyin hr>\A#Q\/Qr a hoTorrl 

1 V/l U I I ivyi ^ WWI ll|...lV^r\ Wl ^1^1 III IV..UI IL W^OI^I I OIIUII^^, IIWVV^VWI, GL I lUA-Cil \J 

o\/aliiatinn nrn^oHiiro w/ith annrn\/alc h\/ nnoratinnc maintonanr'Q 

W V I WWWWI>4I W fVIbll W V 1.41 wjr 1 <^LI W I lO ^ I I I Ul I I VVy I i Ui I Vi/j 

and safety departments may be appropriate. Changes in documents 
such as P&IDs, raw materials, operating procedures, mechanical 

intenritv nrnnrams. and plartrioal rlaaaifiratinn.Q ahniilH hp nntpH an 

.. ..wg. ..y p,. W.. . . —, ---- ----- ww 

that these revisions can be made pe.rmanent when the drawings and 
procedure manuals are updated. Copies of process changes must 
be keot in an accessible location to ensure that desion chanoes are 
available to operating personnel as well as to PHA team members 
when a PHA is being prepared or being updated. 

Incident investigation 

Incident investigation is the process of identifying the underlying 
causes of incidents and implementing steps to prevent similar events 
from occurring. The intent of an incident investigation is for employ¬ 
ers to learn from past experiences and thus avoid repeating past 
mistakes. The incidents OSHA expects employers to recognize and 
to investigate are the types of events that resulted in or could rea¬ 
sonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. These events are 
sometimes referred to as “near misses,” meaning that a serious 
consequence did not occur, but could have. (See Figure 3 for 
sample incident investigation report form.) 

tmpioyers must oeveiop in-nouse capaoiiity to investigate mcioents 
that occur in their facilities. A team should be assembled by the 


ernpiuyer anu ira'iiea in me lecnniques oi invesiigaiion inciuomg now 
to conduct interviews of witnesses, assemble needed documenta¬ 
tion, and write reports. 

A iiiulti-discipiinary team is better able to 

gather the facts of the event and to analyze them and develop 

piauDiuic ou^iianuo ao ikj vviiai iiaypciicu, emu vviiy. 

1 ^Cll i I 11 lOi I lU^l O 


> rTiM^lriid' 

Infomiation about the ChanBe: 


Date of Origination 

Proposed Date of Change 


a Permanent o Temporary From 


Descriotion and Location of Chanoe fScooe) 

Ttv^nirval Qaeie fnr 

ICV^tUllWCU Wgjtj IVA W(>CU<^D 

Nature of the Change: 

Change affects; 

□ Safety □ 

Loss Prevention 


Type of Change: 

a Alarm d 

Shutdown Point 


u ripiiiy niuuiiiudijufi u 



D Job Procedure Q 



□ Other 

Environment □ Health 

Addition or Removal of Equipment 
Pro(^33 CciTipufsr Control 
Equipment/Material Modification 


Applicable NA 

Chaekllste ^ 

Ini^S \ ■’ 

































Consiit piping and equipment specfi^Jons. 

Perform reactive chemicals testing. □ In process? 

Add involved maiehais to Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) inventory. 
Cateilata impact on F&Ei and CEi. 

Complf «ritti Engineering Practices. 

Con^ with Technology Center guidelines. 

Comply vifitt) Dow Enyironmental Protecdon Guideline for Qper^ons. 
Comply with Safety ani Loss Prevention requirements. 

Consult mantenaritslname)_ 

Consult inswmentand efearical technician (name)_ 

Consult parts' technician (name)_ 

Evaluate and modify relief ^stem (name)_ 

Consult Industrial Hy^'ene (name)_ 

Consult Process En^eering (name)_ 

Complete required reviews (name reviews)_ 

Other_~ ■ _ 

PostmodHication Checklist (Before Startup): 






_Pprfnfmad nfP<aartirn audit 



Completed or updated training program. 



Wrote and obtained approval tor job procedures. 



llnriatpd PRID."; nrorp^i; flow ?hAPt$ and pint plane 



Trained personnel on the change. 



Updated cntical instrument checklist. 


□!Q6(3 Gornoutsf cods snd doojmsntstiQn. 

Approvals: Name Date 

Originator _ 

First Reviewer _ 

Department Head/Superintendent _ 

CotporaW S/LP/S 

• iwc. 

Reprinted with permission of Dow Chemical U$A, 
2020 Dow Center. Midland, Mi 48762. 

Figure 2 

National Safety Council 







. LOCATION (if different from mailing address)_ 


3. SEX 

4 AGE 




□ RegiMar, fulPttme □ Temoorary □ Nonemoioyee 

□ Regular, part-time □ Seasonal 



D Less man i mo. G 6 mo$. to S yrs. G Less man 1 mo. G 6 mos. to 5 yrs 

□ 1-5 mos C More than 5 yrs. □ 1-5 mos. D More than 5 yrs 







AM □ Fatality 

■ ——— □ Lost workdays—days away from work 

_ D Lost workdays—days of restncied activity 

B. Time within shift 

‘ - G Medical treatment 

ot $mn D First aK) 

^ □ Other, soecily_ 

During rest penod C Entenng or leaving plant 
During meaf period □ Performing work duties 

U Woddng ovemmt. G Other, 

21. ACCIDENT SEQUENCE. Describe in reverse order of occurrence events preceding the injury and accident. Starting 
with the injury and moving backwanf in time, reconstrita the sequence ot events that led to the injury. 

A. Injury Event . .. _ _ .. 

B. /tecident Event_ . . 

C. Prweding Event #1 _ 

0. Preceding Event #2. #3, etc _ . 

Figure 3 




A. General type of task_ 


B. Specific acpvify 

C. cffipjOim ws working: 

n Aicne With crsw cr fsHcw wcrksf O Cttfw sj^cify 

3 Directly superveed □ N« supensed 
□ Indirectly supervised □ Supervisian not feasiHe 

2S. CAUSAL FACTORS. Events and conditions tnat contributed to the accident include tnose 
identiiied by use oi tne Guide tor Idenotyino causal Factors and Corrective Actions 

€ % 

26. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. TTiose tnat nave oeen. or will be. taken to prevent recurrenctr include those 
indcntiSed by use of tbe Guide for loemifying Causal Factors and Corrective Acuons. 









Heprinted with permissiQn frvm ihs NsUonst 



Safety Council. 1121 Spnng Lake Diive. 
iiasca. iL SG14S-32G1 



Figure 3 (Continued) 

should be selected on the basis of their training, knowledge, and 
ability to contribute to a team effort to fully investigate the incident. 

Employees in the process area where the incident occurred should 
be consulted, interviewed or made a member of the team. Their 
knowledge of the events represents a significant set of facts about 
the incident that occurred. The report, its findings, and recommen¬ 
dations should be shared with those who can benefit from the 
information. The cooperation of employees is essential to an effec¬ 
tive incident investigation. The focus of the investigation should be 
to obtain facts and not to place blame. The team and the investiga¬ 
tive process should clearly deal with all involved individuals in a fair, 
open, and consistent manner. 

Emergency Preparedness 

Each employer must address what actions employees are to take 

when there is an unwanted release of highly hazardous chemicals. 
Emergency preparedness is the employer’s third line of defense that 
will be relied on along with the second line of defense, which is to 


preparedness will take place when the first line of defense to operate 
and maintain the process and contain the chemicals fails to stop the 
release. In preparing for an emergency chemical release, employers 

will need to decide the following: 

• Whether they want employees to handle and stop small or minor 
incidental releases; 

• Whether they wish to mobilize the available resources at the plant 
and have them brought to bear on a more significant release; 

• Whether employers want their employees to evacuate the danger 
area and promptly escape to a preplanned safe zone area, and 
then allow the local community emergency response organizations 
to handle the release; or 

• Whether the employer wants to use some combination of these 

Fmninworc will noaH tn ctslart hnvA/ man\/ Hifforont omornonrs/ nro- 

paredness or third lines of defense they plan to have, develop the 
necessary emergency plans and procedures, appropriately train 
employees in their emergency duties and responsibilities, and then 

inipidltCUL U lilies Ul 


Employers, at a minimum, must have an emergency action plan that 
will facilitate the prompt evacuation of employees when there is an 
unwantfid release of a hiohlv hazardous chemical. This means that 

the emolover’s oian will be activated bv an alarm svstem to alert 
employees when to evacuate, and that employees who are physi¬ 
cally impaired will have the necessary support and assistance to get 
them to a safe zone. The intent of these requirements is to alert and 
move employees quickly to a safe zone. Delaying alarms or confus¬ 
ing alarms are to be avoided. The use of process control centers or 
buildings as safe areas is discouraged. Recent catastrophes indi¬ 
cate that lives are lost in these structures because of their location 
and because they are not necessarily designed to withstand over¬ 
pressures from shock waves resulting from explosions in the process 

When there are unwanted incidental releases of highly hazardous 
chemicals in the process area, the employer must inform employees 
of the actions/procedures to take. If the employer wants employees 
to evacuate the area, then the emergency action plan will be acti¬ 
vated. For outdoor processes, where wind direction is important for 
selecting the safe route to a refuge area, the empioyers shouid place 
a wind direction indicator, such as a wind sock or pennant, at the 
highest point visible throughout the process area. Employees can 
move upwind of the release to gain safe access to a refuge area by 
knowing the wind direction. 

If the employer wants specific employees in the release area to 
control or stop the minor emergency or incidental release, these 

Krt rils 

0 0+ 


- rni *ct 

o H luol III civj 


WO Cll fW \Jl wwow 

I trc 

ul ^ 


l^ow oi iw 

\nnr\\Qm^nfQA UIpn/HIlnn Inr'IHpntpl ir>ir minr»r pmpmonr»icsQ in 

III I ^lO I 1 iOi ILO w > I II iVii«iv«40i iLcli iwiodoOo iwi iiiiiiwi Oi i lOi iwioo hi 

the process area must include pre-planning, providing appropriate 

oni linmont fnr thd ha-7arHc and rnnHi ir'tinn traininn fnr thnco omninu- 

IWI bllV./ II Vi« W y I ^ WW blUMIIII^ IWI 

ees who will pe.dorm the emergency work before they respond to 

handip an artiial rfllpa.c;p, Tha amnlnvar’a traininn nrnnram- inr:lud- 

ing the Hazard Communication standard training, is to address, 
identify, and meet the training needs for employees who are ex- 
oected to handle incidental or minor releases. 

Preplanning for more serious releases is an important element in the 
employer’s line of defense. When a serious release of a highly 
hazardous chemical occurs, the employer, through preplanning, will 
have determined in advance what actions employees are to take. 
The evacuation of the immediate release area and other areas, as 
necessary, would be accomplished under the emergency action 
plan. If the employer wishes to use plant personnel—such as a fire 
brigade, spill control team, a hazardous materials team—or employ¬ 
ees to render aid to those in the immediate release area and to 
control or mitigate the incident, refer to OSHA’s Hazardous Waste 

OpGrations and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) standard (Title 
29 CFR Part 1910.120). If outside assistance is necessa.'y, suc.h as 

thrniinh mutual aid anroamontc hatwocm amnlnv/Arc and Inral 

Vilivw^ll IIIWI* fciAl Wi W I I I V./ i • VW • V« IW WKiAl 

nri\/ornmont omornonm/ rAcnnnco nrnaniTatinnc thoco £imarnQnA\/ 

^WVSyllllliWIIb WIIIWI^WI I t tKJSm* bllVi^WV>i> VirrlllWI^Vi^i t\^y 

raenonricire ^Icri K\/ UiA^XA/^^PPD XHq c^afcitx/ 'anH hciral+K 

i IVi4V/l ^ uiow WV./ V w j 1 l/~\^ VVWt i.ll« lll^ ly di IW I 1^:7 Ql II i 

rM'/^+z:ir»tir\n rcir<iiJrciH -frvr r^r*rM^r^Wj!^r«> io r^ac^rnr^rkr^iKili-fx/ r\4^ 

1^1 wi^OLivyi I i^v^uiic^vj iwi C7II i^i ^^1 i\^y t ^opvji ivj^i o JO 11 iC7 i ^opwi loiuiiiiy VJl 

4-k rvi r^l /^\A rxf nrt ^ *• 

li iT 7 ii ^11 i|jiwyc;i o ai lu ut u lu ui I'ouci ic it luiuoi u v^ui i it iiai luoi. 

RGSpondGfs may ug working undGr vary hazardous conditions; 
tharGforG, thG objGCtivG is to havG tham competantiy iGd by an on- 
scene incident commander and the commanders staff, properiy 

equippeo lo oo ineir assigneo worK sareiy, ana ruiiy irainea lo carry 
out their duties safely before they respond to an emergency. Drills, 
training exercises, or simulations with the local community emer¬ 
gency response planners and responder organizations is one means 
to obtain better preparedness. This close cooperation and coordina¬ 
tion between plant and local community emergency preparedness 
managers also will aid the employer in complying with the Environ¬ 
mental Protection Agency’s Risk Management Plan criteria.'* 

An effective way for medium to large facilities to enhance coordina¬ 
tion and communication during emergencies within the plant and with 
local community organizations is by establishing and equipping an 
emergency control center. The emergency control center should be 
located in a safe zone so that it could be occupied throughout the 
duration of an emergency. The center should serve as the major 
communications link between the on-scene incident commander and 
plant or corporate management as well as with local community 
officials. The communications equipment in the e.mergency control 

center should include a network to .'"eceive and transmit informatio.n 

h\/tAipnhnnp rarlin nr nthpr mpanc It ic imnnrtant tn hp\/p p hanln in 

J < «««%<■ 'Wj V' VVtIW* 111%^ IW« fV IW * b W I V bA ^ 

rommi ininptinnc nptu/nrU in naco nf nnw/or faili irp nr if nnp nni-nmnni. 

wwiliiliwi II Vi/b^bl S./ Ilb^ IIN^bVTWII'V III WbAW Vi/ \./l ^V^VVWI IVAIIViilV^ V/l II S/lIVi/ WVa/1 I I 1 I I Vi< I M 

natlnn moanc failc "Tha oontor plen chr»i ilrl ]r\ci Qrtnlrxncirl \A/lth 

V./VAklV./l I IIIV./U4IIWI iVAIIV,^* IIIV^ Vi/V^ tlbV^I QiOV./ OllV^ViJlV^ ki/Vi/ Willi Llt^ 

r^l^nt l'3\/nMt* r'nmmi init\/ morvo* i itill+v/ innli 

piai IL iClJV./UL, WVi/l I II IIUI Mljr IIIO^O, Ollllliy VUIClWltt^O) lllOlU^lIf^ VVCIIOI IWI 

^\re\ mmrw *•! 

liic cAiii i^uioi ill 1 ^, 17111^1 iwy ci}.^pi vjpi lai^ i oi luc; 

<“*! rm rv%11/^+ i/i^/-b 

aio ouwi I ao a ^uvci i ii i loi ii iwy i iwiiiiv^aiiwi \ uui i i|jai ly \jx:^\^ui i~ 

ir\ I ... 11 A I I A T".+1... Ill ........ ^ ..+.. .. .. A I... ^^.....aI ^ ..f..+« . A ... ^ n A U. A A ^ A 

I ici [ji lui 1C iipi, o/nnr\ i me iii lepui is di lu iiidiciidi sdiciy udid t>i iccib, 

emergency plans and procedures manual; a listing with the location 
of emergency response equipment and mutual aid information; and 
access to meteorological data and any dispersion modeling data. 

'EPA is required by the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 to develop regulations that 
will require companies to make available to the public information on the way the 
companies manage Jhe risks of the chemicals they handle. These regulations will be 
developed in 1992. The OSHA PSM standard, which meets similar Clean Air 
Amendment requirements and the forthcoming EPA ruies, will apply only to specified 

Irt J^l lr^OLJA + ta/ill /b/'ll*» + I 

v/t 1711 iiuaio 111 iioi 7 u v^uai iiiuco. Nwwr ai lu u-r r*v o iidid win i lui i icucoocii ny uc luei iiiudi. 

Compliance Audits 

An audit is a technique used to gather sufficient facts and informa¬ 
tion, including statistical information, to verify compliance with 
standards. Employers must select a trained individual or assemble a 
trained team to audit the process safety management system and 
oroaram. A small orocess or olant mav need onlv one knowledae- 

I" '*-/' “• I ^ w 

able oerson to conduct an audit. The audit includes an evaluation of 

the design and effectiveness of the process safety management 
system and a field inspection of the safety and health conditions and 
practices to verify that the em.ployer’s systems are effectively imple- 

montoH The ai iHit chniilH ho onnHiiotoH nr lort hv n norenn knnwl- 

I f IW I I kW W • I I IW I V WW I «W Wi W VS^ W IWSta ^ J IXIIWWI 

oHnoohlo in ai iHit tonhniniioc \A/hn ie imr\artial tnwarHc tho fanilitv/ nr 

ViTUK/IV/ 111 VAI><<S4I W kW Wi V«IIW l«kJ III t ^IMI tW VV Ul WIW hi IW i j W f 

K^ilnrt -ai rvf on oi iHit nrnnrcim 

Cll ^Cl won 1^ dUWIIlOW. I I lO OOOOI ILlCll OIOI i lot no Wl C4.1 I UWWn 1^1 Vk/^I C4I I 1 

Imnli iHn nlrannin/-i nnnWi mflnr^ oi iHif m/oliiotinn KoTorHo 

it luiuuo pidi II Hi 1 ^, ocaiiiii^, oui iuuwlii i^ ii to ouuil, ovaiuaiiii^ iici^.ciiwo 

ai lu uoi luici iooo ai lu iar\ii wuiic/ouvc auiiuii, jjoi lui 11 iii a luiiuw-up 

and documenting actions taken. 


Planning is essential to the success of the auditing process. During 
planning, auditors should select a sufficient number of processes to 
give a high degree of confidence that the audit reflects the overall 
level of compliance with the standard. Each employer must establish 
the format, staffing, scheduling, and verification methods before 
conducting the audit. The format should be designed to provide the 
lead auditor with a procedure or checklist that details the require¬ 
ments of each section of the standard. The names of the audit team 
members should be listed as part of the format as well. The check¬ 
list, if properly designed, could serve as the verification sheet that 
provides the auditor with the necessary information to expedite the 
review of the program and ensure that all requirements of the 
standard are met. This verification sheet format could also identify 
those elements that will require an evaluation or a response to 
correct deficiencies. This sheet also could be used for developing 
the follow-up and documentation requirements. 


The selection of effective audit team m.em.bers is critical to the 
success of the program. Tea.m members should be chosen for t.heir 

OYnarionro knnxA/lArlnp anH traininn anH QhniilH hp familiar with thp 

W^^WIIV/IIWV/y ^ H • I » • 1^ • ... w w • hf • fc • • w 

nroAPcoAc anH ai iHitinn tophnini loc nraptippc anH nroporii irpc Thp 

WWWWWWW (.AI IV4 (UWVIIlil 1^ &WWI II 11I.J V.,/W y ^1 (..AWIIWV/Wy Ul lVi« WW* I I 

r»l tHci \a/I!I \/on/ rIan/an/Hinn nn tho oi *70 canH nnmr^Iovitx/ nf 

OI4.W Wl ll IW iWUI i I will VUijr WW^WI IWII Wl I II IW ^l^w Ml IVI V/N/l I l|>-^IVr/\ibjr V/* 

ir\rr\r^£soo i /'/^n€?iHorotir\n o lorno r'omr^lov hinhh/ 


1 Uil IViWi WWI lOiVI^I ClllWI !• 

Wi n ICAI^V^y WWIII^iW/\y I ll^i Ii j 

if r»-»o\/ h/^ trv t^Ti-rarri \A/ith 

ii iOLi ui I lOi now picii ll, ll iiiay wo uooiiciwio iw iiavo loaiii iiioiiiwoio wii^ii 
OApoi u^o ill piuwooo oi lyii lool li ly ai lu uooi^ii, piwuooo Wl loi I noil y , 

KlbU Ui I lOMLdUUM Cti lU WUili|JUL 01 WUliUUIO, OlOWLf IWdl lia^aiUO Cll lU 




classifications; safaty and health disciplines; maintenance; emer- 

npnnv nrpnprpHnp*?*;' wprphni i<;inn nr Qhinninn- anri nrnnp*;*; Qafptx/ 

WV-. .WWW, .. W.. W. .WW.W.. w. w« . .p. ^ p^.wwwww w^.wvj 

^inrlitinn Thp tppm mpv iiqp nprt-timp mpmhprQ tn nrnwirlp thp 

Wil i liW I. W V^l • ■ I • WSi/ !«'«..«« b bllS.' 

ovnorticp rpniiirpH anH tn nnmnaro \A/hat ic antiiallx/ Hnno nr fnlln\*/Q/H 

LIWW I W V.f W4 I I V/V4 tV/ WWIIi^VAlV/ fWItVAL IW U4WLUIU4lljr V4V/ilW V# I 1 V./11W V V O V»l 

\A/ifh th^ \A/ritton PQ^^ r^rr^nram 

YVIVII LI tw ¥VIILL\..«il I WIVI W ^1 Ul I I • 

i/%4in4^ Aiirli4 

wwi iviuwiii muviii 


rvi I 

ciicuiivc auuii II iuiuu« 3 a a icvicw ui me icicvaiii uueuiiici iictuuii 

and process safety information, inspection of the physical facilities, 
and interviews with all levels of plant personnel. Utilizing the audit 
procedure and checklist developed in the preplanning stage, the 

audit team can systematically analyze compliance with the provi¬ 
sions of the standard and any other corporate policies that are 
relevant. For example, the audit team will review ail aspects of the 
training program as part of the overall audit. The team will review 
the written training program for adequacy of content, frequency of 
training, effectiveness of training in terms of its goals and objectives 
as well as to how it fits into meeting the standard’s requirements. 
Through interviews, the team can determine employees’ knowledge 
and awareness of the safety procedures, duties, rules, and emer¬ 
gency response assignments. During the inspection, the team can 
observe actual practices such as safety and health policies, proce¬ 
dures, and work authorization practices. This approach enables the 
team to identify deficiencies and determine where corrective actions 
or improvements are necessary. 

Evaluation and Corrective Action 

The audit team, throuoh its svstematic anaivsis, should document 
areas that require corrective action as well as where the process 
safety ma.nagement system is effective. This provides a record of 

thA audit nrnnpdiirPA and findinnQ and Qpn/pc ac a hacpiinp nf 

• w 1 >I% w w.«. piT.wwwww.ww iw ••••willow * V* W» » W VAU» V% V * 

nnpratinn data fnr fiitiirp aiiditc It \A/ilI accict in dotarmlninn nhannoc 

W ^ W I V 4 . Wl V • • V«U« VVA I V/ • I V« VV« I U 4 W WllkAiJ* Will VA^WI W V III V.* V^bWIIIIIIIIll^ \yl I VAI 1 ^ 

nr trondc in fi iti iro ai idite 


rr*£i/^+l\//::i Oi^+i/^rt io fh/ri rr^z-vof imrM^r+or-»+ r-N^r+r* tKri oi iHit •nr-iH 

V.y Wl I V ^ aWLlWI I lO Wl IW Wf LI IIIWOL IllipWILdill l^dl lO Wl II Id dUWIi dl IW 

II iwiuwdo ludiiiiiyiii^ udMwidi iwido, diiw fjidiiiiiii^, iwiiwvvii i^’up, ai lu 
wuwui I idi iiii ly II Id wwi I dWLiwi ici. I I Id uui i duuvd duuui 1 ULid:^;:) i lui i i iciiiy 

udyins With a managGiTient rGviGw of ths audit findings. Th© purposG 
of this rsviGW IS to detorminG what actions ar© appropriate, and to 
establish priorities, timetables, resource allocations and require¬ 

ments, and responsibilities, in some cases, corrective action may 
involve a simple change in procedures or a minor maintenance effort 
to remedy the problem. Management of change procedures need to 
be used, as appropriate, even for a seemingly minor change. Many 
of the deficiencies can be acted on promptly, while some may 


require engineering studies or more detailed review of actual proce¬ 
dures and practices. There may be instances where no action is 
necessary; this is a valid response to an audit finding. All actions 
taken, including an explanation when no action is taken on a finding, 
need to be documented. 

The employer must assure that each deficiency identified is ad¬ 
dressed, the corrective action to be taken is noted, and the respon¬ 
sible audit person or team is properly documented. To control the 
corrective action process, the employer should consider t.he use of a 

trarlfinn cuctom Thic trarkinn cwctom minht inrliiHo norinHir ctati ic 

VI WWI Mli^ wjwvwill* • IllViy VI VAV./I I W j W VW III llll^ltv IIIWIWAV^S.' ^WIIWWIIWW VVA vw* w 

ronnrtc charoH \A/ith affor'toH lov/olc nf manonomont rcsnnrtc 


Cl i/^h oc nf on onninonrinn cti irl\/ onH o finol Imnlomonto- 

OUW/I I I LIWI 1 Wl Ul I ^ I i^ll 11 1^ OLUW Jf y QXt IVU Ci MItCil llll|N/IV>ifl^l liU. 

+inn tn nlnciirzri frM* +Ko+ 


+ ^^ I I i-* rv^'"I ^ vn/i+K 

u II uuyi I 11 lai la^oi i loi u vji ui lai i^c, ii afjpi ujji laio, anu ii ic;m oi lai cu vvui i 

rv% i>N I « y ^ rv^ ^ rv>% I t ^ I ^ />%+ rv^ 

dit^wit^u ciiipiuyctro anu inai layci^iilai ii. i i it^ ly>>■ ciur\ii ly ::>yc>Lc;iii 

provid©s thiG GmpioyGr with tuG status of tnG conGCiivG action. It also 
proviuGS the documGntation required to verify that appropriate 
corrective actions were taken on deficiencies identified in the audit. 


OSHA believes the preceding discussion of PSM should help small 
employers to comply more easily with the new requirements the 
standard imposes. The end result can only be safer more healthful 
workplace for all employees—a goal we all share. 


ADDendix - Methods of Process Hazards Analysis 

■ ■ -- — ---- j - 

On July 17,1990, OSHA issued a proposed rule for the rnanagement 

nf hfl7arri<; a.csRnriiatfiri with nrnnfn;Qei<; iicinn hinhlv hayarrlniic 

w • • ■ ■ ww W W V « a k( * WWWWWW l ( VA>in«.iAI Wt W ^ W 

nhfaminaLQ Thic riilp ralloH tho Pmoocc .Qafptu K^annnomont 

WI a WI a 11 wa^aw • a a a aw a a.« a w ) 'ip'• * Si)'Na< hi I W I I W WW WW WWhl W I VIM4 I W I f I W I i h 

ctanHarH wac finaliTorl nn Pphrnarx/ OA. ■iQQO 

WhWh* I'.iMV.hlSptl VAW * l« «WAi I^W WII I Vp'la./lh.i WhI y Um~r^ I 

In an sannonWIv tn tho nrnnnociH nil^ OQUIA HJe*m 

III I u|«/|i^wi ivpti/N hVp# hi m> pi i uiOy \^\j% i/~v v.<ioouoo^v4 oc;yc;icii 

nf nmnnoc» ho"y<ar*W *T"Pm+ /'lir'm ir^oi/^rh 

iii^Liiwwo wi pi wK^^oo I la^ai u di laiyoio. i i icii \jiouuooiv./i i, vviiium iiiciy uc 
hninfi li fni* ■fl^non Wnmn mP\ 

iicjipiui iwi LI iwod uwiii^ jvju iia^aiu aiiaiyooo, lutiuwd. 

\A/i^ l-f I la ■ ■ ■ an MM M I I A A J mmmmmmmmm a^Ma a^Ma.a A Lk m aaa. aa m m m ... m 

vviiai-ii. rui iciauvBiy uiluuiM|jiiu<dit:!u piuufcJbbeti, review me pruuess 

from raw matei'ials to product. At each (handling or processing step, 

‘ w'hat if” questions are formulated and answered, to evaluate the 
effects of component failures or procedural errors on the process. 

Checkiist. For more complex processes, the “what if” study can be 
best organized through the use of a “checklist,” and assigning certain 
aspects of the process to the committee members having the 
greatest experience or skill in evaluating those aspects. Operator 
practices and job knowledge are audited in the field, the suitability of 
equipment and materials of construction is studied, the chemistry of 
the process and the control systems are reviewed, and the operating 
and maintenance records are audited. Generally, a checklist evalua¬ 
tion of a process precedes use of the more sophisticated methods 
described below, unless the process has been operated safely for 
many years and has been subjected to periodic and thorough safety 
inspections and audits. 

What-lf/Checklist. The what-if/checklist is a broadly based hazard 
assessment technique that combines the creative thinking of a 
selected team of soecialists with the methodical focus of a nrenared 
checklist. The result is a comprehe.nsive hazard analysis that is 
extremely useful in training operating pe-^sonne! on t.he hazards of 

thp» nartimlar nn^ratinn 

,..w pr^. wpr W. .. 

Xho ro\/io\A/ tocjm ic coIon+oH tr\ r^srvrcie^nt a xa/iHz^ ronnc^ r\f r^rriHi 

i I I w V IV./ vv I.WV.AI ii iVi/ v/Vp/iV/V^CSi/V^ I ^v^Vi/l IL CA VVI\.4^ V./i |«/IV,/ViiCI\M'LIVii/lly 

mor'hianir*2jl tQ/^hnir*ol onW oof^tx/ r\/r%rr»rxr» Jr' o 

I I iv./\./i IVAI XSip/X^l If liwc«iy Ul iVJ OCllXi^Ly WIOOI^III IC70. I_CIL./I I p^lOWtl lO^iV^ll Cl 

u/uoiw II fiwi 11 ICILIWI 1 }MrciL./r\Cl^C7 IIIC? L^^UiailUII lU UC OLUUIC/U. 

"Thio l>v/^-»/^**^/»* rwl/v 

I i iio pcLwrxQ^c; ly pi^any ii luiuvjco ii ihji i t lauui i ui i i idJLCH Ud ui i i ictici icti^, 
piv/»wc 7 oo icLyiIIluluyy, jjiuucuuitjyuipiiit^ni utJijiyii, ni 5 :iuuint?iilclliun 

controi, incidGnt GXpenencG, and previous hazards rGviGws. A fisid 
tour of the operation also is conducted at this time. 

nitj review leam meinoaicaiiy examines me operation trom receipt or 
raw materials to delivery of the finished product to the customers 
site. At each step, the group collectively generates a listing of %hat- 
if questions regarding the hazards and safety of the operation. 

When the review team has completed listing its spontaneously 
generated questions, it systematically goes through a prepared 
checklist to stimulate additional questions. 

Subsequently, answers are developed for each question. The 
review team then works to achieve a consensus on each question 
and answer. From these answers, a listing of recommendations is 
developed specifying the need for additional action or study. The 
recommendations, along with the list of questions and answers, 
become the key elements of the hazard assessment report. 

Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). HAZOP is a formally 
structured method of systematicaiiy investigating each element of a 
system for all of the ways in which important parameters can deviate 
from the intended design conditions to create hazards and operability 
problems. The hazard and operability problems are typically deter- 

Hill it^u uy cx OLUuy ui u it:; pip" cxi lu li i^ii ui i \k^i ii uici^i ai i lo \u\ jjiai il 
I i luuci; uy CL i^ai 11 wi \J^ \ oui ii i^i vvi lu ui iiiv,/Ciiiy ai laiy^c ^ii^wlo ui 

pui^i llldt UUIdl I lO Cll ion 1^ il I ddUl I pipoill Id dl lU ddUl I VdOOdl UI 11 id 


Portinont naramotorc am colnntorl fr>r ovamnio fln\A/ tomnoratiim 

f LW 1 KJ Ml I W W4WV4 f < W I W/XMl IIWW) 

nmccliro anri timo Then tho effort nf Howintinnc frrm Hocinn 

!%■« biatis.^* btiw waiwWvwi Sdiwv i»«cki w »tw iiwii* waWWt^t* 

conditions of each parameter is examined. A list of key words, for 
example, “more of,” “less of,” “part of,” are selected for use in de¬ 
scribing each potential deviation. 

The system is evaluated as designed and with deviations noted. All 
causes of failure are identified. Existing safeguards and protection 
are identified. An assessment is made weighing the consequences, 
causes, and protection requirements involved. 

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). The FMEA is a methodi¬ 
cal study of component failures. This review starts with a diagram of 
the operation, and includes all components that could fail and 
conceivably affect the safety of the operation. Typical examples are 
instrument transmitters, controllers, valves, pumps, rotometers, etc. 
These components are listed on a data tabulation sheet and individu¬ 
ally analyzed for the following: 

• Potential mode of failure, (i.e., open, closed, on, off, leaks, etc); 

• Consequence of the failure; effect on other components and 
effects on whole system; 

• Hazard class, (i.e., high, moderate, low); 


• Probability of failure; 

• Detection methods; and 

• Remarks/compensating provisions. 

Multiple concurrent failures also are included in the analysis. The 
last step in the analysis is to analyze the data for each component or 
multiple component failure and develop a series of recommendations 
appropriate to risk management. 

Fault Tree Analysis. A fault tree analysis can be either a qualitative 
or a quantitative model of all the undesirable outcomes, such as a 
toxic gas release or explosion, that could result from a specific 
initiating event. It begins with a graphic representation (using logic 
symbols) of all possible sequences of events that could result in an 
incident. The resulting diagram looks like a tree with many branches 
listing the sequential events (failures) for different independent paths 
to the top event. Probabilities (using failure rate data) are assigned 
to each event and then used to calculate the probability of occur¬ 
rence of the undesired event. 

This technique is particularly useful in evaluating the effect of alter¬ 
native actions on reducing the probability of occurrence of the 
undesired event. 


States with AoDroved Plans 

■ I 


Alaska Department of Labor 


■4 A O+U 0+^,-<^+ 

I I I I VVt!£>l Oil I Oil CCl 

Room 306 
Juneau, AK 99801 
(907) 465-2700 


Industrial Commission of Arizona 


- - - ^ 


riiueiiiA, MZ.OOOU/ 

(602) 542-5795 

California Department 
of Industrial Relations 
455 Golden Gate Avenue 
4th Floor 

ban rrcinuisjuu, 



Connecticut Department of Labor 
200 Folly Brook Boulevard 
Wethersfield, CT 06109 

/nr\o\ c-ioo 


riciwcm Lytfpcai ii i it?i ii ui uauui 

and Industrial Relations 

Q<5A Di inAhKnu/l QirAot 


Honolulu, Hi 96813 


-/--- - 

B «« AS ^ ir~r^ 

Indiana Department of Labor 

Qi iilHinn 

OidlC willow L^UIIIXUM 

402 West Washington Street 

Room W195 

I_If_iki Ar^r\/\A 

maianapoiis, iin 
(317) 232-2378 


Iowa Division of Labor Services 
1000 E. Grand Avenue 
Des Moines, lA 50319 

/CHc\ no-\,'iAA~r 

\sjj C^KJ I t / 


Kentucky Labor Cabinet 
1049 U.S. Highway, 127 South 

Pranlrfnrt l^V AnfiOi 

(502) 564-3070 



Maryland Division of Labor 

nnH InHi ictn/ 

IW II j 

Department of Licensing 

and Reaulation 

— -- ^ 

i-r\A ni_ 

ou I cji. raui riaue, t^iiu nuui 

Baltimore, MD 21202-2272 

lA-\n\ <5'3'3_/H7Q 

I I t 


Michigan Department of Labor 
Victor Office Center 

4L.W I I V VCIOI 111 I OV^UCll KS 

RO. Box 30015 

Lansing, Ml 48933 
(o I /; *s/,3-yDuu 


I v/i~i 

Michigan Department 
of Public Health 
3423 North Logan Street 
Box 30195 

I.C11 toil 1^, IVII 


Minnesota Department of Labor 
and Industry 
443 Lafayette Road 

Qt Dpill c;c;i CC 

Oi. I dui, IVII V I sjsj 



Nevada Department of Industrial 

Capitol Complex 

H <57n o r'lii-M/Ot 
I I \j \j, Vv/uiiy Oil oc^i 

Carson City, NV 89710 
(702) 687-3032 


l^*«l I ■ 

New Mexico Environmental 

Occuoational Health 

I.— — 

and Safety Bureau 
1190 St. Francis Drive 

PO R/^v OA1 io 

• » I I w 

Santa Fe, NM 87502 


\ / - — — - - - 


M « t 

I MOW loi L/o^cii II noi 11 ui (.duui 

state Office Building - Campus 

Room 457 
Albany, NY 12240 
(518) 457-2741 


North Carolina Department 
of Labor 

4 West Edenton Street 

Km 07cnH 

Haioiyi I, iMV^ \jyj i 

(919) 733-0360 

Department of Consumer 


Labor and Industries Building 

Wintor Qtroot MR Di^omytQn 

...I IV/V-/I I I "TWV/ 

VVIIIIWI Wit w \i^ i , 

Salem, OR 97310 
(503) 378-3272 



nutil lU niuu L^cpcil II i iCI li \Jl LXIL^WI 

and Human Resources 

PriiHonrin Riuora MartinA7 

I I va w wi iwiw • !• * wi %•« ■ w ••« WM. 

Ri lilHinrt 

|^V4IIUII 1^ 

505 Munoz Rivera Avenue 
Hato Rev. PR 00918 

/n/^rv\ TC A r\M A r\ 

(oua) / I I » 


South Carolina Department 
of Labor 

ocnn Pi-ir£sot ririxyo 

WWWW I Wl«w 

RO. Box 11329 
Columbia, SC 29211-1329 

A r\^r\ a 

(ouo) / 

Tennessee Department of Labor 
710 James Robertson Parkway 

S I ii+rt ‘‘A” „ Or\A Clrvi^r 

Nashville, TN 37243-0659 

Industrial Commission of Utah 

RO. Box 146600 

I _i,_ . I IT o >1 -I ^ rx cic.r\f\ 

oaii i_aNe oiiy, u i o^t i i w-uuww 

(801) 530-6898 


Vermont Department of Labor 
and Industry 

i OA Qfotzi Qf 


Montpelier. VI 05620 
(802) 828-2288 


\/Srr«5in le^lfariHe FA^martm^nt 

V II ^11 i lOICil %i I iwi •% 

of Labor 

2131 Hospital Street 

St. Croix, VI 00840-4666 



V II yil llct L^t^pai III Id II Ul UCILA^I 

and Industry 

Pn\A/orc.Ta\/lnr Ri lilHinn 

I K^VVWaW Miawaa* ■ ^ 

13 South 13th Street 

Richmond, VA 23219 

(OLKf) 7 00-^0/ / 


Washington Department of Labor 
and Industries 

Genera! Administration Building 
RO. Box 44001 
Olympia. W.A 98504-4001 
(206) 956-4213 


I I mi V^l I 

Occupational Safety and Health 


Herschler Building, 2nd Fbor 

122 West 25th Street 

\M\/ nr^r\r\n 
i^neyenne, vv i o^iuuii 

(307) 777-7672 

OSHA Consultation Project Directory 











District of Columbia 





















.... (205)348-3033 
.... (907)269-4939 
.... (602) 542-5795 
.... (501)682-4522 
.... (415) 703-4441 
... (303)491-6151 
... (203) 566-4550 
... (302) 577-3908 
... (202) 576-6339 
... (904) 488-3044 
... (404) 894-8274 
... (671) 647-4202 
... (808)586-9116 
... (208) 385-3283 
... (312)814-2337 
... (317)232-2688 
... (515)281-5352 
... (913)296-4386 
... (502) 564-6895 
... (504) 342-9601 
... (207) 624-6460 
.... (410)333-4218 
.... (617)969-7177 
.... (612)297-2393 
.... (601)987-3981 
.... (314)751-3403 
.... (402)471-4717 



i>icw nciiii|jo< lilt; 

New Jersey. 

Mow Mexico. 

New York. 

North Carolina.. 

INUr III UciNUlid ... 



>.< I XfUAI I Wl I IVA ...••••. 



r^i IT J • 

r ud lu PMuu. 

Rhode Island ... 

S Ai ith Hamlina 

W«%l I V./III • 

South Dakota... 

Tennessee . 

Texas . 




Virgin Islands... 


West Virginia ... 



(702) 486-5016 

/cnoN 07^ ono>4 

(609) 292-3923 
(505) 827-2877 

(518) 457-2481 
(919) 733-2360 

/"7A-I \ C-lOO 

^ / U I ; C^C. I I oo 



(412) 357-2396 

/OAn\ ICA o^7^ 

I / I 


(803) 734-9599 

(605) 688-4101 

(615) 741-7036 
\ / 

(512) 440-3834 

(801) 530-6868 

(802) 828-2765 

(804) 786-8707 
(809) 772-1315 

\ f 

tr\r\f>\ r\rf> r a Ary 

(304) 558-7890 

(Ci.r\&\ 0 «A-fi£; 7 Q('U\ 

\mf^ I •/ 

(608) 266-1818(8) 
. .. (307) 777-7786 

- \- - f .. 

(H) - Health 
(S) - Safety 


03HA Ar63 Officss 

Area Telephone 

Albany, NY...(518)464-6742 

MiDuquerque, imivi.......(quo) /od-o#i i 

Allentown, PA.(215)776-0592 

AAl^ /QHT^ 07i 

iwi r-\f V .. w / / ^ I '•Jft-m 

Appleton, Wl.(414) 734-4521 

Auausta. ME.^2071622-8417 

' —^-».... \— ■ /- _ . - 

A.._i.i__ Tw /nMrs\ Arsr\ 

Ausiin, IA.(oi^:)^o^:-o/oo 

Avenel, NJ.(908) 750-3270 

K^n //nn\ QftO-OQ/in 

LJCIIIII I IWI C, IVIL^..... \-T I \JJ </WC.'£.l_r-rw 

Baton Rouge, LA.(504) 389-0474 

Bay-side, NY...(718)279-9060 

tjeiievue, vva.(riuo) ooo-/o*iu 

Billings, MT.(406) 657-6649 

Birmingham, AL.(205) 731-1534 

Bismarck. ND.(701)250-4521 

Boise, ID.(208)334-1867 

Bowmansville, NY.(716)684-3891 

Braintree, MA.(617) 565-6924 

B nrir’O'-'nrt PT /ono\ C70 CCTQ 

Calumet City. IL.(708) 891-3800 

Carson City, NV.(702) 88-5-6963 

unar lesion, wv.iJ4/-oy;3/ 

Cincinnati, OH.(513) 841-4132 

/^i 1 /n-» coo oo-« o 

«^ifciVtii<di lu, wn . uc^-oo I o 

Columbia, SC.(803) 765-5904 

roiiimhiic ni-i rfi14^4nQ-!^c;ft9 

Concord, NH.(603)225-1629 

Corous Christi. TX.^5121888-3257 

--,...-.-. . .^ , 

r-l_ll_TV/ /04 X\ OOO 0^00 

uaiias, IA.(4 1^) 

Denver, CO.(303) 844-5285 

Hoo Dioiooo II ^7nft^ fln'^./iflnn 

LyV70 I lail 1^0, H_..... \f wwy WWW -rwww 


Des Moines, lA. 

Enalewood. CO. 

— ^ - 

ET-I/-. nA 

C.I le, rM. 

Fort Lauderdale, FL. 

Fort Worth, TX. 

error. k'V 

I I Of ir\i wi i, IV I . 

Harrisburg, PA. 

Hartford, CT. 

Hachroi irW Hoinhtc M. I 


Hato Rey, PR. 

Honolulu, HI. 

Houston, TX. 

Houston, TX. 

Indianapolis, IN. 

Jackson, MS. 

Jacksonville, FL. 

Kansas City, MO. 

Lansing, Ml. 

Little Rock. AR. 

Lubbock, TX. 

Madison, Wl. 

M r!krlf/vr\ Kl I 

Ol liWI I, I ... 

Methuen, MA. 

Milwaukee, Wl. 


IVIII 11 iVIl ^. 

Mobile, AL. 

Nashville, TN. 

M ciiA/VXrl/' KIV 

I i\^i rv, I ^ I ... 

Norfolk, VA. 

North Aurora, IL. 

wrviuiiuitia oiiy, wrv.. 

Omaha, NE. 

Parsippany, NJ.. 

Peoria, IL. 

Philadelohia. PA 



/O-l A\ ooo CTrO 

(305) 424-0242 

(817) 885-7025 
/\ ooy.ynoA 

~t V/C.’~T 



(809) 766-5457 
(808) 541-2685 

(601) 965-4606 

/CnQ\ TCT.Ci D^ 

J f I I 

(61/) 565-8110 


/CION 0/IQ_iQQy1 

\\J l£^J W/fW" I 

(615) 781-5423 

/O-ION OC/1_QQyin 

(804) 441-3820 

(708) 896-8700 

/yinCN oo^ coc^ 

£.<3 I I 

. (402)221-3182 

. (201)263-1003 

. (309) 671-7033 

. (215)597-4955 
> / 


Phoenix, AZ. 

Pittsburgh, PA. 

Portland, OR. 

Providence, Rl. 

Raleiah. NC.. 

^ * 

i . I IT" 

csaii LaKe u i . 
San Francisco, CA 

Savannah, GA. 

Smyrna, GA. 

Springfield, MA. 

St. Louis, MO. 


Syracuse, in t . 

Tampa, FL. 

Tarrytown, NY. 

Toledo, OH. 

Tucker, G A. 

Westbury, NY. 

Wichita, KS. 

Wilkes-Barre, PA... 

(6Q2) 640-2007 

(412) 644-2903 
(503) 326-2251 
(401) 528-4669 
r9191 8.56-4770 
(801) 524-5080 


\ ' / .. 

(912) 652-4393 

(413) 785-0123 

rSI 41425-4249 

\ • /--- ~ 

(315) 451-0808 


\ / — ' - - - - 

(914) 682-6151 
(404) 493-6644 
(516) 334-3344 

(316) 269-6644 


Related Publications 

OSHA-2056 All About OSHA 

OSHA-3084 Chemical Hazard Communication 

OSHA-3047 Consultation Services for the Employer 
OSHA-3088 How to Prepare for Workplace Emergencies 
O-SHA-209S OSHA Ins'^ections 


1/ ^ I 

DQl-IA ■ Fmnlnuoa VUnrlenlano Hinhtc 

imm! I » ^ J ^ ^ W 9 ! t t t I • «W 

^QI-JA_On 7 T C?/arc*r»no/ P^rtt t!r\nr»/^nf 

/^OLJA 0*4 00 D f»/n ^ A A ^ 

^^J4L nuL^aoo c>ca/c?i/ ivianaycru/atii 

/^r»LJA on“7n ^ 

v-^onM-ou/3 nfij/^z/dzu/y rtuL&uuun 

HaZcira LyUfTirnufnuciuuf} OLunuaru, nu^ uuue? u/ rfue^/d/ 
HeguiBiions (c^rn; ran /y/c/. /^c/u. 

Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals 
Standard, Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 
1910.119 FR 57, P. 6356. This contains the actual text of the PSM 

(A single free copy of the above materials can be obtained from 
OSHA Publications Office, Room N3101, Washington, DC 20210, 
(202) 523-9667). 

OS HA-3104 Hazard Communication - A Compliance Kit 
(A reference guide to step-by-step requirements for compliance 
with the OSHA standard.) 

OS HA-3071 Job Hazard Analysis 

(OSHA 3104 and OSHA 3071 are available from the Superintendent 
of Documents. U.S. Government Printino Office, Washinaton, DC 
20402, (202) 783-3238. OSHA 3104 - GPO Order No. 929-022- 
000009,' $18-domestic; $22,50-foreign. OSHA 3071 - GPO Order No. 
029-016-00142-5, $1.00.) 

1994 Q _ 154-969 : QL 3 

Regional Offices 

Region 1 

Region VI 

coc (Sriffin Street 

1 1 1 wl i icll IvJ i 1 w w 1 

1 oi riuor 

riL/UI 11 

DOolUii, IVIM 1 1^ 

L/ciUcio, 1 A / 

Tnlonhnnn- (9iA\ 7f\7 A7^i 

iGiepnone. v^i /j uoo-/ i04 

IGicpi lOI Ic. /D/“M'/OI 

1 Kegion ii 

Region VII 


(lA * KS MO NE) 

201 Varick Street 

911 Walnut Street Room 406 

Room 670 

Kan<?a*i Citv MO 64106 

NewYork. NY 10014 

Telenhnne- (8161 4'56-5861 

Telephone: (21 2) 337-2378 

1 It7. \Q> 1 iJOW 1 

1 . Region VIII 

1 Kegion iii 

(CO^ MX, ND, sn, UT,* WY*) 

(DC, DE, MD,* PA, VA,* WV) 

Federal Building Room 1576 

1 Gateway Building, Suite 2100 

1961 Stout Street 

1 3535 Market Street 

Denver CO 80294 

1 Philadelphia. PA 19104 

/OOOX Q/1/l-30Ai 

1 Telephone: (215) 596-1201 

1 .... Region IX 

1 Region iv 

(American Samoa, AZ* CA,* 

1 (AL, FL, GA, KY,* MS, NC, 

Guam, HI,* NV,‘TrustTemtories 

1 SC,*TN*) 

of the Pacific) 

1 1375 Peachtree Street, N.E. 

71 Stevenson Street Room 420 

1 , .Suite 587 

San Franeiseo C A 94105 

1 Atlanta GA 30367 

Atlanta GA 30367 

1 TfilonhnnA- (AnA.\ 347-3573 

MUCtI IlCl, \Jir\ OUOU/ 

/AH Ci\ 

■ I y .w .y w .. w*' • w 1 tricrpi iv-^i ic. y-t i uj 1 i Tj 

1 Region V 

Region X 

1 (IL,IN,*MI,* MN,*OH,WI) 

(AK*ID OR *WA*) 

Room 3244 

1111 Third Avenue 

Suite 715 

Chicago, IL 60604 

Telephone: (312) 353-2220 

S e attl e . WA 98101 - 3212 
Telephon e : (206) 553 - 5930 

*Th6se states and territories operate their own OSHA-approved job safety 

and health programs (Connecticut and New York plans cover public 

employees only). States with approved programs must have a standard 

that is identical to, or at least as effective, as the federal standard.