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Full text of "Three Mile Island socio-economic impact study / prepared by : Governor’s Office of Policy and Planning ... in cooperation with : the Dept. of Agriculture, the Dept. of Community Affairs, the Dept. of Commerce, the Dept. of Insurance, the Dept. of Labor & Industry, the Dept. of Revenue."

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THREE MILE ISLAND 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY 






THREE MILE ISLAND 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY 



THREE MILE ISLAND SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY 


COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 


Prepared By : 


Governor's Office of Policy and Planning 
504 Finance Building 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 
Walter H. Plosila, Director 
in cooperation with: 

The Department of Agriculture 
The Department of Community Affairs 
The Department of Commerce 
The Department of Insurance 
The Department of Labor & Industry 
The Department of Revenue 


December 14, 1979 


The preparation of this report is being financed through a 
jointly funded grant from the federal government. Federal 
agencies contributing to this project include, the Economic 
Development Administration in the Department of Commerce, 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Com- 
munity Services Administration, and the Department of Energy. 



I 




CONTENTS 


Page 

I . Summary 1 

II. Background 7 

III. Immediate and Short Term Impacts 11 

Account of the Accident 12 

Manufacturing 13 

Nonmanufacturing 28 

Tourism 53 

Housing and Property Values 60 

Construction 68 

Agriculture 73 

State and Local Government 8 3 

IV. Long Range Impacts 9 3 




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SUMMARY 


The nuclear power plant accident at Three Mile Island in the early 
spring of 1979 had an immediate and significant economic impact on the 
seven county area surrounding the plant site. While the economy of the 
region returned to near normal levels shortly after the crisis period 
ended, the potential for continued economic costs remains. 

The Three Mile Island accident was an unprecedented occurrence and 
clearly the worst operating incident in the more than 20 year history of 
non-military nuclear power use. It directly affected the lives of 
almost 150,000 people who felt compelled to evacuate their homes, fleeing 
from a potential threat which was invisible , odorless and soundless . 
Southcentral Pennsylvania was the focus of worldwide attention for days 
as the routine business of life was interrupted . 

While the accident began in the early morning hours of Wednesday , March 
28, public perception and reaction remained relatively low until two 
days later - March 30, when radiation releases from the plant heightened 
public awareness of the situation. Just past noon on Friday, March 30, 
the Governor of Pennsylvania , Dick Thornburgh , issued an advisory recom- 
mendation for pregnant women and pre-school children living within a 
five mile radius of the plant site to evacuate for reasons of their 
personal health and safety. 

The Governor' s advisory triggered a gradual exodus. A study conducted 
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission found that an estimated 144,000 
persons evacuated from a 15 mile radius, representing 39% of the total 
population. In the 5-10 mile radius, 44 percent; and in the 10-15 mile 
radius, 32 percent. The estimated cost of the evacuation has been 
placed at $9.8 million, but does not include lost income or wages for 
the evacuating population . 

The economic impacts of the Three Mile Island fall into two distinct 
categories : the immediate and short term impacts w hich were precipitated 

for the most part by the evacuation and which abated in the weeks and 
months following the end of the crisis period, and the continued potential 
for longer term economic costs to the public and the region which is 
served by TMI operating utilities. Each are discussed in summary form 
below. 


1 . 


IMMEDIATE AND SHORT TERM IMPACTS 


Manufacturing - Manufacturing industries are important to southcentral 
Pennsylvania especially the food and kindred products industry which is 
a significant employer in Dauphin, Lancaster , Cumberland and Lebanon 
counties. Other important area industries include printing , publishing 
and allied industries , and non-electric machinery . 

The TMI accident had a significant but brief impact on manufacturing 
enterprises within an approximate 20 mile radius of the plant. Based on 
an extrapolation of data collected by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Commerce it is estimated that: 

. $7.7 million in value of production was lost or 
an average $6,725 per establishment. 

. $1.5 million was lost in wages or an average $15 
per employee . 

. 188,000 in man hours of work were foregone or an 
average 1.8 hours per employee. 

The accident also caused some disruption in supply of materials and 
marketing of products and dislocations in employment in manufacturing 
firms, but their impacts were transitory . 


Nonmanufacturing - Nonmanufacturing firms also form a significant com- 
ponent of southcentral Pennsylvania' s economic base with retail trade 
and services comprising almost two- thirds of all firms in this sector. 

In total, the TMI accident caused greater economic losses to this sector 
than to manufacturing , primarily due to the evacuation which caused the 
loss of customers who subsequently decreased the demand for goods and 
services . 

Overall, it is estimated from an extrapolation from data collected by 
the Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, that in the seven county area: 

. $74.2 million was lost in business or an average 
sales or $3,763 per establishment. 

. $5.5 million in wages were lost or an average $21 
per employee . 

. 1.1 million man hours of work were foregone or an 
average 4.0 hours per employee. 

Nonmanufacturing firms also experienced disruption in supply and marketing 
and the pattern was similar to manufacturing in that the disruptions 
were felt by only a small share of the total firms and were, overall, 
ephemeral . 


2 . 


For both the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing firms, it is still 
unclear how much of the losses experienced were absolute , as opposed to 
how much were recaptured by increased production , greater sales, overtime , 
etc. , in the weeks and months following the crisis period. It is apparent 
that some, but certainly not all of these losses were mitigated in this 
manner. 

By late May, 1979, there were several indications that the manufacturing 
sector had recovered from the immediate effects of the accident. By 
then, no plant had any employees out of work due to TMI , there was 
little or no reduction in average weekly working hours and only about 10 
percent of the establishments reported factory orders were below normal 
or felt there was some type of "image effect" in their product. While 
there may have been some small lingering effects of TMI (i.e., "product 
image" may have caused some factory orders to be below normal) it is 
more than likely that other economic factors were creating sluggish 
economic conditions impeding a return to normal business levels in the 
TMI area . 

Similarly , the nonmanufacturing sector had mostly recovered from the 
immediate effects of TMI by the end of May. While data indicates that 
about one in four of the nonmanufacturing entities had business levels 
below normal during September , this probably reflects a slowly decaying 
economic condition over the summer months resulting from worsening 
national economic conditions . If the manufacturing study had been 
carried out in September , a similar condition in that sector would have 
probably been indicated . The lack of significant growth in manufacturing 
employment in the TMI area since June would tend to support this conclusion . 


Agriculture - Farming is a major influence and contributor to the economic 
well-being of the seven county region which surrounds the TMI plant 
site. At the time of the accident , there was widespread public concern 
over the safety of agricultural products produced in the area. Extensive 
testing for radiation levels revealed only minute and short lived levels 
of radiation present which were well below allowable state and federal 
standards. Since the accident, no adverse radiation effects on foodstuffs, 
livestock or plant health have been discovered. 

The farm community suffered financial losses which have been estimated , 
by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture , to range from $250,000 to 
$500,000. Overall, the impact was not pervasive as over 96 percent of 
farmers contacted in a 25 mile radius of the plant said they suffered no 
losses at all. 


Government - Government agencies at both the state and local levels were 
pressed to cope with the demands created by the TMI accident . For the 
most part, these demands were manifested in increased personnel costs 
and additional expenses necessary to meet the special requirements 
during the crisis period. 


3 . 


Three counties and 34 local municipalities claimed expenditures of 
$113,000, related to the accident. The operating utility , Metropolitan 
Edison reimbursed $41,761 to twenty one (21) municipalities within a ten 
mile radius for certain emergency expenses (police overtime, supplier 
etc.) as of December 21, 1979. An additional twenty (20) municipalities 
have been contacted by the utility to determine their extraordinary 
expenses resulting from the accident. State government expenditures 
have been catalogued at nearly $630,000 for personnel costs and extraordinary 
expenses. TMI has not created, based on review of 1980 municipal budgets, 
any continuing costs. State revenues do not appear to have suffered 
from the accident , again indicating its truncated nature. 


Touri sm - Tourism, another important part of southcentral Pennsylvania's 
economic base sustained an estimated $5 million short-term loss due to 
the accident. These losses were distributed over convention trade, 
lodging establishments , bus tours, and other components of the industry . 
Although tourism has continued to run below previous years' levels, this 
phenomena has also been seen statewide and nationally . The local 
tourism industry feels that TMI has not played as prominent a role as 
other factors such as the gasoline shortage , in contributing to its 
decline. 


Housing and Property Values - A possible impact of TMI has been a 
decreased number of homes sold and a longer selling period for those 
homes on the market within a five mile radius of the plant. These 
effects are not evident on the same scale in concentric rings beyond 5- 
10 miles, 10-15 miles and 15-20 miles. In addition on an aggregated 
county basis, no definitive adverse pattern was evidenced. In addition , 
housing sale prices in the five mile radius have not appreciated at the 
same level as those in the other radii since the accident. Data for 
August, 1979 (the latest available month) show improvement over preceeding 
months indicating this impact may dissipate in time. However, new 
construction starts were also down in the five mile radius in the months 
following the accident. 


LONG RANGE IMPACTS 


A primary long range impact of the TMI accident is the potential for 
continued higher electricity costs for Pennsylvania ratepayers served by 
Metropolitan Edison and its corporate sister, Pennsylvania Electric . 

With both TMI nuclear units in an outage status, Metropolitan Edison 
power generating capacity has been reduced by 38 percent, and Penn- 
sylvania Electric's by 13 percent. To compensate for this deficit, the 
two utilities have been purchasing power from other interconnected 
generators at an estimated cost of $22 million per month, or $264 million 
per year. 

The Federal Department of Energy has estimated that the average., monthly 
cost for a residential customer has increased at least $7.50 due to this 
situation. The increased electricity prices can also have a significant 
impact on commerce and industry . Approximately , one- third of all manufacturing 
and nonmanufacturing firms contacted said their expansion or new investment 
plans could he affected by a ten percent increase in electricity costs. 

An increase of 25 percent or greater according to these firms could more 
dramatically alter expansion/ investment plans. Twice as many nonmanu- 
facturing firms as manufacturing firms indicated that their expansion 
plans would he affected by a 25% or greater rate increase . 

Continued increased electricity rates could also place the Metropolitan 
Edison-Pennsylvania Electric service areas, which encompasses a wide 
geographic portion of Pennsylvania at a competitive disadvantage for 
location of new firms. 

On a general level without considering electricity prices, an estimated 
two-thirds of all manufacturing and over three-quarters of all nonmanu- 
facturing firms would make new investments regardless of their experiences 
with the TMI accident . This willingness to expand and make new invest- 
ments in southcentral Pennsylvania , (assuming no major increases in 
electricity prices) is a strong indicator of optimisism and confidence 
in the region. 

As a result of the TMI accident , a number of insurance claims and legal 
actions have been generated . To date, only relocation and wage loss 
claims amounting to 1.3 million for those persons falling within the 
criteria of the Governor's advisory have been settled. A number of 
claims and law suits, including class actions have been filed by govern- 
ment. agencies and business concerns which suffered losses during the 
crisis period. Given the status of federal court dockets, the unique 
nature of the accident and the substantial and unprecedented amount of 
financial damage alleged, it is anticipated that it will take years to 
ultimately resolve these claims. 


5 . 


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THREE MILE ISLAND 


SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY 



BACKGROUND 


Study Design 

An unprecedented occurrence, the worst operating accident in 
the history of non-military nuclear pov/er , developed at the 
Three Mile Island (TMI) nuclear plant on March 28, 1979. 

The resulting crisis was a focus of world wide attention for 
days. The accident directly affected the lives of almost 
150,000 persons who temporarily evacuated the area sur- 
rounding TMI, and for some resulted in altered lifestyles 
and perceptions. Real and imagined threats to public health 
and safety, created by the accident, impacted social and 
economic systems in southcentral Pennsylvania. 

The purpose of this study is to: (1) provide a record 

through research and cataloging of this unique incident's 
social and economic impact on southcentral Pennsylvania and 
(2) develop from the record a strategy for mitigation of 
confirmed adverse findings. 

A consortium of Commonwealth agencies, and the special 
Pennsylvania Commission to Study and Evaluate the Conse- 
quences of TMI, appointed by Governor Dick Thornburgh, and 
chaired by Lieutenant Governor, William W. Scranton, III, 
have joined together in conducting the study. Coordination 
of the study is being managed by the Governor's Office of 
Policy and Planning. Other consortium agencies include: 
the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, 
the Department of Community Affairs, the Department of 
Insurance, the Department of Labor and Industry, and the 
Department of Revenue. 

A final consolidated report will be published in June of 
1980. The undertaking of this study is just one component 
of the Commonwealth's overall response to the Three Mile 
Island incident. Separate and extensive projects to study 
health, mental health, emergency preparedness and environ- 
mental questions raised in the wake of TMI are being addressed 
by other state agencies. 


Nature of the Impact Area - The Three Mile Island nuclear 
power plant sits in the middle of the Susquehanna River 
about ten miles south of Harrisburg, the State capitol. The 
surrounding countryside contains the Commonwealth's most 
productive farmland, several small and medium sized cities, 
a prosperous industrial structure, a strong governmental 
presence (emanating from Harrisburg, the State capitol and 
U.S. Department of Defense facilities nearby) and a relatively 
well diversified economic base. Agribusiness, benefiting 
from the area's excellent soils, is a major contributor to 
the area's economic well-being. Other assets include excel- 
lent transportation facilities, as evidenced in the location 
of many warehousing and transport-dependent enterprises and 
a proud historic past which precedes the American Revolution. 


Three medium size cities - Lancaster, York, and Harrisburg - 
lie within or just outside a 20 mile radius of the plant 
site . 


In contrast to the sharp, angular hills and wall-like mountains 
which dominate so much of Pennsylvania, the greater Three 
Mile Island area is a rich fertile land of valleys and 
rolling hills. Farms in the immediate area are intensively 
cultivated in crops, pasture and orchards and are well 
maintained. While the area's cities contain pockets of high 
unemployment and low per capita income, they are, for the 
most part, like the smaller towns and villages, well maintained 
and timeless. Tourism is important to the greater TMI area, 
especially in Hershey and Lancaster. 


Population within the 20 mile radius of the plant site 
stands at an estimated 682,400 persons.^/ Within a five 
mile radius the population is almost 38,000 persons. ' 
Population for the other rings is shown in Table 1. This 
area, a part of a seven county southcentral Pennsylvania 
region, is one of the fastest growing in the state. Once 
largely rural and undeveloped, this area is experiencing 
significant urbanization, steady commercial, industrial and 
residential development, especially in the suburban areas 
surrounding the major cities and towns. Several of the 
inner cities, most notably Lancaster, are enjoying substantial 
rehabilitation and revitalization. Agricultural activity, 
however, still accounts for over one-half of the region's 
land use while another third remains in forest or open space 
uses . 


The manufacturing of food and kindred products provides a 
major source of employment in the 20 mile radius of TMI. 

This segment is the leading manufacturing employer in 
Dauphin County, providing 6,470 jobs in 1975, with 31 per- 
cent of its manufacturing employment in the food industry. 

In Cumberland, Lancaster, and Lebanon Counties food and 
kindred products average around ten percent of all manu- 
facturing jobs, a significant component. Other sectors 
which predominate include printing, publishing and allied 
industries, and non-electrical machinery. 

The TMI area is stronger economically than the State as a 
whole. Counties within the impact area have fewer families 
below the poverty level. Labor force participation rates in 
the TMI impact area are higher than the State rate for both 
males and females. 


^^Calculated from U.S. Bureau of Census unpublished 1977 
population for minor civil divisions in Pennsylvania. 

2 / 

^Pennsylvania Health Department Census of the TMI Five 
Mile Radius, unpublished data. 


8 . 


Table 1 


Population Estimates for the TMI Impact Area 



Estimated 

Population 

0-5 Mile Radius 

37,842^/ 

5-10 Mile Radius 

127 , 272^/ 

10-15 Mile Radius 

204 ,375^/ 

15-20 Mile Radius 

312 , 911^/ 

0-20 Mile Radius 

682,400^'^ 


Based on Pennsylvania Health Department Census. 

^^Estimated from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Telephone Survey. 

c / 

'^Derived from the U.S. Bureau of the Census unpublished 
data for minor civil divisions in Pennsylvania. 


Data for 1976 indicates that all of the seven impacted 
counties had unemployment rates below the state average of 
7.9 percent, with Lancaster County exhibiting the lowest 
unemployment rate of 5.1 percent. Except for the Harrisburg 
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) , total un- 
employment rates in general were higher among females, 
nonwhite, black and minority groups. Even among these, the 
rates were below the state average, except for Adams County. 
(See table 2 ) . 


In reviewing occupation employment patterns, Harrisburg with 
its state government employment, has a higher white collar 
employment rate than the State average. Blue collar rates 
in Lebanon, Lancaster, and York Counties, by comparison, 
exceed the Pennsylvania rate. The figures for Lancaster 
County reflect the significance of the agricultural sector 
of the economy; service employment in Lebanon County is 
above the State average and well above the remaining counties 
in the TMI impact area. (See table 2 ) • 


9 . 


Table 2 


Selected Labor Force Statistics: 1976 



Adams 

Harrisburg 

SMSA* 

Lanc- 

aster 

Lebanon 

York 

Penna. 

Unemployment 

Total 

Rate : 

7 . 1 

5 . 4 

5.1 

6.7 

6.4 

7.9 

Female 

10.1 

5.1 

6.3 

7.4 

6.7 

8.5 

Nonwhite 

16.8 

10.5 

10.5 

16.3 

14.2 

15.5 

Black 

17.1 

10.0 

11.4 

15.0 

14.5 

15.7 

Minority 

Group** 

16.7 

11.0 

10.8 

13.3 

14.3 

15.6 


Source: Table prepared from data published by Pennsylvania 

Bureau of Employment Security in Annual Planning Report 
series for fiscal year 1978. 

* Comprised of the counties of Cumberland, Dauphin, and 
Perry. Separate data for each county not available. 

** The minority group category is comprised of blacks, other 
nonwhites, and Spanish-Americans . Some duplication is 
possible since Spanish-Amer ican may include nonwhite 
races in addition to white. 


Table 3 

Employment by Occupation, 
Percent Distribution: 1974 


Labor Market 
Areas 

White 

Collar 

Blue 

Collar 

Service 

Farmers and 
Farm Workers 

Harr isburg^'^ 

52.5 

33.7 

12.0 

1.7 

Lancaster 

38.2 

43.2 

12.6 

6.0 

Lebanon 

39.5 

42.6 

15.5 

2.4 

York^/ 

39.6 

47.1 

10.5 

2.8 

Pennsylvania 

47.1 

39.1 

12.0 

1.7 


Source: Table prepared from Pennsylvania Department of Labor 

and Industry, Bureau of Employment Security, 
Pennsylvania Occupational Projections (Harrisburg, Pa., 
December, 1976). 

^^Includes Cumberland, Dauphin, and Perry counties. 

2/ 

'Includes Adams and York counties. 


10 . 


IMMEDIATE AND SHORT TERM IMPACTS 


11 




ACCOUNT OF THE ACCIDENT 


In the early morning hours of Wednesday, March 28, 1979, 

Three Mile Island's number two nuclear reactor suffered the 
failure of several water pumps. This seemingly minor event 
triggered the subsequent accident which "escalated into the 
worst crisis yet experienced by the nation's nuclear power 
industry".!/ In the days that followed the situation was 
compounded by" . . . equipment failures, inappropriate pro- 

cedures and human errors and ignorance" (ibid) and culminated 
just past noon on March 30, 1979, when the Governor of 
Pennsylvania issued an advisory for pregnant women and pre- 
school children living within a five mile radius of the 
plant to evacuate. 

Evacuation - Preliminary results of a public opinion survey 
of 1,500 households found that the Governor's advisory 
resulted in the evacuation of an estimated 144,000 persons 
from a 15 mile radius of the Three Mile Island Plant. 

This accounts for about 39 percent of the total estimated 
population living within a 15 mile radius of the plant. It 
is also estimated that 60 percent of the population within a 
5 mile radius of the plant evacuated. In a 5-10 mile radius, 

56.000 persons or 44 percent evacuated. In a 10-15 mile 
radius which contains most of the greater Harrisburg area, 

67.000 persons or 32 percent evacuated. 

The majority of those who evacuated did so on March 30, the 
day of the Governor's advisory. The NRC study found, sur- 
prisingly, that a significant portion of the evacuating 
population left prior to March 30: 17 percent in the 5-10 

mile ring and 14 percent in the 10-15 mile ring. The medium 
date the evacuees returned was, April 4, 1979, indicating an 
average evacuation period of five days. While the great 
majority of those evacuated remained in Pennsylvania (72 
percent) 21 states in all received evacuees, including those 
as far away as Florida, California and Oklahoma. 

The total estimated economic cost of the evacuation has been 
placed at $9.8 million. This cost does not include lost 
income for those who evacuated or for those who remained but 
were unable to work for one reason or another. The average 
evacuation expense was $68 per person. Of this total, by 
mid November, 1979, almost $1.3 million had been paid to 
3,158 claimants who fell within the criteria of the Governor's 
advisory, by the operating utility's insurance company. 

This amounts to an average of $384 per person indicating 
that these evacuees stayed away for a longer period than 
other segments of the evacuating population. 


1/Report of the President's Commission on the Accident at 
Three Mile Island, October 1979, Washington, DC. 

2/Three Mile Island Telephone Survey, Preliminary Report on 
Procedures and Findings, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
October, 1979. 


12 . 


MANUFACTURING 


Findings 


The TMI accident had a short-lived but significant impact on 
manufacturing industries in the seven county area surrounding 
the plant site. 

Based on an extrapolation of data collected from manufacturing 
establishments within an approximate 20 mile radius of the 
TMI plant concerning losses occurring during the first week, 
it was estimated that lost value of production equaled 
$7.7 million, lost wages for employee of these firms totaled 
over $1.5 million and nearly 188,000 man hours of work were 
lost . 

It is still unclear how much of these losses were absolute 
as opposed to how much was recaptured by increased production 
and overtime in the weeks following the crisis period. It 
is almost certain that some recapturing occurred to overcome 
some of these short term losses. This factor will be ex- 
plored in more detail in a final data collection effort by 
the Pennsylvania Commerce Department in early 1980. 

The accident also affected, in a minor way, employment in 
the twenty mile radius during the first week or so. Since 
then, its impact has continued to be minimal. Disruptions 
in supply of materials and marketing due to the accident 
affected only a minor portion of the manufacturing industries 
and were also short lived. 


Study Design 


The impacts on manufacturing have been determined from data 
collected from a total of 363 manufacturing establishments 
within an approximate 20 mile radius of the TMI plant. 

These firms employed over 71,200 workers according to the 
1977 Census of Manufacturing , 60 percent of which were in 
the durable goods sector. All establishments with 100 or 
more employees and all food and kindred products establishments 
were contacted, and information was sought from establishments 
in all the various Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 
manufacturing categories (SIC 20-39). An excellent response 
to the Commerce Department's study was obtained - nearly 
95 percent of the contacted firms responded. See Table 4 
on the following page. 


13 . 


Table 4 


Manufacturing Employment in the 20 Mile TMI Area i/ , 


Industry 

Respondents 

Universe 

All Manufacturing Industries 

71 

,269 

101 

,749 

.Durable Goods 

42 

,502 

58 

,377 

Lumber & wood products 


628 

1 

, 528 

Furniture & fixtures 

1 

,727 

2 

,414 

Stone, clay, glass & concrete prod. 

2 

,697 

4 

,013 

Primary metals 

6 

,095 

7 

,536 

Fabricated metals 

6 

,24 5 

10 

, 007 

Machinery, except electrical 

12 

,277 

14 

,750 

Electrical & electronic products 

4 

,753 

8 

,372 

Transportation equipment 

6 

,144 

7 

,415 

Instruments & related products 

1 

,256 

1 

,329 

Misc. manufacturing industries 


680 

1 

,013 

Nondurable Goods 

28 

,767 

43 

,372 

Food & kindred products 

6 

,823 

12 

,467 

Tobacco manufacturers 


334 


497 

Textile mill products 

5 

,940 

6 

,360 

Apparel & related products 

3 

,686 

6 

,967 

Paper & allied products 

3 

,085 

4 

,04 6 

Printing, publishing & allied indus. 

3 

,910 

5 

,797 

Chemicals & allied products 


574 


795 

Petroleum refining & related indus. 


249 


301 

Rubber & misc. plastics products 

1 

,700 

2 

,218 

Leather & leather products 

2 

,466 

3 

,924 


The area includes all of Dauphin, Cumberland, and York 
Counties and those parts of Adams, Lancaster, Lebanon and 
Perry Counties within a 20 mile radius. 


Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Statistics, Research and Planning*- 1977 Census of Manu~ 
f acturing 


14 . 


'iaoxe D 


Establishment Distribution by Employment Size Group 


Total 


Establis ’nmen t s 

0 

1-19 

20-99 

100-199 

200-499 

500-999 

1000^ 

148 

6 

64 

56 

10 

8 

3 

1 

er SIC's 993 

66 

429 

314 

75 

79 

17 

13 

1,141 

72 

493 

370 

85 

87 

20 

14 


Source; Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of 
Statistics, Research and Planning. 


The total universe for this study was 101,749 employees in 
a total of 1,141 establishments. Adjustment and extrapolation 
of the data was accomplished for each 2-digit SIC group and 
by each of seven employment size groups. These employee 
size groups are: zero employees (for example, self-employed); 
1-19 employees; 20-99; 100-199; 200-499; 500-999; and 1,000 
or more employees. The number of establishments by employment 
size groups is shown in Table 5 above. This was done to 
estimate the economic impacts for all establishments and 
employment in the manufacturing "universe" . 

As part of this study, there was a special emphasis placed 
upon the food and kindred products industry (SIC 20) in order 
to thoroughly examine the TMI accident's impact on food 
processing plants. A hundred percent return was sought from 
all food and kindred product establisliments . Unfortunately, 
some of the firms not responding were the largest employers. 

To further study the impact of TMI on food processing, ten 
large food processors outside the 20 mile radius which 
utilize foodstuffs produced within the 20 mile radius of 
TMI were also contacted. These involved large dairies, and 
fruit and vegatable processors located elsewhere in Pennsyl- 
vania and Maryland. 


Immediate Impacts 

The immediate impacts of TMI on manufacturing industries 
occurred essentially in the first week foilwing the incident. 
The first week began with the Friday, March 30, 1979 advisory 
of the Governor of Pennsylvania to families with pre-school 
children and pregnant women to evacuate the area in a 5 mile 
radius of the plant and extends through April 6, 1979. During 
the second week, on April 9, 1979, the Governor canceled 
his advisory concerning evacuation. It is essential to 
recognize this time period since the Department of Commerce's 
study found that most manufacturing firms had returned to 


15 . 


normal production by April 4, ^979, and the remaining firms 
returned to normal production soon thereafter. Therefore, 
the immediate effects on employment, wages, and production 
were short lived and were mostly concentrated during the 
first week. However, other impacts may have longer term 
aspects, these are discussed in this section under the heading 
"short term impacts" and in subsequent sections dealing with 
long range impacts. 

TMI related losses to manufacturing establishments during the 
first week are presented in Table 6. It is interesting 
that the greatest percentage of losses took place in large 
establishments - those employing 100 or more workers, even 
though they represent only 18 percent of the total number 
of establishments. They also account for 79 percent of the 
total employment. 


Table 6 

Losses in First Week by 
Number of Establishments by Size 



Total 1/ 

Average per 
employee 2/ 

Under 

100 Employees 

Over 

100 Employees 

Man Hours Lost 

187,973 

1.8 

46,951 

141,022 

Wages Lost 

$1,515,509 

$14.89 

$506,702 

$1,008,807 

Value of Pro- 

duction Lost 

$7,672,820 

$75.41 

$845,815 

$6,827,005 

Number of 

Establishments 

1,141 


935 

206 


1/ Includes totals for all manufacturing establishments including food 
and kindred products (SIC 20) . 

2/ Total days lost, wages or value of production in universe divided by 
total 1977 employment. 

Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, 

Research and Planning. 


Losses in man hours, wages, and value of production which 
occurred during the first week following Ti^ll in the food 
and kindred product establishments are shown in Table 7. On 
an average per employee basis, these establishments lost 
less than the average experienced for all other manufacturing 
groups . 


16 . 


Table 7 


FIRST WEEK LOSSES - FOOD PROCESSING 
AND COMPARISON TO OTHER MANUFACTURING 




Average 

Loss per 

Employee 


Total 
Loss In 

SIC 2 0 

SIC 20 

Non-Food 
SIC ' s 

All 

Manufacturing 

Man Hours 

12,937 

1.0 0 

2.00 

1.8 

Wages 

$ 71,905 

$5.77 

$16.17 

$14 . 89 

Value of 
Production 

$143,691 

$11.53 

$84.33 

$75.41 


Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, 

Bureau of Statistics, Research and Planning 


The Department of Commerce also found that none of the firms 
responding to its study of TMI ' s impacts had any employees 
out of work by the time the Department gathered its data 
during the last two weeks in May, again suggesting that the 
losses in wages and value of production were confined 
largely to the immediate period following the accident. 

Man Hours Lost - Overall, employees in manufacturing were 
away from work for about two hours during the first week. 

But this is just the average - some employees lost more time 
from work. For example, the average man hours lost per 
employee in all categories except food and liindred products 
was nearly five hours for establishments having 500 to 999 
employees. Although employees in food and kindred products 
lost an average of one hour for all establishments in this 
category, employees in those small food firms (0-19 employees) 
lost 2 . 3 hours . 

Wages Lost - The absenteeism and layoffs in manufacturing 
resulted in an average per employee wage loss of around $15. 
As was the case in lost man hours, the food and kindred 
products workers seemed to have lost less wages during the 
incident. In some other establishments losses were greater, 
for example non food firms employing between 500-999 
workers lost an average of about $31 in wages per employee, 
which was around twice the overall average ($15) for all 
manufacturing firms. Average lost wages in food establish- 
ments amounted to six dollars, but for some food firms 
(20-99 employees) the losses were up to $13 in wages per 
employee . 


17 . 


Losses in Value of Production - The overall average loss in 
value of production for all manufacturing establishments was 
$75 per employee. But those large non-food firms (500 to 999 
employees) mentioned previously, which experienced the 
greatest average time and wages lost per employee also had 
the greatest loss in value of production - an average of 
almost $350 per employee. The average loss in value of 
production for all establishments having more than 100 
employees was $85 per employee. Contrastingly, all of the 
food and kindred products establishments sustained an aver- 
age value of lost production of only $12 per employee. 

However, small food manufacturing establishments in the 
employee range of 20 to 99 did ‘'ose an average of $43 per 
employee . 

Supply and Marketing Disruptions - During the time period 
immediately following the TMI incident, there was some dis- 
ruption in supply of raw materials and other products nec- 
essary to carry out the manufacturing process. Disruptions 

in the marketing of finished products or goods to consumers or 
users also occurred. However, these disruptions were not a 
widespread or a pervading problem. 

The Department of Commerce's study found that almost seven 
percent of the total manufacturing firms experienced dis- 
ruptions in supply of products purchased and almost 12 per- 
cent experienced disruptions in marketing of products sold. 

(see Table 8) These disruptions mainly affected small 
establishments probably because they tend to both obtain 
materials and market their products locally. 

Of the firms affected by disruptions in supply of materials, 

88 percent had less than 100 employees. These smaller firms 
probably would feel the inconvenience of suoply disruptions 
more than the larger firms since they are less able to maintain 
a large inventory of needed materials. Within this size 
group of less than 100 employees, nearly one-half of those 
operated by the self employed experienced disruptions in their 
supplies of products purchased. 

Eighty-nine percent of the firms experiencing disruptions in 
marketing also had less than 100 employees. Such firms 
probably were affected by having capital tied up in un- 
delivered products. 

Disruptions in marketing were felt more by food and kindred 
product establishments than the average for all the other 
SIC categories. (See table 8) Food and kindred product 
establishments experienced twice as many marketing dis- 
ruptions as they did disruptions in obtaining supplies. 


18 . 


Industrial Dislocation 


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Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of 

Statistics, Research and Planning. 


There were several reasons for these marketing and supply 
disruptions. Because of the voluntary evacuation there was 
less capability of providing timely deliverv of materials 
for processing or the shipping of finished products. In 
addition there would have been a reduced market for manu- 
factured products since some outlets closed temporarily (e.g. 
stores and restaurants) . People in the area became more 
selective in their purchases; this selectivity particularly 
affected the food processing establishments. Disruption 
in supply and marketing during the first week was more of 
a problem for the food establishments than it was for the 
average of all the non-food processing categories. The 
disruption in marketing of food products was experienced by 
twice as many establishments as those experiencing disruption 
in obtaining supplies of products. It is likely that the 
marketing problem resulted from immediate consumer resistance 
at the time of the accident to locally produced agricultural 
products and to temporary losses of sales because of a 
decreased demand resulting from people having evacuated 
the area. Several dairies in the Harrisburg area reported 
a short lived decrease in sales. The fact that numerous 
restaurants and schools in the area were closed for several 
days would also account for some decrease in consumer demand. 
Aside from consumer resistance to food products, the supply 
of certain raw materials sensitive to potential radiation 
could also have been subject to resistance by manufacturers. 

The Teamsters strike which began during the immediate 
period following the TMI incident, also impacted a few manu- 
facturing firms. The degree to which the study's findings 
are influenced by the strike cannot be determined. 

In summary, supply and marketing dislocation effects on 
industry at the time of the TMI incident were minimal, 
affecting about 10 percent of the manufacturing establishments. 
Some firms experienced dislocations in supply and delivery 
at the time of the event due to evacuation of the area and 
some consumer resistance over safety concerns. 

Because of TMI ' s special potential for causing adverse 
effects on the food processing industry, the Commerce 
Department study also assessed the impacts on ten large 
food processors located just outside the 20 mile radius 
as mentioned earlier. During the height of the incident, 
these firms had no problems relating to man hours lost or 
value of production lost. But there was some consumer 
resistance experienced by a few of the dairies resulting 
from consumer concern over the safety of milk obtained from 
the TMI area. In some cases, the milk from within the 20 
mile radius was kept separate so that customers could buy 
milk from outside the area if they so chose. In other cases, 
local milk was processed into cheese or dried milk. Overall, 
however, the study found that, as of the end of May, no 
serious problems were being experienced. 


20 . 


Unemployment 


Claims data from the Office of Employment Security in the 
Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry also confirm 
that the effects of the incident were short lived. Indeed, 
except for the first several weeks, the TMI incident has 
had little remaining impact on employment and unemployment 
rates in the area, and even during its initial stage the 
impact was minimal. 

Records of the Office of Employment Security reveal that there 
were 721 initial claims and 1,489 continued claims filed (as 
of October 13, 1979), due to the TMI incident. These claims 
v;ere filed in the Harrisburg, Lebanon, Lancaster and York 
local offices where the bulk of the claims related to TMI 
were handled. These offices served the claimants within an 
approximate 20 mile radius of TMI. 

Initial claims represent those filed by someone recently 
unemployed or a person who has a previously disrupted employ- 
ment record making an additional claim. Not every initial 
claim becomes eligible for compensation. The number of 
initial claims represents a rough approximation of those 
individuals who were unemployed because of the TMI incident. 

A note of caution, however, is necessary - in order to be 
eligible for unemployment compensation, the claimant had to 
be told by his employer not to report for work. Furthermore, 
the claimant had to remain in the area. ‘Therefore, this 
data does not reflect those who voluntarily evacuated the 
area while their em.ployer remained in operation. 

A continued claim represents a person who has filed an initial 
claim and v/ho returns in the second week to the unemployment 
office because he has been unemployed for at least part of 
a v/eek. However, some of the continued claims represent person 
who were out of work for several weeks. 

Table 9 shows that 482 persons in the manufacturing sector 
filed initial claims - comprising 68 percent of the total. 
Although there were 457 continued manufacturing claims, their 
share of the total was only 31 percent of all continued claims. 
This decrease in percentage share (in manufacturing) is 
attributable to the occurrence of more continued claims in 
the nonraanuf acturing sector. Most of the nonmanufacturing 
continued claims were in the construction category. 


21 . 


Most of the claim activity shown in Table 9 occurred in 
the month of April, 1979, with the exception of the con- 
struction industry: About 75% of the initial claims (about 
540) were made in the first week, and the bulk of these were 
partial claims which represent only a few lost days of 
work. Since only 482 of the initial claims were in the 
manufacturing sector, and since the total 1977 manufacturing 
employment in an approximate 20 mile radius (Table 4) is 
about 100,000 employees, the share of manufacturing employees 
filing initial claims is well below one percent of the total 
manufacturing employment. 

The construction claims as noted earlier do not encompass 
the general construction field such as home building, but 
rather reflect claimants engaged at TMI in specialized 
maintenance . 


Table 9 

Unemployment Claims Related to TMI, 
as of October 13, 1979 


Industry 


Initial Continued 


Apparel 

Printing & Publishing 
Fabricated Metals 
Machinery (except electrical) 
Transportation Equipment 
Misc. Manufacturing 


13 

4 

1 

1 

27 

436 


13 

4 

1 

1 

27 

411 


Total Manufacturing 


482 457 


Agriculture Services 2 
Construction 152 
Transportation & Public Utilities 3 
Services 82 


7 

942 

10 

73 


Total Nonmanufacturing 


. 239 


1,032 


TOTAL 321 1,489 

Source: Department of Labor and Industry, Office of 

Employment Security. 


22 . 


An analysis of data provided by the Department of Labor and 
Industry concerning changes in total employment and unemploy- 
ment does not show any notable effect of TMI . Table 10 
lists month-by-month levels of total employment and unemploy- 
ment since May and shows the monthly changes over those levels 
experienced in March. Data for all seven counties which 
are usually considered as possibly affected by the accident 
have been included. 

In spite of fluctuations which have occurred over the six 
month period since the accident, the data indicate that 
overall employment levels have consistently remained higher 
in all months and in all counties than those which were 
occurring during March 1979. And, the overall change in 
unemployment from March through September has been down, 
except for Lebanon County. An increase in unemployment 
rates occurred in June, but this reflects the usual seasonal 
entry of students into the labor market, amplifying the 
total number of unemployed during that period of time. 

Of importance is that fact that there was still a growth of 
total employment over the period including May, June, and 
July. It would be during this time that one might have 
expected some drop in total employment due to TMI. Yet 
this did not occur. Instead, there was an overall increase 
of almost 20,000 jobs over the March level. This increase 
in employment was not as large as would normally have occurred 
but this is a result of the general economic situation 
rather than any relationship to the TMI incident. 

After July, there was a general downturn in total employment 
levels responding to the "slippage" in the national economy 
which had been occurring since the second quarter of 1979. 
Decreases in business levels and consumer spending brought 
on by high rates of inflation, high prices, rising interest 
rates and threats of a recession began to take their toll 
on employment gains. 

Still, the September levels of employment in all counties 
were higher than those in March and, in most cases, the rates 
of unemployment continued to decline from Juen into September. 
The TMI area's local economy can be credited with stability 
and strength in spite of the developing onerous national 
and state economic conditions. 

Short Term Impacts 

Impact on Factory Orders - According to the Department of 
Commerce's study, in late May, 78 percent of the manufacturing 
firms reported that their factory orders were normal since 
the accident. At the same time, no plants reported any 
employees out of work due to TMI. Only 10 percent (118 
establishments) were estimated to have had orders below normal 
Most of these latter firms (103) were those with less than 100 


23 . 


TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 


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employees. The 87 percent share of smaller firms with less 
than 100 employees having below normal orders is disproport- 
ionate in size to the 82 percent identified as small establish- 
ments. This indicates that these firms felt this impact 
slightly more than larger firms. Over half (56 percent) 
of these had depressed orders were in the 1-19 size group; 
this group constitutes only 43 percent of all establishments. 
There was no significant difference between the food processing 
industry (SIC 20) and all other manufacturing categories. 

Factors contributing to the reduction in factory orders 
are difficult to isolate. Some of these firms with below 
normal orders may have been experiencing product image 
problems, and the study does indicate that could be the 
case. But other factors were also at work during the same 
period of time which could have influenced factory orders. 
During the month of April, some effects of the continuing 
strike by some steel haulers may have caused a decrease in 
orders in certain of the steel related establishments. 

But more importantly, beginning in April, a period of 
national economic decline began. The U.S. Census Depart- 
ment's Composite Index of Leading Indicators dropped over 
2.0 percent during the strike-depressed month of April; 
and thus began a quarter of general decline and a sluggish 
economy. During periods such as this, new orders and 
capital investments decline. 

Image Problems - The estimated number of establishments in 
May noting an effect on the image of their product since 
TMI is nearly the same as the estimated number of those 
having factory orders below normal and the percentage 
share of total number of establishments is about the same 
( 10 percent) . 

The losses to the firms noting an image effect is estimated 
to have been about 1.1 million dollars. This averages out 
to about a little over $10,000 per establishment experiencing 
the problem. For food and kindred products, eight percent 
of the establishments believed they were still being handi- 
capped by an image problem. 

The estimated value of losses in the food industry due to 
image problems is about $60,000 or approximately $4,800 
per establishment. For those firms able to estimate 
product image losses, the largest share of the losses was 
concentrated in firms with 20 to 200 employees, i.e., 
product image problems appear to have been felt by both some 
of the smaller and some of the larger firms. Some of the 
biggest firms could not or wouxd not estimate the dollar 
value of product image losses. 


25 . 


NONMANUFACTURING 


Summary of Findings 

Immediate TMI Impacts - First Week Following Accident 


Man Hours lost were estimated to be just over one million 
representing an average loss of 4.0 hours per employee. Service, 
retail trade, and construction sectors experienced the greatest 
losses, and among these more average per employee losses were 
reported by smaller employers (less than 20 employees) than by 
larger ones. 

Lost Wages are estimated at $5.5 million, an average of 
$21 per employee. Smaller firms sustained the greatest 
average loss, $33 per employee; smaller employers in most 
sectors averaged more wages lost per employee than larger 
businesses. Of the larger employers, (20 employees and up) 
only those in the construction industry lost more wages per 
employee than their smaller counterparts. 

Employees out of work or absent from work either by their 
own choice or because their place of employment was clsoed, 
totaled approximately 42,700 or 16 percent of the total 
number of employees in the six county area surroudning TMI. 
Smaller employers (less than 20 employees) indicated an 
average 25% out of work/absent compared to a 12% average for 
larger employers. Services, transportation and utilities, 
construction, and retail trade reported a greater percentage 
out of work/absent than other sectors. 

Supply and marketing disruptions were experienced by only a 
small portion of the businesses. Five percent of the busi- 
nesses reported supply disruptions and 12 percent marketing 
disruptions. The larger businesses had the greatest share 
of both supply and marketing disruptions. Retail trade, 
wholesale trade, and the service sectors accounted for 92% 
of those reporting supply dislocations and for over 98% of 
those in product marketing. 

Value of business or sales losse s in the six county area 
around TMI were estimated to be just over $74 million. 

This represents an average loss per establishment of around 
$3,700. Without exception, the greatest losses were experienced 
by the larger firms, while the total losses and losses per 
employee were greatest for the smaller firms. Over 85 percent 
of the lost business occurred in the retail trade, wholesale 
trade and the finance, insurance and real estate sectors. 

Overall conclusion - In the immediate period, smaller firms 
generally experienced a greater loss of man hours, wages, 
and employees out of work than did larger firms. The greatest 
losses in all categories were reported by the retail trade 
and service businesses. Larger employers in most sectors 
had supply and marketing disruptions than smaller employers. 
Larger firms also lost the greatest total value of business. 


26 . 


Short Term TMI Impacts - April, 1979 through September, 1979 


Business interruption effects seem to have disappeared by 
Septemberl, 1979. Only five percent of the businesses 
spoken to which reported that their business was interrupted 
at the time of TMI had not regained normal levels by Sept- 
ember, 1979. Although 23 percent of all firms indicated 
business levels were below normal in September, 1979, this 
probably results mostly from factors other than the TMI 
accident. Over three-fourths of the 23 percent was accounted 
for by retail trade and services. 

Average Weekly Working hours by September, 1979 were at 
normal levels for 88% of the businesses. The sectors 
reporting the greatest share of their establishments with 
below average weekly working hours were transportation and 
public utilities, retail trade and services. 

Image problems were reported by less than five percent in 
September. Only in the wholesale trade area did the image 
problem appear to be noteworthy. Over 96 percent of the 
responding firms felt that the TMI accident would not have 
any long term image effects on their business. 

Nonmanufacturing Employment Changes reflect little adverse 
impact. During April through June, 1979, employment increased 
in the counties surrounding TMI. But from June to September, 
employment in this area declined, probably reflecting the 
cummulative effects of a worsening economy. Moreover, the 
TMI area has shown less employment decline in the June to 
September 1979 period than the State as a whole. 

Small Business Administration (SBA) assistance data shows 
that by mid-November, 1979, SBA had accepted 64 applications 
for loans in the amount of nearly $3.3 million for TMI 
related economic injury. Most of these were from the retail 
trade sector. Thus far, 22 applications have been approved 
in the amount of $510,000. Additional requests for aid can 
be made up to January 28, 1980. 


27 . 


NONMANUFACTURING 


Study Design 


A study of TMI impacts on the nonmanufacturing sector was 
undertaken in September, 1979, by Pennsylvania Department 
of Commerce's Bureau of Statistics, Research and Planning. 

Data concerning the impacts of the TMI incident was obtained 
for firms within a six county area surrounding the TMI 
plant - these counties include Dauphin, Cumberland, Lancaster, 
Lebanon, Perry and York. The reason for the use of the 
six county area was the need to utilize information provided 
by the Office of Employment Security, in the Pennsylvania 
Department of Labor and Industry. This data did not permit 
the locating of individual establishments at the municipality 
level as could be done in the manufacturing sector. 

It should also be pointed out that the two studies were con- 
ducted four months apart. As a result, the information 
about the impacts may be influenced in some cases by economic 
factors other than TMI which have emerged during the summer 
months . 

The universe of entities and employment in the six county 
area in December, 1978 was 20,197 entities employing 267,032 
persons. An entity is the total county business operations 
of a company operating in a county regardless of the number 
of establishments. The 267,032 universe of employment 
represents the employment in all establishments in all of 
the 20,197 entities. In addition, the entities and employ- 
ment were disaggregated into eight two-digit nonmanufacturing 
sectors based upon the Standard Industrial Classification 
Code . 

Table 11 identifies the eight nonmanufacturing sectors and 
shows how the entities are distributed among four employment 
size groups. The most significant fact is that 87.5 percent 
of the entities are small, 17,663 out of 20,197 entities 
employ less than 20 workers. The only exception is the mining 
sector which has a greater percentage of entities employing 
over 20 workers. 

In assigning entities into nonmanufacturing sectors, each 
was identified according to the major activity which it 
performs. The universe does not include firms representing 
self-employed individuals. Furthermore, the 314 entities 
included under the agriculture sector represent only large 
farms (ie., those employing 10 or more workers in a 20-week 
period or paying in cash at least $20,000 to employees in 
any one quarter) as well as those engaged in forestry, 
fishing, or agricultural services. 


Universe of Entities Distribution in Nonmanufacturing Study 
By Sector and Employment Size Group 


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29 


Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, Research and Planning. 


The small firms 0-19 (nearly 88 percent of the total) employ 
only 29 percent of the total workers. See Table 12. 

An examination of the distribution of the entities and their 
associated employment among the eight nonmanufacturing sectors 
reveals that services and retail trade account for 63 per- 
cent of all firms and 61.8 percent of the total employment 
in nonmanufacturing. Services is the leading sector in the 
number of firms, while retail trade leads in the size of 
employment . 

The Department of Commerce's study of TMI impacts on nonmanu- 
facturing included contacting a total of 577 entities (employing 
82,019 workers) out of the total universe. The Department 
contacted 100 percent of the entities employing 250 or more 
workers, 25 percent of those in the 100-249 employee range, 

10 percent of those employing 20-99, and one percent of those 
with 0-19 employees. 

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the universe of entities and approximately 31 percent of the 
employment universe (see Table 13). The Department received 
data on the impacts of TMI on business operations from 401 
firms. This represents a very good response (about 70 per- 
cent) and, accounts for two percent of all entities in the 
universe. And the employment associated with the responses 
was nearly 50,000 employees - about 19 percent of the employ- 
ment in the universe. 

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collection efforts, there were roughly the same number of 
responses - 363 responding establishments in the case of the 
manufacturing sector and 401 entities in nonmanufacturing. 

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though the percentage of the universe represented by the 
responses was much smaller in the case of nonmanufacturing 
(two percent of the entities) as compared with manufacturing 
(32 percent of the establishments) . For employment, the 
nonmanufacturing responses represented about 19 percent of 
the total possible employment of the universe, and in manu- 
facturing the responses represented 70 percent of the possible 
universe employment. 


30 . 


Universe of Employment Distribution in Nonmanufacturing Study 
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31 


Source; Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, Research and Planning 


Table 13 


Nonmanufacturing Study 
TMI Impact Area 




Entities 




Employment 

Size Group 

Universe 

Contacted 

% of Universe 
Contacted 

Responses 

% of Universe 
Responding 

0-19 

17,663 

181 

1.0 

123 

0.7 

20-99 

2,140 

218 

10.2 

160 

7.5 

100-249 

291 

75 

25.8 

54 

18.6 

250 + 

103 

103 

100.0 


62.1 

TOTAL 

20,197 

577 

2.9 

401 

2.0 



Employment 




0-19 

78,657 

736 

0.9 

609 

0.8 

20-99 

83,882 

8,430 

10.1 

6,189 

7.4 

100-249 

42,907 

11,267 

26.3 

7,758 

18.1 

250 + 

61,586 

61,586 

100.0 

35,406 

57.5 

TOTAL 

267,032 

82,019 

30.7 

49,962 

18.7 


Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, Research 
and Planning. 


32 


The extent of the responses by nonmanufacturing sector (responses 
as a share of the total entities and employment in the universe) 
is shown in Table 14 below. 


Table 14 

Extent of Responses by Nonmanufacturing Sector 


Sector 

% of Total Entities 

% of Total Employment 

Agriculture, etc. 

1.9 

9.9 

Mining 

11.5 

10.3 

Construction 

1.2 

6.5 

Transportation, etc. 

4.2 

28.5 

Wholesale Trade 

3.0 

15.0 

Retail Trade 

2.1 

13.0 

Finance, etc. 

2.7 

40.3 

Services 

1.6 

21.7 

TOTAL 

2.0 

18.7 

Source: Pennsylvania 

Department of Commerce, 

Bureau of 


Statistics, Research and Planning. 


There is some variation in the extent of the responses - the 
range in share of total entities responding goes from just 
over one percent to just over eleven percent. But the share 
of universe employment covered is much more variable, ranging 
from less than seven percent (construction) to over 40 percent 
(finance, insurance and real estate) . The difference in the 
ranges means that, in several cases, a greater share of the 
larger entities responded. Hence, one could expect to have 
results more typical of the universe for each sector and 
less subject to variation where the greatest number of 
entities responded. 


33 . 


In order to present the estimated economic impact data for all 
nonmanufacturing entities and all employment in the six county 
area, the Department inflated the data obtained from the 
responses. This extrapolation was done for each of the four 
employTCent size groups within each of the sectors and by each 
of eight nonmanufacturing sectors. In this way, a total 
sectorial response and a total for each employment size 
group for all sectors could be obtained. Generally, the 
extrapolation of the respondent's data to the nonmanufacturing 
universe was obtained by using either 1) the ratio of total 
universe employment in each size group and sector to the 
employment in the corresponding respondent size group and 
sector or 2) the ratio for the number of entities in the 
same way. 

Appendix A which identifies the two-digit breakdown of the 
component segments of the sectors according to the Standard 
Industrial Classification is included at the end of this 
section. 


Immediate Impacts 


The period for which immediate impacts of TMI were sought by 
the Department of Commerce was the period extending from 
March 30 through April 6, 1979. This includes the time 
during which the Governor issued his advisories with respect 
to voluntary evacuation and other matters related to the 
incident, such as the closing of schools within the five 
mile radius. It extends almost to the time when the advisories 
were lifted on April 9, 1979. The immediate impacts are 
therefore generally synonymous with the height of the accident 
during the first week. 


Employment Effects - The immediate impacts of the TMI incident 
can be seen by examining the estimated amount of man hours 
lost by the various eight sectors in nonmanufacturing and 
associated wage losses. Man hours lost during the March 
30 to April 6, 1979 period are shown in Table 15 on the 
following page. There were a total of 1,064,841 estimated 
man hours lost by all nonmanufacturing entities; this represents 
an average loss of 4.0 hours per employee. However, there 
was a distinct difference in the amount of losses depending 
upon the size of the entity - for example, small entities 
with less than 20 employees lost an average of 6.6 hours per 
employee while entities employing more than 20 persons lost 
an average of only 2.9 man hours. It appears that the small 
firms bore the greater share of the man hour losses, with 
some sectors feeling more pronounced losses per employee 
than the small firm average, such as transportation and 
public utilities, and services. This tendency toward small 
firms having the larger man hour losses could be linked to 
the occurrence of decisions to let persons off work being 
made by local management, while the larger firms decisions 
may have had to be made at more distant locations. 


34 . 


Wages Lost - The man hour losses, of course, resulted in 
lost wages. An estimated $5.5 million were lost during 
the immediate period of the incident (see Table 16) . This 
averaged out to over $20 per employee for all entities 
irrespective of size. The employees in smaller firms 
(less than 20 employees) sustained an estimated loss of 
around $33 per employee, while those in larger entities 
averaged about $16. There were significant differences 
among sectors - transportation and public utility employees 
in smaller entities experienced an average wage loss of 
over $100, while employees in similar small wholesale trade 
entities lost only around $12 per employee. One sector 
were size of entity was relatively unimportant was the con- 
struction industry, where average wage losses per employee 
were about the same in both small and large entities. 


Table 15 

Man Hours Lost First Week 


Sector 

Total 

Average 

per 

Employee ' 

By Entities 
with less 
than 20 
Employees 

Average 

per 

Employee 

By Entities 
with more 
than 20 
Employees 

Average 

per 

Employee 

Agriculture, etc. 

1,935 

0.7 

755 

0.6 

1,180 

0.7 

Mining 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Construction 

132,438 

5.6 

71,073 

6.2 

61,365 

5.0 

Trans. & Public 
Utilities"^' 

84,479 

3.1 

35,428 

10.5 

49,051 

2.1 

Wholesale Trade 

70,069 

2.8 

31,573 

4.0 

38,496 

2.2 

Retail Trade 

345,060 

3.8 

156,221 

5.9 

188,839 

2.9 

Finance, etc. 

71,438 

3.3 

28,263 

6.0 

43,175 

2.6 

Services 

359,422 

4.9 

191.865 

8.2 

167,557 

2.3 

TOTAL 1 , 

064,841 

4.0 

515,178 

6. 6 

549,663 

2.9 

^^Total man 

hours lost 

in universe 

divided by the 

December , 

1978 



emplo 3 mient. 

2 / 

Does not include data for Metropolitan Edison which is a unique 


case. 

Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, 
Research and Planning. 


35 . 


Table 16 


Wages Lost First Week 


Sector 

Total 

Average 

per 

Employee^/ 

By Entities 
with less 
than 20 
Employees 

Average 

per 

Employee ' 

By Entities 
with more 
than 20 
Employees 

Average 

per 

Employee 

Agriculture, etc 

9,644 

3.3 

3,761 

3.3 

5,883 

3.3 

Mining 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Construction 

1,031,581 

43.3 

525,393 

45.4 

506,188 

41.4 

Trans. & Public 
Utilities^' 

661,827 

24.7 

347,425 

103.0 

314,402 

13.4 

Wholesale Trade 

232,630 

9.1 

95,795 

12.3 

136,835 

7.8 

Retail Trade 

1,943,310 

21.2 

702,302 

26.5 1 

,241,308 

19.0 

Finance, etc. 

243,811 

11.3 

117,090 

24.7 

126,721 

7.5 

Services 

1,351,525 

18.5 

762,216 

32.6 

589,309 

11.8 

TOTAL 

$5,474,328 

20.5 2 

,553,982 

32.9 2 

,920,346 

15.5 


Total wages lost in universe divided by December 1978 employment. 

2 / 

Does not include data for Metropolitan Edison which is a unique 
case. 

Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, 
Research and Planning. 


Work Lost - Another way of examing the immediate employment 
effects of the incident is to look at the data concerning the 
number of employees out of work at some time during the March 
30 to April 6, 1979 (first week) period. Table 17 which follows 
shows that the overall nonmanufacturing sector experienced 
an estimated 42,700 persons out of work due to TMI during 
the first week. This represented 16 percent of the total 
number of employees in the six county area. The data indicates 
that smaller entities had one-quarter of their employees out 
for at least some period of time. It is striking that over 
90 percent of all the employees in the transportation and 
public utilities sector were out of work in the smaller firms 
having less than 20 employees. 


Table 17 


Employees Out of Work First Week 


Establishments by employment size 


Sector 

Total 

0-19 

20-99 

100-249 

250 

Agriculture, etc. 

248 

97 

107 

44 

0 

Mining 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Construction 

4,069 

2,380 

1,495 

194 

0 

Trans. & Pub. Util. 

4,811 

3,058 

573 

425 

755 

Wholesale Trade 

2,832 

782 

604 

732 

714 

Retail Trade 

12,623 

4,440 

5,403 

1,979 

801 

Finance, etc. 

2,770 

808 

633 

91 

1,238 

Services 

15,333 

7,930 

3,308 

1,405 

2,690 

TOTAL 

42,686 

19,495 

12,123 

4,870 

6,198 


Percent of employees 


Agriculture, etc. 

8.6 

8.6 

8.6 

8.6 

0 

Mining 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Construction 

17.1 

20.6 

17.2 

6.7 

0 

Trans. & Pub. Util. 

17.9 

90.6 

8.9 

7.4 

6.7 

Wholesale Trade 

11.1 

10.0 

5.8 

17.3 

24.2 

Retail Trade 

13.8 

16.8 

16.5 

14.2 

4.3 

Finance, etc. 

12.8 

17.0 

12.8 

2.1 

16.2 

Services 

20.9 

33.9 

17.5 

12.9 

13.5 

TOTAL 

16.0 

24.8 

14.5 

11.4 

10.1 


^^Percent of all employees by sector in the six county TMI area as of December, 
1978. 

Source; Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, Research and Planning. 


37 


Supply and Marketing Disruptions - During the TMI incident, 
there was some disruption of nonmanufacturing entities' 
supply and marketing channels for products purchased or 
products sold. The Department of Commerce's study of the 
impacts of TMI found that, at the time of the accident, five 
percent of the nonmanufacturing entities had disruptions in 
supply of products purchased and about 12 percent had 
disruptions in channels for products sold. 

This is remarkably close to the disruption patterns experi- 
enced in the manufacturing sector. In both manufacturing 
and nonmanufacturing only a relatively small share of the 
total establishments/entities were disrupted, and the dis- 
ruption in marketing was the more pronounced. In fact, the 
share of the establishments experiencing marketing dis- 
ruptions was nearly identical in both cases. 

Table 18 displays the distribution of dislocations among the 
smaller and larger firms according to the eight nonmanu- 
facturing sectors. It is significant that contrary to the 
situation which occurred in manufacturing, it was the larger 
nonmanufacturing entities which experienced the greatest 
share of the disruptions, both in supply and in marketing. 
Because of the dominance of smaller firms in nonmanufacturing, 
it is not surprising that most of the actual number of 
disruptions occurred among these firms. However, when the 
entities are classified as either smaller or larger, then it 
can be seen that the share of the entities disrupted is 
greater among larger firms. 

The basic causes for disruption at the time of the accident 
for nonmanufacturing were probably the same as those causing 
disruption in manufacturing - ie., during the crisis period 
thousands of persons evacuated the area, some retail stores 
(including food outlets) and service establishments closed 
for a period of time. Simultaneously, a Teamsters strike 
occurred. For instance, the data collected by Commerce in 
May, 1979 concerning TMI impacts on 16 selected warehousing 
and distribution firms (part of the transportation and 
public utilities sector) revealed that about one-third of 
the establishments experienced some form of disruption 
attributable to TMI in either supply or delivery of pro- 
ducts - and, for some of these firms, the truckers strike 
was even more disruptive than TMI. 

Retail trade, wholesale trade, and services entities account 
for 92 percent of those experiencing dislocations in supply 
and over 98 percent of the marketing distributions. This 
indicates that the disruptions are linked to the decline in 
the number of consumers (resulting from the voluntary evacuation 
or consumer resistance among those who remained) as well as 
transportation interruptions in the flow of commodities 
purchased or sold, or services rendered. 


38 . 


Table 18 


Nonmanufacturing Dislocation 



Total Entities 

Less than 20 

Employees 

More than 20 

Employeei 


Disrupted 

% of 

Disrupted 

% of 

Disrupted 

% of 

Sector 

Entities 

Entities 

Disruption 

Entities Entities 

in Receiving Supply of Products 

Entities 

Entities 

Agriculture, 

etc . 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 


Mining 

12 

46.2 

5 

45.5 

7 

46.7 

Construction 
Trans. & Pub- 

13 

0.4 

0 

0 

13 

5.0 

lie Utilities 
Wholesale 

38 

4.5 

0 

0 

38 

17.9 

Trade 

116 

7.2 

100 

7.7 

16 

5.4 

Retail Trade 

450 

7.3 

266 

5.1 

184 

18.9 

Finance, etc. 

13 

0.9 

0 

0 

13 

8.3 

Services 

364 

5.6 

332 

5.6 

32 

5.5 

TOTAL 

1,006 

5.0 

703 

4.0 

303 

12.0 


Agriculture, 
etc . 

0 

Disruption 

0 

in Marketing 

0 

Products 

0 

0 

0 

Mining 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Construction 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Trans. & Pub- 
lic Utilities 

26 

3.1 

0 

0 

26 

12.3 

Wholesale 

Trade 

571 

35.6 

502 

38.4 

69 

23.2 

Retail Trade 

1,225 

19.9 

930 

17.9 

295 

30.2 

Finance, etc. 

12 

0.8 

0 

0 

12 

7.7 

Services 

565 

8.6 

498 

8.3 

61 

11.5 

TOTAL 

2,399 

11.9 

1,930 

10.9 

469 

18.5 


Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, Research and Planning. 


39 


Value of Business Lost - The estimated total value of busi- 
ness or sales losses during the immediate period of the TMI 
incident was just over $74 million for the entire nonmanu- 
facturing activity in the six county area. The average loss 
per entity was $3,673. (This average value represents the 
losses sustained in each sector where there were reported 
losses by size group of entities.) The value of business 
lost during the first week is shown in Table 19 which follows 
on the next page. 

Overall, the largest business losses were experienced by the 
retail trade, wholesale trade, and the finance, insurance 
and real estate sectors. Over 85 percent of the lost business 
occurred in these three sectors; and retail trade alone 
accounted for 53 percent of the total loss. 

Average loss per entity was highest for finance, insurance, 
and real estate, followed (in order) by wholesale trade and 
retail trade. The largest losses were found in entities 
having more than 20 employees (i.e., the larger firms). 

This should not be surprising, since the larger firms do the 
greatest volume of business, even though they comprise the 
minority of the number of total firms. The average value of 
lost business in the larger firms was nine times that of the 
smaller firms , while total employment in these firms was only 
2.4 times that of the smaller ones. Wholesale and retail 
trade had remarkably similar losses per entity regardless of 
size of firm, even though the total losses in wholesale trade 
were one-third that of retail trade 


Short Term Impacts 

The Pennsylvania Commerce Department's nonmanufacturing 
study also evaluated the TMI impacts after the first week 
crisis period ended. 

The Department of Commerce found that of the 401 entities 
heard from, 199 (nearly 50 percent) expressed the opinion 
that their business had been interrupted due to TMI and that 
their business activity was not at normal levels during the 
time of the crisis. And, by April 9, 1979 - when the Governor's 
advisories were rescinded - 86 entities (about 43 percent) 
were still not back to normal business activity. By contrast, 
the manufacturing study showed that most manufacturing 
plants had returned to normal production by April 4th, and 
the remaining soon thereafter. By the end of April, however, 
the majority of nonmanufacturing firms had returned to 
normal business levels and by the end of May, only 19 out 
of the 199 which had indicated interruptions had not returned 
to normal business activity. 


40 . 


Table 19 


Value of Business Lost 


Total 

Sector million $ 

Average 

per 

Entity^' 

Less than 

20 Employee 
million $ 

Average 
per entity 

More than 

20 employees 
million $ 

Average 
per entity 

Agriculture, etc. 0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Mining 0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

0 

Construction 2.815 

880 

1.096 

373 

1.718 

6,687 

Trans. & Pub- 
lic Utilities^' 1.213 

1,449 

0 

0 

1.213 

5,719 

Wholesale 

Trade 11.050 

6,889 

4.941 

3,783 

6.109 

20,499 

Retail Trade 39.115 
Finance, etc. 13.154 

6,352 

19.767 

3,814 

19.348 

19,824 

8,775 

2.725 

2,029 

10.428 

66,848 

Services 6.842 

1,043 

2.846 

476 

3.996 

6,855 

TOTAL 74.188 

$3,736 

31.376 

$1,873 

42.812 

$17,249 


1/ Value of business lost in universe divided by 12/73 employment in entities 
by size groups for sectors having losses. 

2 / 

The transportation and public utilities sector does not include data for 
Metropolitan Edison which is a unique case, nor for an airline with a 
comparatively large loss whose response arrived after estimates had been 
completed. 


3/ 

One financial institution in the 20-99 employment size group reported 
an extraordinarily large business loss of $500,000. Although the $500,000 
loss was Included in the extrapolations, the remainder of the 20-99 size 
group was inflated by an average of the 0-19 and 100-299 employee size 
group instead of the 20-99 size group. 


Source: Pennsylvania Department of Commerce, Bureau of Statistics, 
Research and Planning. 


41 . 


It is difficult to isolate TMI impacts from all other 
economic factors which may have been the cause of this 
finding. Maybe there were some problems still associated 
with TMI/ but there were many other cogent factors also at 
work. April began a quarter of general decline and a sluggish 
economy. In such a climate, both nonmanufacturing and 
manufacturing activities can be expected to experience 
problems . 


Business Levels - The data gathering effort conducted by the 
Commerce Department in September, 1979, concerning the 
nonmanufacturing firms did not produce data documenting man 
hours lost, wages lost, or value of business lost due to TMI 
for the time beyond the immediate impact period of the 
incident. Rather, it showed that such dollar losses "since 
then" were either none or were not known. 

At the time of the September study, nearly 23 percent (4,560) 
of the total entities in the universe had business levels 
below normal, while 72 percent considered their business 
levels to be normal. Of the total entities which believed 
that their business levels were below normal, more than one half 
(52 percent) were in the retail trade sector and about 28 
percent were engaged in providing services. So a total of 
80 percent of the entities having business below normal by 
September were in these two sectors. See Table 20. 

Viewed from the aspect of the individual sectors, however, 
over 38 percent of all entities in the retail trade sector 
felt their business to be below normal and an estimated 26 
percent of the wholesale trade entities and nearly 24 percent 
of the transportation and public utilities entities believed 
their business was below normal levels. 


Table 20 

Nonmanufacturing Sectors with Below Normal Business 

September, 1979 



Number of 

% 

of all 

Sector 

Entities 

Entities 

Agriculture, etc. 

0 


0 

Mining 

0 


0 

Construction 

58 


1.8 

Transportation & Public 
Utilities 

199 


23.8 

Wholesale Trade 

421 


26.2 

Retail Trade 

2,367 


38.4 

Finance, etc. 

240 


16.0 

Services 

1,275 


19.4 

TOTAL 

4 , 560 


22.6 

Source: Pennsylvania 

Department of Commerce, 

Bureai 


of Statistics, Research and Planning 


42 . 


It should be reiterated here that about 10 percent of the 
firms which responded that their business had been inter- 
rupted due to TMI (19 out of the 199 interrupted) had not 
returned to normal business activity by the end of May, 

1979. After May, however, most of the remaining responding 
firms gradually returned to normal activity from the effects 
of TMI so that, by September 1, 1979, only nine entities 
(about five percent of the 199) had not yet regained normal 
levels of business (and one of these was experiencing a 
strike) . This would indicate that the effects of business 
interruption due to TMI had all but disappeared by September 
1, 1979, and factors other than TMI must have been influencing 
the economy. 


Working Hours - The Department's study in September found 
that an estimated 88 percent of all nonmanufacturing entities 
had average weekly working hours at normal levels. While 
almost nine percent had weekly working hours below normal. 

A higher percentage occurred in the transportation and 
public utilities sector. There an estimated 33 percent of the 
entities experienced below normal average working hours. 

This could be linked to the fact that about 24 percent of 
the entities in this sector felt that their business levels 
were below normal. In this sector, more than the others, 
the declines in business appear to have affected the amount 
of hours worked. Other sectors reporting a high degree of 
below normal working hours are services (about 11 percent) 
and retail trade (about 10 percent) . 


Image Problems - By September 1979, less than five percent 
of the universe of nonmanufacturing entities noted any short 
term image effect from TMI on their product. Only in the 
wholesale trade sector did the image problem appear to be 
noteworthy. Wholesale trade mainly includes the distribution 
and sale of both durable and nondurable goods to retailers 
and trading establishments. Therefore, declines in retail 
businesses can adversely affect wholesale trade. So, while 
image problems may have been felt by the entities, in all 
likelihood the explanation lies in the lessening of business 
activity and consumer demand brought about by a sluggish 
economy as it affected retail establishments. Further evidence 
of this may be seen in the fact that only a little over two 
percent of the retail trade entities felt they were experiencing 
any TMI image problems, but over 38 percent of the retail 
trade firms thought that their levels of business were below 
normal . 

Most nonmanufacturing establishments could not provide a 
dollar value for the short term image effects. Over 96 
percent of the firms responding felt that the TMI incident 
would not have any long term image effect on their business 
activity . 


43 . 


When comparing the opinions concerning the severity of the 
"image problem" between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing 
firms, there would appear to be a lessening of concern about 
image occurring in the business community over time. For 
example, in May, 1979, the manufacturing firms analyzed by 
the Commerce Department indicated that only about 10 percent 
of the total (112 out of 1,141 firms) believed that their 
product had an "image problem" due to the accident. While 
it is recognized that manufacturing is different from non- 
manufacturing, nevertheless business leadership attitudes 
concerning the incident would probably be similar. Thus, 
since less than five percent of the nonmanufacturing firms 
reported image problems in September, this probably reflects 
an improvement over the perceived condition in May. 


Employment Changes - An examination of comparative employ- 
ment trends from the time of the accident through September 
was undertaken to determine TMI ' s significance. This study 
compares employment trends in the Harrisburg, York, Lancaster 
and Lebanon labor market areas (a seven county area surrounding 
the plant) by six sectors of nonmanufacturing (including 
government) in order to determine whether the trends in 1979 
were similar to those in 1978. The purpose was to weigh the 
1979 trends against the sectorial changes as they occurred 
in 1978, and to relate the results of the Department of 
Commerce's study showing the aforementioned short term 
effects to employment trends which have occurred since 
March. 

Table 21 shows employment changes by nonmanufacturing sector 
for the period March through September for both 1979 and 
1978. It should be noted that the March 1979 total nonmanu- 
facturing employment was 369,000, roughly 14,000 jobs 
higher than the previous March of 1978. Between March and 
September, 1979, nonmanufacturing employment grew by about 
4,000 jobs (or just about one percent) compared to a growth 
of 20,000 jobs (roughly six percent) in 1978 over the same 
period. What this shows is that the nonmanufacturing 
economy from March through September in 1979, has not had as 
significant growth as in 1978. More importantly, the wholesale 
and retail trade sectors, which felt much of the brunt of 
TMI in the immediate period of the accident, have shown no 
overall growth in employment. Table 21 reveals that between 
March and June of 1979, total nonmanufacturing employment 
grew by 8,000 jobs, with wholesale and retail trade accounting 
for almost 2,000 of these jobs. What happened then is that 
from June onward, a gradual decline in nonmanufacturing 
employment set in cancelling out over one-half of the employ- 
ment gained. Wholesale and retail trade lost all of the 
employment increases which were gained between March and 
June. So irrespective of TMI, there were employment gains 
in all sectors of nonmanufacturing except government in the 
three months immediately following the accident. 


44 . 


Table 21 


Emplo 3 nnentl/ Changes By Nonmanufacturing Sector^'^ 
By End of Quarter Month, 1978 and 1979 


March-June March-September 


Sector 

March 

June 

Absolute 

Change 

% 

Change 

Sept. 

Absolute 

Change 

% 

Change 

1979 

Contract Construction 

22.9 

25.3 

+2.4 

+10.5 

25.6 

+2.7 

+11.8 

Trans. & Public 
Utilities 

30.6 

31,4 

+0. 8 

+2 . 6 

31.1 

+0.5 

+1. 6 

Wholesale & Retail 
Trade 

116.4 

118.2 

+1.8 

+1.5 

116.4 

0 

0 

Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 

22,4 

22.7 

+0.3 

+1,3 

22.7 

+0.3 

+1.3 

Government 

97.1 

96.8 

-0.3 

-0.3 

94.4 

-2,7 

-2.8 

Other Nonmanufacturing 

80.0 

83.0 

+3.0 

+3.7 

83.1 

+3.1 

+3.9 

TOTAL 

369.4 

377.4 

+8 . 0 

+2.2 

373.3 

+3.9 

+1.1 

1978 

Contract Construction 

20.1 

27.3 

+7.2 

+35.8 

28.4 

+8.3 

+41.3 

Transp. & Public 
Utilities 

29.4 

31.5 

+2. 1 

+7.1 

31.6 

+2.2 

+7.5 

Wholesale & Retail 
Trade 

10« 0 

117.5 

+9.5 

■ H8 . 8 

116.4 

+8.4 

+7.8 

Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 

20.6 

22.0 

+1 . 4 

+6. 8 

22.1 

+1.5 

+7.3 

Government 

96.7 

99.0 

+2.3 

+2 . 4 

94.7 

-2.0 

-2.1 

Other Nonmanufacturing 

80.9 

82.8 

+1.9 

+2.3 

81.9 

+1.0 

+1.2 

TOTAL 

355.7 

380.1 

+24.4 

+6.9 

375.6 

+19.9 

+5. 6 


Employment in thousands and not seasonally adjusted. 

2 / 

Includes Harrisburg, York, Lancaster and Lebanon labor market areas. 
3 / 

Preliminary figures. 

Source: Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Office of 

Employment Security 


45 


Table 22 shows percent changes in employment in nonmanu- 
facturing month by month since March for 1979 and 1978. It 
shows that during April, (first month after the accident) 
employment was nearly one percent higher than that in 
March - and wholesale and retail trade were doing even 
better ( a gain of 1.5 percent). These gains in nonmanu- 
facturing employment during the month of April and through- 
out the period up through June would indicate that TMI had 
no significant adverse affects on nonmanufacturing employment. 

The above statement recognizes that 1979 was not as good a 
year as 1978, but this is probably not a result of TMI, but 
rather due to adverse economic factors at work throughout 
the nation and the State. These include inflation, rising 
interest rates, the dampening effects of OPEC price increases 
and the lessening of available capital for investment. 1978 
was a relative "banner year" when compared to 1979, at least 
in total employment gains. 

After June, the cumulative effects of the slowly worsening 
economy began to "settle in" so that there have been few 
nonmanufacturing sectors gaining any significant employment. 
Except for construction and other nonmanufacturing (which 
includes services) , all other sectors exhibited stagnation 
or losses. Even though total nonmanufacturing employment 
levels were substantially higher in March of this year when 
compared with March of last year, by June and September 
total employment had fallen below the totals for the same 
months of 1978. 

Finally, when comparing the seven county TMI area with the 
Commonwealth and the nation, (see Table 23) , it becomes 
evident that Pennsylvania and the TMI area have not been 
doing as well as the nation as a whole. The March to June 
period in 1978 showed Pennsylvania and the TMI region to be 
ahead of the nation, but during the period June to September 
1978, the State and the region began to fall behind the 
growth in nonmanufacturing experienced in the nation as a 
whole . 

For the same six-month period in 1979, the State and the TMI 
region have remained below the national nonmanufacturing 
rate of employment growth gains. However, it is very 
important to note that the seven county TMI area has been 
doing better than the State as a whole since June (i.e., its 
declines have not been as great) . 


46 . 


Table 22 


Nonmanuf acturing Employment Comparisons, 1978 and 19191 ! 


Percent Changes 



March/April 

April/May 

May /June 

June/July 

July/Aug . 

Aug. /Sept 

Sector 

Change 

Change 

Change 

Change 

Change 

Change 

1979 

Contract Con- 
struction 

+3.1 

+4.7 

+2.4 

+2.8 

-0.4 

-1.2 

Transp. & Public 
Utilities 

+1.0 

+0.3 

+1.3 

-0.6 

+0.3 

-0.6 

Wholesale & 

Retail Trade 

+1.5 

0 

0 

-0.6 

-0.2 

-0.8 

Finance, Insurance 
and Real Estate 

0 

-0.4 

+1. 8 

-0.4 

+0.4 

0 

Government 

+0.3 

+1.0 

-1.6 

-3.3 

-0.3 

+1.2 

Other Nonmanufact. 

+0.2 

+1.7 

+1.7 

-0.2 

+0.2 

+0.1 

TOTAL 

+0. 8 

+1.0 

+0.3 

-1.0 

0 

0 






(-0.05) 

(-0.05) 

1978 

Contract Con- 
struction 

+14.4 

+13.5 

+4.6 

+2.9 

+2.5 

-1.4 

Transp. & Public 
Utilities 

+1.-, 

+6.0 

-0.3 

-0.3 

0 

+0 . 6 

Wholesale & 

Retail Trade 

+1.0 

+6 . 8 

+0.9 

-0.3 

-0.3 

-0.3 

Finance, Insurance 
& Real Estate 

+1.9 

+3.3 

+1.4 

0 

+0.9 

-0.5 

Government 

+0.1 

+2.6 

-0.3 

-4.7 

-0.5 

+1.0 

Other Nonmanufact. 

+1.1 

-0.6 

+1.8 

-0.5 

0 

-0.6 

TOTAL 

+1.6 

+4 , 1 

+1.0 

-1.3 

0 

0 






(+0.03) 

(+0.05) 

^^Includes Harrisburg, York, 

Lancaster 

and Lebanon 

labor market 

areas . 



2 / 


September 


figures are preliminary. 


Source: Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Office of 

Employment Security. 


47 . 


Table 23 


Nonmanufacturing Employment Trend Comparisons 
U.S., Pa. and Seven County TMI Area 


Area 


March-June 
% change 
1978 


March-June 
% change 
1979 


June-Sept . 
% change 
1978 


June-Sept . 
% change 
1979 


u . s . 

3.8 

Pa. 

4.6 

7 county TMI area 

6.9 


2.9 

+ 0.5 

+ 0.7 

2.3 

- 1.3 

- 1.6 

2.2 

- 1.2 

- 1.1 


Source: Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry, Office of 

Employment Security. 


This story of declining employment trends in nonmanufact- 
uring in all likelihood explains why some nonmanufacturing 
entities were finding themselves "below normal since TMI" 

(23 percent of the entities ) , or felt they were experiencing 
"image problems" (five percent of the entities) , or had "below 
average weekly working hours" (nine percent of the entities) 
by September, 1979 - six months after the TMI accident. 

It should be pointed out that most nonmanufacturing firms 
were at "normal levels" by September. Given the state of 
the national economy, it is a credit to the stability of the 
region's economy, that the TMI region is doing as well as it 
is. Some firms in September were even at "above normal" 
business levels (six percent of the entities) , and some 
were having above normal weekly working hours (3 percent of 
the entities) . 


Small Business Effects 


On April 18, 1979, Governor Dick Thornburgh requested the 
Small Business Administration to declare an economic disaster 
area in southcentral Pennsylvania counties affected by the Three 
Mile Island incident. His request was made in order to 
entitle area merchants, farmers and businessmen who 
sustained economic losses as a result of the incident to 
receive SBA loans at significantly reduced rates, as well 
as certain forms of economic and technical assistance. 

Governor Thornburgh noted that economic hardships had been 
brought about by the incident and the precautionary measures 
it necessitated - including the limited evacuation of preg- 
nant women and young children and the placement of Civil 
Defense forces on alert status. As a result, he recognized 
that normal business activity had been disrupted and firms 
had experienced millions of dollars in losses. He believed 
that these businesses qualified for the economic injury 
assistance which SBA can provide. 


48 . 


An assessment of the impacts on small businesses was deve- 
loped via an examination of the number of applications for 
business loans from the Small Business Administration. In 
the beginning of May, SBA established temporary offices to 
receive applications for loans in Harrisburg, York, and 
Lancaster. Later in May an office was set up in Middletown. 

The SBA loans must be for economic injuries suffered because 
of the TMI incident. Proof of the injury must be furnished 
with the loan application. Loans can only be provided for 
the losses not recoverable through normal commercial channels, 
or internal resources. The SBA will accept TMI related 
applications until January 28, 1980. Loans up to $100,000 
can be made available at an interest rate of 7 3/8 percent 
annually for a period of up to 30 years. The actual repay- 
ment period can be shorter and is determined by an applicant's 
ability to repay the loan. 

As of November 15, 1979, SBA had conducted over 475 inter- 
views with potential applicants to explore eligibility. As 
a result, 64 applications have been accepted. The dollar 
amount associated with these eligible applications was 
nearly $3.3 million. Most accepted applications were from 
retail establishments and the main cause of the loss due to 
TMI was the drop in sales prior to Easter. Another group 
affected were realtors which experienced a slight downturn 
in activity following the accident. Thus far, 22 applica- 
tions have been approved for loans amounting to $510,000 and 
31 applications ’ ^ve been declined by SBA. Ten applications 
were still bein.., processed by mid-November. One application 
for $12,000 has been withdrawn. 

Because of the nature of the SBA program and its eligibility 
requirements for borrowing money, those firms which had 
experienced financial trouble prior to the TMI incident were 
rejected because they could not establish that their problem 
was due to TMI alone. Also, establishments which can easily 
obtain credit through normal commercial financial channels 
or which can absorb the losses with their existing resources 
are not reflected in the figures above, because they would 
be ineligible. 

Many members of the business community did not apply to the 
federal government for help. Since the closing date for the 
program is not until the end of January, it could be anticipated 
that many business owners are waiting until the end of this 
calendar year to assess their financial condition before 
deciding whether or not to apply for a loan. 

At the present time only the Harrisburg office remains open; 
the Middletown office closed in mid-June and the Lancaster 
and York offices closed in mid-August due to lack of activity. 
Most of the interest in the SBA program was shown in May and 
June . 


49 . 


Nonmanufacturing Unemployment Compensation Claims - The 
description of the unemployment claims filed as a result of 
TMI has been well covered in the section on manufacturing. 
The information indicated that 239 of the total initial 
claims (one-third of the total) occurred in nonmanufacturing 
sectors. Of the continued claims - 1,032 or almost 70 
percent of the total also are in nonmanufacturing. The 
majority of the nonmanufacturing claims are in the con- 
struction sector. 


50 . 


APPENDIX A 


Division 

01 

02 

07 

08 

09 

Division 

10 
11 
12 

13 

14 


Division 

15 

16 
17 

Division 

Division 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 
4 5 

46 

47 

48 

49 

Division 

50 

51 


STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
DIVISIONS BY 2-DIGIT BREAKDOWN 


A. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 

Agricultural Production - Crops 
Agricultural Production - Livestock 
Agricultural Services 
Forestry 

Fishing, Hunting and Trapping 

B. Mining 

Metal Mining 
Anthracite Mining 

Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining 
Oil and Gas Extraction 

Mining and Quarrying of Nonmetallic Minerals, 
Except Fuels 

C. Construction 

Building Construction - General Contractors and 
Operative Builders 

Construction Other Than Building Construction - 
General Contractors 

Construction - Special Trade Contractors 

D. Manufacturing (20-39) 

E. Transportation and Public Utilities 
Railroad Transportation 

Local and Suburban Transit and Interurban Highway 
Passenger Transportation 

Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing 

U.S. Postal Service 

Water Transportation 

Transportation by Air 

Pipe Lines, Except Natural Gas 

Transportation Services 

Communication 

Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 

F. Wholesale Trade 

Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 
Wholesale Trade - Nondurable Goods 


51 . 


Division G. 


Retail Trade 


52 

Building Materials, Hardware, Garden Supply, and 
Mobile Home Dealers 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

59 

General Merchandise Stores 

Food Stores 

Automotive Dealers and Gasoline Service Stations 
Apparel and Accessory Stores 

Furniture, Home Furnishings, and Equipment Stores 
Eating and Drinking Places 

Miscellaneous Retail 

Disivion 

H. Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 

60 

61 

62 

Banking 

Credit Agencies Other Than Banks 

Security and Commodity Brokers, Dealers, Exchanges 
and Services 

63 

64 

65 

66 

Insurance 

Insurance Agents, Brokers, and Service 

Real Estate 

Combinations of Real Estate, Insurance, Loans, 

Law Offices 

67 

Holding and Other Investment Offices 

Division 

I. Services 

70 

Hotels, Rooming Houses, Camps, and Other Lodging 
Places 

72 

73 

75 

76 

78 

79 

Personal Services 

Business Services 

Automotive Repair, Services, and Garages 
Miscellaneous Repair Services 

Motion Pictures 

Amusement and Recreation Services, Except Motion 
Pictures 

80 

81 

82 

83 

84 

Health Services 

Legal Services 

Educational Services 

Social Services 

Museums, Art Galleries, Botanical and Zoological 
Gardens 

85 

88 

89 

Membership Organizations 

Private Households 

Miscellaneous Services 

Source : 

Standard Industrial Classification Manual, Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Management and 
Budget, Statistical Policy Division, 1972 


52 . 


NONMANUFACTURING 


Tourism 


Pennsylvania's tourism business is one of the state's largest 
industries. It is the generator of 180,000 jobs and nearly 
$300 million in state tax revenues, based upon total annual 
traveler expenditures of about $4.7 billion a year. Visitors 
usually spend about $600 million a year touring in south- 
central Pennsylvania alone. 

The tourist industry was directly affected by the TMI incident 
— businesses and employees were both impacted. Events 
which followed soon after the TMI incident created additional 
hardships for the industry. The Amish polio scare in May, 
the gasoline shortage which started in Pennsylvania in June, 
and the slowly worsening condition of the national economy 
as reflected in rising unemployment and increasing inflation 
are major contributors to the decline in tourism. Because 
of this, it is difficult to separate the individual impacts 
on tourism created by each of these events; nor is it easy 
to accurately measure the extent to which tourism has 
recovered from TMI, or to diagnose what the exact long term 
effects of TMI on tourism will be. In any case, because of 
the early recognition of adverse TMI impacts, the federal 
Economic Development Administration in the U.S. Department 
of Commerce has awarded a $50,000 grant to the Pennsylvania 
Department of Commerce for a tourist advertising effort to 
overcome this problem. 


Impacts on Convention and Commercial Activity 


Immediate Impacts - In the 30 day period following the inci- 
dent at TMI, a small sample of tourist-related businesses 
within a six county area surrounding the plant was contacted 
by the Bureau of Travel Development in the Pennsylvania Depart- 
ment of Commerce for the purpose of identifying the immediate 
short-term losses incurred as a result of the crisis. 

Lancaster, Harrisburg and Gettysburg were used as study 
areas. Information was obtained from ten major lodging and 
convention sites employing an average 2,625 persons; it 
indicated that initial sales losses of nearly $2 million 
were directly attributable to TMI. Such losses included the 
cancellation of the National Hardware Dealers' spring 
convention at the Pennsylvania Farm Show Building in Harris- 
burg -- resulting in an estimated loss of $500,000 in receipts 
to the area's businesses. This particular convention loss 
resulted in the cancellation of reservations of 2,300 rooms 
in major lodging establishments in and around the Harrisburg 
area, and there were other conference and reservation cancel- 
lations at the time of TMI as well. 


53 . 


Overall, motel/hotel occupancy rates dipped drastically be- 
cause a number of conferences and conventions scheduled for 
the month of April were cancelled. While hotel/motel 
reservations suffered because of the decline in convention 
and conference business, there were some lodging accommo- 
dations which profited, with April business being above 
normal. They were those which hosted the hundreds of 
reporters, engineers, medical personnel and others who were 
responding to the accident. 

Based upon the $2.0 million in lost sales revenues experienced 
by the ten major lodging and convention sites, the Depart- 
ment extrapolated the data to reflect the estimated sales 
losses in the six county area around TMI. The estimated 
immediate short term loss is on the order of $5 million. 

This calculation utilized an average sales loss of $762 
associated with each employee in the sample and the 1976 
employment in all 244 lodging and convention establishments 
in the six county area (6,240) around TMI. 

The estimated $5 million in immediate short term losses does 
not represent the total which was sustained by the tourism 
community. The figure would certainly be higher if additional 
establishments such as independent restaurants, service 
stations, and entertainment sites were to be considered. 

Nor does it include wage losses of employees in the tourism 
industry -- some tourist businesses made cutbacks in employ- 
ment in order to offset their losses of income. 


Short-Term Impacts 


In early November, the Department of Commerce conducted a 
follow-up survey of the same areas. Results from the second 
survey indicate continued losses, with most businesses 
attributing the decline to spring and summer gasoline 
shortages . 

Harrisburg experienced the greatest loss. Bus tour bookings 
for 1980 were ahead of last year in the Lancaster area, but 
were below normal in Harrisburg. TMI was not considered a 
significant factor for declining business in Gettysburg. 

Lancaster - Lancaster area business losses attributed to TMI 
lasted approximately three to four weeks. As the tourist 
season progressed, other factors including a small outbreak 
of polio among the Amish and the gasoline crunch contributed 
to the decline. Area businesses ranked TMI third among the 
three factors considered responsible for the decrease. At 
the time of the survey, however, bus tour bookings for 1980 
were well ahead of last year. 


/ 


54 . 


Harrisburg - Harrisburg area businesses experienced severe 
and immediate short term losses. As the summer progressed, 
the percentage of decline decreased indicating possible 
image improvement for the area. Most area businesses 
assigned the major portion of their losses to the gasoline 
shortage even though the immediate losses resulting from the 
accident were severe enough to be considered major for 
Harrisburg . 

So far, 1980 bus tour bookings are slightly below normal, 
and may reflect the apprehension of potential visitors 
because of the area's close proximity to TMI . 

Somewhat unique to the situation was the concern of this 
area's business managers and owners that TMI "won't go 
away". Recurring or new problems at the nuclear site are 
considered to be very newsworthy, and thus unwelcomed by the 
business community. These same private sector entrepreneurs 
remain skeptical about the value of TMI as a new tourist 
attraction. 

Gettysburg - Gettysburg tourism losses attributed to the 
accident were not considered significant by area businesses. 
Only during the two weeks following the incident was TMI 
considered responsible for any losses. The distance separating 
Gettysburg from TMI is probably a strong contributing factor 
to this finding. Area businesses in the sample concurred in 
blaming the gasoline crisis for tourist season losses. 


Tourist Travel Plans - Several weeks after the TMI incident, 
private sector hoteliers, restaurateurs, and other travel 
industry members sponsored a research study to determine the 
existing and projected effects of the TMI incident on 
tourism. A consultant was retained by the tourist industry 
to determine the longer term impact of TMI on travel plans. 

The study was conducted in late April through the use of a 
telephone inquiry of six geographic areas in and around 
Pennsylvania. This survey, it is important to note, was 
carried out prior to the emergence of other factors (the 
polio outbreak, the gasoline shortage, economic downturn, 
etc.) which later had a great bearing on tourism during the 
summer season. A total of 608 interviews were conducted in 
the following areas: 

Allentown/Reading/Scranton/Wilkes-Barre 

Baltimore 

Cleveland 

Long Island (New York) 

Northern New Jersey 
Philadelphia/Wilmington 


55 . 


Those questioned were household heads who intended to travel 
by car or bus during the succeeding six months, and who 
would bring along one or more pre-teen children on the trip. 
The study found that 98 percent of all the respondents were 
aware of the TMI incident, therefore, their decision to 
travel to Pennsylvania could have been heavily influenced by 
the TMI event. 


Impacts on Travel Plans - The study found that two percent 
of all households queried would avoid traveling to Pennsyl- 
vania by car or bus because of concerns relating to TMI , 
nuclear power, nuclear plants, radiation, and fallout. The 
seven selected travel destinations are listed below, along 
with the percentage of households which indicated they would 
avoid these areas. 

Gettysburg 
Harrisburg 
Hershey 

Lancaster/Dutch Country 
Poconos 
Philadelphia 
Pittsburgh 

It is obvious that Harrisburg and its association with 
nearby TMI was the only selected area where a notable share 
of the respondents did not want to visit. But of equal 
interest is the fact that only approximately one percent of 
the family travelers would avoid the other six selected 
areas -- hence the share which would have avoided these 
destinations was less than the share which indicated they 
would avoid traveling to the state as a whole. 

Because of the national news coverage, the TMI incident re- 
ceived, it is remarkable that such a small percentage of the 
family travelers' plans were found to be negatively affected. 
Nevertheless, during the summer the experience of the tourist 
industry led it to believe that TMI did have a continuing 
impact on tourism, even though it is felt that other factors 
have played a more dominant role in creating the general 
tourism malaise. For example, findings in mid-August 
indicate that tourism in Lancaster County was off 50 percent 
this year (off $150 million) , partly because of the nuclear 
accident . 


Less than 1% 
6 % 

1 % 

1 % 

Less than 1% 
Less than 1% 
Less than 1% 


Testimony of James R. Bartlett, Executive Director of 
the Pennsylvania Dutch Visitors Bureau, before the House 
Select Committee Investigating Three Mile Island, August 
22, 1979. 


56 . 


visitor Center Totals - The Department of Commerce coopera- 
tes with local travel agencies across the Commonwealth in 
the maintenance of visitor information centers. A log of 
visitors to these centers is maintained and is forwarded to 
the Bureau of Travel Development on a monthly basis. 
Information on the total number of visitors recorded at 
visitor information centers in the 20 mile radius (Cumber- 
land and York centers) , as well as those recorded at centers 
in the rest of the state, is shown in Table 24 on the 
following page. This data indicates that the number of 
visitors at these centers and in the rest of the state has 
been declining since April when compared with the previous 
year. The rate of decline increased from April through July 
but improved during August and September. The decline in 
visitors at the Cumberland and York centers was steeper than 
in the rest of the state during May through August but less 
than the state decline in September. The steeper decline 
may have reflected the effects of TMI and the polio out- 
break -- two experiences which are relatively unique to this 
area. But after the summer months, this effect seems to 
have abated. 


Commonwealth Media Campaign - To combat the economic losses 
incurred or anticipated by the travel industry as a result 
of TMI, the Department of Commerce will undertake a media 
advertising campaign in the spring of 1980, before the 
actual travel season begins. The campaign will attempt to 
counteract the negative publicity produced by the nuclear 
accident. It's thrust will be directed toward projecting an 
"all-clear" image for Pennsylvania. The advertising campaign 
is expected to assist in overcoming any long term effects of 
TMI which may harm Pennsylvania's image as a place to enjoy 
natural, man-made, ethnic, historical and cultural attractions 
for family visits and group meetings. An Economic Develop- 
ment Administration grant of $50,000 has been given to 
Pennsylvania to assist in conducting this campaign. 

TMI as a Tourism Generator - Since the TMI incident created 
so much national publicity, the site of the plant has become 
an attraction of sorts for the tourist and the curious. The 
Metropolitan Edison Company since 1970 has maintained a 
visitors' center and observation facility adjacent to the 
plant which, before the incident, normally attracted an 
average of 16,000 people a year, mostly school groups and 
occasional passers-by. The largest daily attendance prior 
to the incident was 350 visitors. 

As a result of the crisis, the center was closed during 
April, May and June. It reopened July 7, 1979, with a 19 
minute video tape produced by the utility explaining the 
accident and radiation emitted. On the first day, 1,200 
visitors came to the center. The second day 900 visitors 
arrived. Since reopening, the center has been operating six 
days a week, and visited by an average of 2,347 persons per 


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58 . 


week. Average daily attendance is running higher than 
before the incident. Between July 7 and October 31 the 
center was visited by 38,718 people. This compares to a 
total of 14,000 for the entire year of 1978. 

Because of the increased number of visitors to TMI , it is 
estimated that some tourist dollars are flowing into the 
area as a result of the accident, which may tend to offset 
some of the losses suffered during the tourist season. 
However, as indicated previously, Harrisburg area businesses 
are skeptical about the value of TMI as a tourist attraction. 


59 . 


NONMANUFACTURING 


IMPACTS ON HOUSING AND PROPERTY VALUES 


Findings 


The Three Mile Island accident had a noticeable effect on 
the real estate market within a five mile radius surrounding 
the plant in the months immediately following the accident. 
This effect diminishes with distance from the plant site, 
and the latest available data indicates that the impact may 
be dissipating. 

According to a study done of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Community Affairs, the major impacts of TMI are a decreased 
number of homes sold, and a longer selling period for homes 
on the market within the five mile radius. Data for these 
two factors, when compared to data for the corresponding 
months in 1978, reveals substantial differences. These 
impacts may be short term, since housing market data for the 
third quarter of 1979, appears to be more encouraging. An 
added indicator of the impact of TMI is that the effect 
statistically diminishes outside of the 5 mile radius. 

Although housing sale price seems somewhat depressed, this 
does not in itself comprise as substantial an impact as the 
number of houses sold and days on the market. Here again, 
the five mile radius exhibits the deepest deflation, yet 
appears to recover in August. Realtors noted a few incidences 
of loss of sales due to TMI, but no panic selling. Property 
values were also influenced by other extenuating circumstances 
such as the relatively harsh winter-spring of 1978-79 and 
the uncertainty of mortgage funds. It is impossible to 
precisely identify where one impact ends and another begins 
in analyzing a universe as variable as the real estate 
market. 

The DCA analysis was done on the basis of 5 mile concentric 
circles from the TMI plant site. By comparison, a second 
study done by the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue on an 
aggregated county by county basis, found no definitive 
effect of the TMI accident or property values. This analysis 
is explained in greater detail in the Impacts on Government 
chapter . 

Within the new construction market, TMI and other constraints 
such as unavailable, or expensive mortgage money and high 
interest rates have had a depressing effect. Again, the 
greatest drop occurs in the 5 mile radius, decaying over 
distance from TMI, and recovering substantially by August. 
Builder expectations also reflects a residential building 
downturn focusing on the 0-5 mile ring, because of TMI. 

This may be a speculative appraisal, however. Construction 
employment was lower in Harrisburg compared to other areas, 
but many extraneous variables make a direct correlation with 
TMI difficult. 


60 . 


Continued monitoring and analysis of property value data 
over the coming months is necessary before a conclusion 
statement on the impact of TMI can be drawn with any confidence. 


Study Design - To investigate the effect of the nuclear 
accident (TMI) on the real estate market, the Pennsylvania 
Department of Community Affairs recorded all residential 
real estate transactions by 5 mile concentric rings from 
Three Mile Island. The data came from two sources in order 
to cross check the findings; the Central Penn Multi-List, 
representative of many homes for sale in the TMI 20 mile 
radius; and the State Tax Equalization Board (STEB) Assessor's 
Office, covering all homes sold within the 20 mile radius of 
TMI. Data from Central Penn Multi-List, Inc. for the years 
1977-1979 are available on a quarterly basis from the firm's 
Comparable Book. In this publication, residential properties 
settled in the prior quarter are listed by area and indicate 
time on the market, list price and sale price. In the third 
quarter of 1979, sales through the Multi-List service con- 
stituted 53 percent of all sales in the area described by a 
5 mile radius from Three Mile Island. By and large, the 
larger firms are members. Thus, the Multi-List data represent 
a fair sample of real estate transactions, especially in the 
5 mile radius. 

The Central Penn Multi-List service also encompasses most of 
the area described by a 20 mile radius from TMI and thus, 
when we examine figures for the total Multi-List area, we 
are considering most of the geographic area surrounding TMI. 


Number of Homes Sold - From the STEB data, the number of 
homes sold declined appreciably in a similar time period 
May-July, 1978 and 1979. A pattern can be noted in Table 25 
as the degree of impact increased from May to July, and 
generally decreased with distance from TMI. 


The data from the Central Penn Multi-List (information by 
quarters) do not show a decline from 1978 in the number of 
homes sold in the total 20 mile radius. However, the data 
does show a distinct decrease of homes sold in the 5 mile 
radius when compared to the second quarter of 1978. (See 
Table 27) . 


Residential Home Values - With respect to sale price, yearly 
appreciation values must be considered. The U.S. League of 
Savings and Loan Associations reports that between April 
1978 and April 1979, the average price of existing housing 
in the Northeastern U.S. increased from $52,600 to $61,000, 
an increase of 16 percent. The average price of Central 


61 . 


Tabic 25 


Resldeatial Sales by Mop.eh 





M4Y 


JLiiE: 

JOL 







Z 

% 



Z 



1978 

1979 

Chaage 

1978 1979 Change 

197_8 

1979 

Chaage 






0-5 Male Radius 




if Sales 


42 

28 

-33 

63 41 - 35 

49 

12 

- 75 

Average 

Value 

32,599 

34,154 

4.8 

35,526 34,694 - 2.3 

34,532 

35,587 

3.1 






5-10 Mile Pv.adius 




?:•’ Sales 


123 

136 

10.5 

185 161 - 13 

141 

86 

- 39 

Average 

Value 

37,927 

44,640 

17.7 

44,983 47,433 5.4 

42,291 

46,935 

11.1 






10-15 Mile Radius 




Sales 


553 

512 

-8.2 

679 614 -9.5 

709 

540 

-23.8 

Average 

Value 

33,571 

40,139 

9.8 

35,343 41,828 18.3 

39,396 

40,099 

1-8 






15-20 Mile Radius 




Sales 


249 

210 

-15.7 

275 230 -16.7 

235 

185 

-21.3 

Average 

Va.lue 

34,450 

44,857 

30.2 

36,482 41,328 13.3 

34,957 

40,645 

16.3 


Rqualiaaiioa Board; Assessor's Office. 


Source: State Ta:< 



Pennsylvania houses is not as high as the base figure in 
1978. It was $42,227 or approximately $10,000 less. For 
the quarter prior to the TMI accident, the increase of 1979 
price over the 1978 price was only 0.8 percent. For the 
quarter subsequent to the TMI accident, the increase was 9.7 
percent. The increase climbed to 12 percent in the third 
quarter of 1979. Therefore, though not performing at the 
level of the regional norm, both the STEB data and the 
Central Penn Multi-List data show increases in housing value 
from the previous year, 1978, for the total area. 

The 5 mile radius, though, shows an actual drop in housing 
value in the June STEB data as can be seen in Table 25. The 
number of transactions in the 5 mile radius is relatively 
small, and a few low value transactions could have depressed 
the average value. However, the sluggish increases and some 
decrease are significant. A guarded interpretation (due to 
the small number of cases) is that the average value of 
residential real estate transactions in the 5 mile radius is 
less than might be expected subsequent to the TMI accident. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the housing 
values from 1978 to 1979 are less depressed with distance 
from TMI. In the third quarter of 1979, the increase over 
one year previous within the 5 mile radius was 19 percent, 
indicative of a possible upturn. 

Figuring 30-60 days between a sales contract and closing, 
the TMI related effects are calculated to occur beginning in 
May, and carry through thereafter. As related above, there 
does appear to be negative effect in the 0-5 mile radius. 
Values appear to be slightly depressed in the 5-10 mile 
radius and 10-15 mile radius in that June and July values 
are less than 16 percent in Ring 2 and the July value is 
only 1.8 percent in Ring 3. Ring 4 showed healthy increases 
of 13.3 percent and 16.3 percent in June and July. 


Real Estate Buyer Resistance - Following residential home 
values change, a second indicator of real estate buyer 
resistance in the TMI area is the number of days settled 
properties were on the market. With regard to days on the 
market for the total area, the average number of days on the 
market in the quarter following the accident was 82.7 and 
for the quarter one year previous the value was 81.6 (see 
previous summary table) . There is no significant difference. 
The second quarter of 1979 shows a marked decrease in days 
on the market over the quarter previous. The third quarter 
is likewise lower than the second. There would appear to be 
no resistance to buying as indicated by this statistic when 
considering the total area (20 mile radius from TMI). 


62 . 


Table 27 


Residential Sales by Quarters: Comparison 1978 to 1979 


Second Quarter Third Quarter 


1978 1979 

% Change 

1978 

1979 

% Change 

Number Sold 





0-5 mile 

radius 64 53 

Total 20 

mile 

- 17.2 

41 

48 

17.1 

radius 1,020 1,075 

5.4 

1,165 

1,140 

- 2.1 

Sold Price Average 





0-5 mile 

radius 38,460 38,735 

Total 20 

0.7 

34,012 

40,686 

19.6 

mile 

radius 42,751 46,903 

9.7 

44,114 

49,573 

12.4 

Days on Market Average 





0-5 mile 

radius 71.0 93.4 

Total 20 

mile 

31.5 

65.5 

59.6 

- 9 

radius 81.6 82.7 

+ 1.3 

73.5 

73.5 

0 


Source: Central Penn Multi-List, Inc. 


63 


For the 5 mile radius area, there is an appreciable dif- 
ference in days on the market in the second quarter of 1979 
as compared to the same quarter of 1978. Submitting the 
data to a "t" test, the difference is significant at the .10 
level of significance. Thus, the data indicate some pos- 
sibility of buyer resistance in the 5 mile radius area but 
the evidence is not overwhelming. Time on the market 
decreased in the third quarter which suggests than any 
effect was short-lived. 


The Real Estate Industry Perspective - The realtor perception 
of residential sales is another indicator of buyer reaction. 
In July, the Department of Community Affairs queried 15 real 
estate agencies practicing in the area immediate to the 
plant (5 mile radius) about their experiences concerning the 
effects of the incident on the real estate market. Of 
particular interest was information on sales resistance, the 
occurrences of buyers backing out of contracts made prior to 
TMI , and any changes in the value of properties since the 
incident. The results of the study are shown on Table 28. 

Table 28 

Realtor Study Responses 


Potential Impacts Yes 

Resistance to Sales 4 11 

Buyers Backing Out of Contracts 3 12 

Lower Property Values 1 14 

Source: Pennsylvania Department of Community 

Affairs 


As pertaining to sales resistance, only four realtors felt 
that there was some resistance as measured by their volume 
of business. Even for these, business had returned to 
normal by the month of May. Two reported that there was 
slight resistance within sight of the cooling towers. 

Buyers from out-of-town were more likely to be cautious 
about buying in the immediate area. In general, by the time 
of the study, real estate market activity seemed to be 
normal for that time of year. Any sluggishness of the 
market was attributed more to high interest rates and 
tightness of mortgage money than to the TMI incident. 


64 . 


The problem of buyers backing out of contracts because of 
the TMI incident was experienced by three realtors. One 
Middletown realtor reported this had happened up to eight 
times - the others reported that it occurred once or twice. 
From this preliminary reporting, at least some buyers had a 
concern about living in proximity to Three Mile Island. 


Population Movement 


There has not been any widespread outmigration from the area 
surrounding the Three Mile Island plant since the accident. 
Many individuals, however, have considered moving. A study 
by Mountain West Research found that 19 percent of persons 
surveyed in a 15 mile radius had considered moving because 
of the accident with 22 percent having definitely decided to 
move (4 percent of the total) . Evacuees were three times 
more likely to have considered moving than non-evacuees. 

The Pennsylvania Department of Health in its census of all 
residents in the five mile radius found that 150 households 
had moved since the accident. In interviews with 55 of the 
150, they found that 29% (16) had moved because of TMI. 
Elementary school enrollments in the five mile radius also 
fail to show any noticeable out-migration trend. So, while 
a significant proportion of the population surrounding TMI 
have considered moving due to the accident, only a very 
small percentage have actually relocated. 


65 . 


NONMANUFACTURING 


IMPACTS ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
Construction Employment 


To analyze the effects of the TMI nuclear accident on the 
construction industry, data on contract construction employ- 
ment were obtained from the Bureau of Employment Security of 
the Department of Labor and Industry. These data were 
analyzed by staff of the Department of Community Affairs. 

Data were obtained by month for 1978 and 1979 for the 
Harrisburg Labor Market Area (LMA) and those market areas of 
York, Lancaster and Lebanon. In total these areas constitute 
the seven county area of: Dauphin, Cumberland, Perry, York, 
Adams, Lebanon and Lancaster counties. Data were also 
obtained for comparison purposes from the Allentown-Bethlehem- 
Easton (ABE) area, an area outside the Three Mile Island 
area, and for the entire state of Pennsylvania. Table 29 
shows percentage change by month in 1979 over employment in 
the same month one year previous. 

The Harrisburg LMA shows declines in employment for all of 
1979, compared with 1978, and these declines are most marked 
beginning in April, the start of the spring construction 
season. During this time, construction employment increased 
in actual numbers month by month, but the levels were not 
nearly what they had been one year previous. The state as a 
whole began showing declines also in April 1979, indicating 
something of a depression in the industry. The total seven 
county area also showed declines beginning in April, 1979. 
However, the declines in the Harrisburg LMA were most sig- 
nificant probably due to the end of Harristown construction 
described in more detail below. The Allentown-Bethlehem- 
Easton area also registered declines. Noting the data for 
the state and ABE, not all of the decline in Harrisburg can 
be attributed to purely local reasons. 

It is quite likely that construction employment in Harris- 
burg was higher than usual in 1978 because of the Harristown 
project. That project was essentially completed by 1979. 

There was a significant increase in employment by May 1978 
over March of that year - an increase of 2400 workers or 
about 50 percent. Beginning from a slightly smaller base in 
March 1979 (200 fewer) , there was a more modest increase by 
May of 800 or 10.6 percent. For the state in the same 
period, the increase was 17.7 percent. For the period 
March-August 1979, Harrisburg increased by 14.7 percent and 
the state increased by 23.3 percent. Applying the state 
rate of increase to the Harrisburg area, the expected 
employment would be 9,248. The actual value in August for 
Harrisburg was 8,600. A difference of 648 might be attributed 


to local effects. Although the rate of increase in con- 
struction employment in Harrisburg is not up to 1978 levels, 
factors other than TMI could well have caused the lowered 
rate. As a matter of fact, the monthly absolute construction 
employment figures increase modestly over the spring and 
summer months. Hence, TMI is a doubtful cause of sluggish 
construction employment. 


New Residential Construction 


The rate and scale of new construction activity is a major 
determination of the economic health of an area. It is 
sensitive to public perception of safety and vitality of any 
location. The construction of new units is a good indicator 
of the confidence of the population in living in the TMI 
area. Constructing a new home is a substantial investment 
requiring much time and thought concerning location choice. 
The impacts of TMI on new construction can be measured by an 
examination of local new construction permit data in permit 
issuing places. Also, the trend in construction beginning 
with April, 1979, can be reflective of the impact of the TMI 
incident. 

New Construction Starts - The Pennsylvania Department of 
Community Affairs has examined new residential construction 
units in the 5, 10, 15 and 20 mile radii from TMI. It was 
felt that any impacts of the incident would be seen first 
and most keenly within communities located close to the 
plant. It should be remembered that in addition to whatever 
effects TMI may be having there are other serious economic 
factors which are certainly influencing new construction 
starts. Mortgage money, while available, now has interest 
rates well above 12 percent. In the U.S., residential 
construction costs are over 16 percent higher than last 
year. With talk of recession, people have become cautious 
in initiating contracts for new construction, and plans are 
being delayed in the hope that interest rates may come down. 
Housing starts this year, for example, are expected to 
decline nationally about 20 percent from 1978 levels. 


As can be seen from data in Table 30, a substantial decrease 
in new construction activity occurred in April, May, June, 
July and August of 1979, from the same months in 1978. 
Although this decline could be the result of inflationary 
costs and mortgage money limiting new construction, there is 
a strong case for some TMI effect. The effect seems to 
decay over distance from TMI, and the greatest impact 
focuses on the 5 mile radius from TMI. 


67 . 


Table 29 



Contract 

Construction Employment: 
(Data in thousands) 

1979 




JAN 

FEB 

MAR 

APR 

MAY 

JUNE 

JULY 

AUG 

Harrisburg SMSA 

7.7 

7.0 

7.5 

7.8 

8.3 

8.1 

8.5 

8.6 

Lancaster SMSA 

7.8 

7.3 

7.8 

8.1 

8.3 

8.7 

8.8 

8.6 

fork SMSA 

6.5 

5.7 

6.2 

6.3 

6.7 

7.0 

7.2 

7.0 

Lebanon Labor Market 

Area 1.2 

1.2 

1.4 

1.4 

1.4 

1.5 

1.5 

1.5 

Seven County Area 

23.2 

21.2 

22.9 

23.6 

24.7 

25.3 

26.0 

25.3 

'Allentown 

Bethlehem 

Easton 

SMSA 

7.9 

7.2 

7.8 

8.1 

8.6 

8.8 

8.8 

8.9 

Pennsylvania 

166.1 

150.7 

166.7 

185.2 

196.3 

198.5 

205.7 

205.5 


Percent 

Change 

in Contract Construction 
From 1978 to 1979 

Employment 



Harrisburg SMSA 

-4.9 

-6.7 

-2.6 

-15.2 

-17.8 

-20.6 

-18.3 

-21.8 

Seven County Area 

+5.0 

+1.9 

+5.5 

- 3.3 

- 5.4 

- 7.3 

- 7.5 

-12.2 

i^llentown 

Bethlehem 

Easton 

-6.0 

-8.9 

-4.9 

-11.0 

- 6.5 

-11.1 

-13.7 

-14.4 

Pennsylvania 

+4.2 

-0.3 

+4.1 

- 2.6 

- 1.3 

- 6.3 

- 6.1 

- 6.9 


Source: Bureau of Employment Security of the Department of Labor and 
Industry. 


68 


Table 30 


New Construction Starts: Residential 


April May 



1978 

1979 

% Change 

1978 

1979 

% Change 

0-5 miles 

36 

32 

- 11 

78 

37 

- 53 

5-10 miles 

89 

58 

- 35 

104 

61 

- 41 

10-15 miles 

309 

157 

- 49 

228 

205 

- 10 

15-20 miles 

120 

110 

- 8 

115 

109 

- 5 



June 



July 


0-5 miles 

39 

32 

- 18 

41 

19 

- 54 

5-10 miles 

65 

76 

+ 17 

58 

73 

4 26 

10-15 miles 

215 

260 

+ 21 

179 

138 

- 23 

15-20 miles 

144 

107 

- 26 

90 

60 

- 33 



August 





0-5 miles 

46 

36 

- 22 




5-10 miles 

68 

50 

- 26 




10-15 miles 

281 

232 

- 17 




15-20 miles 

93 

100 

8 





Source; Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs: 

U.S. Census and direct contacts with local 
municipalities . 


Although the 5 mile radius appears to be the most significantly 
impacted, the other radii show negative effects as well; this 
is significant in that normally construction activity is 
highest over the summer months. The construction market seems 
to have recovered somewhat by August, 1979. Further infor- 
mation on the third quarter of 1979 will be necessary to 
determine the temporal limits of possible TMI effects on 
new construction. 


Builder Expectations 


Another indicator of new construction confidence in the TMI 
area is builder expectations. The Department of Community 
Affairs conducted a study of builders in the south central/ 
southeast area of Pennsylvania regarding plans to build in 
the 20 mile radius of TMI. Of the 30 builders who work in 
the 20 mile radius of TMI, two will not build in the 5 mile 
ring, one will build in the 5 mile ring but did not think 
business would be good because of the accident, and two 
others who will build in the 5 mile ring gave combined 
accident and economic reasons why business would not be good 


69 . 


in the 5 mile ring. Thus, about 17 percent of the builders 
perceived an impact on construction activity from TMI within 
the 5 mile radius. Approximately, 33 percent of the builders 
either gave economic reasons for not building within the 20 
mile radius of TMI, inclusive of the 5 mile ring, or while 
they would build, did not feel business would be good. 

These economic reasons center around unavailable or too 
expensive construction or mortgage money. These findings 
suggest that even though the condition of the economy might 
depress building activity in the Three Mile Island area, the 
potential for a reduction in new construction investnient due 
to TMI is present. (See Table 31) . 


Table 31 

Builder Expectations 


No 

Reasons 


Accident 

Related 

Reasons 


Economic 

Reasons 


Economic and 
Accident Reasons 
Combined 


Will not build 
in 20 mi. radius 
Will not build in 
0-10 ring but will 
build in 10-20 ring 
Will not build in 
I 0-5 ring but will 
i build in 5-20 mile 
I ring 

i Will build in 5 mile 
ring, but felt busi- 
ness might not be good 

TOTAL* 


11 


1 

3 


2 

10 


2 

2 


j Source: Pennsylvania Department of Community Affairs 

j * Four builders will build within the 5 mile radius and see 
i no problems. 


70 . 


IMPACTS ON AGRICULTURE 


Findings 


Although there was widespread public apprehension over the 
safety of agricultural products immediately after the Three 
Mile Island accident, the overall economic impact of the 
accident on the farm community was short lived and minor. 
Specialized segments of the agricultural community such as 
milk juggers, who sell milk directly to consumers, however, 
did suffer financial losses. 

The primary public concern revolved around the possible 
level of radiation present in milk and other farm commod- 
ities. Extensive monitoring of milk samples for Iodine- 
131 by the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture revealed 
only minute levels of radiation well below the allowable 
state standard. Continued milk sampling since May 4, 1979, 
has been negative. Investigations also failed to show any 
relationship between the TMI accident and livestock and 
plant health in the area surrounding the plant. 

Overall, the farm community reported minimal losses due to 
TMI — 96 percent of the 300 farmers located within a 25 
mile radius of the plant reported no losses due to TMI. 

Milk juggers in a fifteen mile radius of the plant did 
report losses of $60,000, in the month following the incident 
and sales are still lingering about 10 percent behind last 
year's levels. This impact dissipates with distance from 
the plant, and surprisingly, did not extend to the roadside 
vegetable sellers who are similar in many respect to milk 
juggers. This indicates the transitory nature of the 
impacts . 

Overall, the total economic loss to the farm community due 
to TMI has been estimated at between one quarter and one 
half million dollars. 


Radiation Analysis of Farm Products 


Immediately following the March 28, 1979 initial radiation 
releases at TMI, the Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture 
began to take milk samples from farms and dairies within a 
45 mile radius of the plant. The samples were analyzed for 
radioactive content by the Department of Environmental 
Resources for Iodine-131, a substance which, if received in 
substantial amounts, is a contributor to thyroid cancer. In 
addition, tests for other radioactive elements such as 
xenon, krypton and cesium were carried out. 


71 . 


The level of iodine radiation is measured in picocuries per 
liter. A picocurie is one-tr illionth (10” of a curie or 
a rem. Pennsylvania's health standard for milk allows 1,000 
picocuries per liter; the federal Food and Drug Administration's 
allowable level is 12,000 picocuries per liter. At such 
levels, regulatory actions would be needed to protect the 
public health and safety. Such actions were not necessary 
due to the TMI accident. 

Between March 29 and April 21, 1979, the Pennsylvania Depart- 
ment of Agriculture took 200 milk samples, all of which were 
tested for the presence of Iodine-131. The highest reading 
found in any of these samples was 29 picocuries per liter. 
Continued testing of milk since May 4, 1979, has shown less 
than 10 picocuries per liter for all sampling through 
November 23, 1979. This level is below the minimum detectable 
with the equipment being used. Table 32 summarizes the 
results of the milk sampling through November 23, 1979. 

While no significant radiation contamination has been discovered, 
sampling continues since radiation levels are normally 
disclosed in milk before it can be detected in other food- 
stuffs . 

During the first three weeks in April, over 30 different 
food items were sampled within a 30 mile radius of TMI. 

This sampling also included river water, well water and tap 
water. No additional testing of these specific food items 
took place after April 24, 1979, since prior results did not 
merit further testing. However, on June 6, samples of fresh 
lettuce, radishes, rhubarb, spring onions and fresh straw- 
berries grown within a seven mile radius of TMI were also 
tested and were found to be free of radioactive content. No 
further monitoring of foodstuffs other than milk is planned. 


Livestock Analysis for Radiation - A number of animal health 
studies have also been undertaken by the Department of Agri- 
culture. Data collected in May, 1979, from 100 livestock 
owners within a five mile radius of the crippled nuclear 
plant studied the TMI effects on a total of 8,200 dairy cows 
and heifers and 1,818 beef cattle. Of those surveyed, 95 
percent reported no unusual herd health problems. The 
remainder reported herd health problems that were classified 
as routine. The Department feels that such problems would 
normally be expected to occur at the five percent rate in 
any other area of the Commonwealth. 


72 . 


1 ' 


Table 32 


SUMMARY OF MILK SAMPLES ANALYZED FOR RADIOACTIVE CONTENT 


Sampling Period 

No. of Samples 

Distance from 

TMI 

Results 

March 29 - April 21 

200 

All 

within 

45 

miles 

0-29 pc/1* 

''A t'^tal of 38 dairy farms & 

15 dairies were utilized for sampling) 


April 25 - May 2 

28 

2-40 miles 



0-13 pc/1 

May 4-10 

15 

All 

within 

40 

miles 

less than 10 pc/1** 

May 9-14 

13 

All 

within 

40 

miles 

tl If 

May 17 - 23 

12 

All 

within 

20 

miles 

II If 

May 24 - 31 

15 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

tl II 

June 1-7 

12 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II 11 

June 8-15 

12 

All 

within 

40 

miles 

II II 

June 15 - 22 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II II 

June 22 - 29 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II ft 

July 2-6 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

11 It 

July 9-13 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

11 If 

July 12 - 19 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

It 11 

July 23 - 27 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

11 II 

July 27 - August 3 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II If 

August 6-10 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

11 II 

August 16 - 20 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

tl II 

August 20 - 24 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II II 

August 27 - 31 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

ft If 

September 3-7 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II If 

September 10 - 14 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II If 

September 17 - 21 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II II 

September 24 - 28 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

It 11 

October 1-5 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

It It 

October 8-12 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II tl 

October 15 - 19 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

II II 

October 22 - 26 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

11 It 

October 29 - November 2 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

If II 

November 5-9 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

ft II 

November 12 - 16 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

11 It 

November 19 - 23 

6 

All 

within 

25 

miles 

tl It 


*pc/l means picocuries per liter 

**The testing equipment utilized cannot accurately test levels below 10 pc/1. 
The less than 10 pc/1 means that the radioactive content is somewhat between 
0 and 10 picocuries per liter. 

Source: Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture. 


73 


Several owners of livestock residing within a few miles of 
TMI felt that their animal health problems resulted from the 
TMI incident. In each case, the Department performed 
extensive sampling of the livestock feedstuffs for radio- 
activity, performed autopsies on dead animals when possible, 
and carried out other diagnostic tests for various diseases. 
To date, none of these herd health problems have been found 
to be related to the incident. Indeed, the Agriculture 
Department has extensively studied several animal and 
poultry health problems in the Three Mile Area. All problems 
have been definitely diagnosed to be due to factors unrelated 
to the accident. These investigations, also, will continue. 

The Department has also investigated numerous inquiries con- 
cerning plant health and insect problems and their possible 
relationship to TMI. To date, none has been established. 

The Department of Agriculture attributes the relatively cool 
summer and its accompanying high humidity and frequent 
showers to the higher incidence of plant diseases reported. 


Consumer Resistance - There was a widespread public concern 
immediately following the incident about the safety of milk 
and fresh vegetables sold in the area. For example, within 
the 20 mile radius, two of the nation's largest firms producing 
candy products stopped buying local milk during the month of 
April. Such consumer and buyer resistance appeared immediately 
after the accident and was relatively short-lived. During 
the first days of the accident, many food retailers in the 
TMI area felt it necessary to inform the public that their 
milk for sale came from farms in places outside of the TMI 
vicinity. Outside of Pennsylvania, there were instances 
where retailers advertised that their milk did not come from 
this State. Moreover, there was some resistance by out-of- 
state dairy plants to accept locally produced milk, and 
there were cases where they cancelled orders for Pennsylvania 
milk . 

Milk dealers near TMI experienced declines in sales to 
varying degrees. One large dairy serving the Harrisburg 
area found that sales dropped 18 percent during the first 
week following the incident and this was followed by a 
subsequent 15 percent decline during the second week. The 
dairy felt it necessary to advertise in the local newspapers 
that they did not utilize milk received from farms within a 
10 mile radius of TMI and, in fact, had disposed of milk 
from within that radius. Dairies in the York, Lebanon and 
Lancaster areas also experienced declines in sales but to a 
lesser degree and for a shorter period of time. 

The loss in sales of milk and other farm products just 
after the TMI incident was not solely due to a consumer fear 
over its consumption or use. It must be remembered that an 


74 . 


estimated 144,000 persons within a 20 mile radius volun- 
tarily left the area, and that this reduction in potential 
consumers had a significant impact on retail sales. In 
addition, public schools, a major market for milk, were 
closed throughout much of the 20 mile impact area for 
several days. Many restaurants were also closed due to a 
lack of employees and customers, and this further reduced 
demand for certain foodstuffs. 


Mitigating Factors - Once the evacuees returned to the area, 
the sales and consumption of local farm products returned to 
near normal levels. This was due to a number of reasons. Of 
paramount importance was the fact that the State released to 
the public the early results of radiation testing of milk 
and other foodstuffs. The low radiation levels found helped 
to assure the safety of consuming these foods. In addition, 
the publicized fact that livestock, at the time of the 
accident, were feeding on stored grain and not pasture also 
is thought to have had a calming effect. A third factor was 
the comparison to the radiation levels found in the Chinese 
nuclear explosion fallout of 1976 and 1977. At that time, 
radiation levels found in raw milk reached nearly 500 pic- 
ocuries per liter and was not considered to be a significant 
health threat. When the public became aware of these 
factors, resistance to consumption of local products greatly 
diminished. 

4 


Impacts on Farmers 


The Department of Agriculture undertook a study to determine 
the socio-economic impacts of TMI on full-time farmers 
living and farming within a 25 mile radius of the plant. 

The Department initiated collection of data in late June, 

1979, from 600 farmers in the 25 mile impact area to deter- 
mine possible impacts (see Table 33) . The 300 responses 
obtained represent about a six percent sample of the estimated 
5,000 farmers located within a 25 mile radius of TMI. Four 
groups of farmers, based upon the major type of farm enterprise, 
were identified. These were; 1) dairy, 2) livestock and 
poultry, 3) fruits and vegetables, and 4) farmers who grew 
grain only. In addition, data was grouped according to 
whether the farmers resided within 10 miles of the plant or 
outside the 10 mile radius. 

The results of this study are felt to be representative of 
the total farm community. The response level accounts for 
nearly 61,000 farmland acres (nine percent of all farmland 
in the area) . The results of the data collected by the 
Department have been presented as percentage shares of 
farmers experiencing particular impacts. It is necessary to 


75 . 


Table 33 


FARMER RESPONDENTS - TMI IMPACT STUDY 



Within 
10 Miles 

11-25 

Miles 

Total 

Universe of Estimated # of Farms^'^ 

700 

4 ,300 

5,000 

Estimated Land Acreage^'^ 

95,000 

555,000 

650 ,000 

Number of Farmers Responding 




Dairy 

7 

110 

117 

Livestock & Poultry 

14 

105 

119 

Fruit & Vegetables 

7 

39 

46 

Grain Only 

5 

11 

11 

TOTAL 

33 

271 

304 

Sample Size (%) 

4.7 

6.3 

6.0 

Respondent's Land Acreage 

8,319 

52,367 

60,686 

Percent of Land Acreage Covered 
by Sample 

8.8 

9.4 

9.3 


Estimates based upon the 1978 Crop and Livestock Summary 
and the 1974 U.S. Agricultural Census. A proportionate 
share of the county's totals equal to an approximate per- 
centage of land area within the given radius from Three 
Mile Island was utilized to arrive at the estimates. 


Source : 


Pennsylvania Department of Agriculture 


point out that 90 percent of the results came from farmers 
living beyond the 10 mile radius and therefore it is felt 
that comparisons of percentage shares rather than absolute 
numbers of farmers are more meaningful with this response 
distribution pattern. The results are further weighted 
toward the information from dairy (39 percent) and livestock 
and poultry farmers (39 percent ) , the predominant type of 
farming in the TMI vicinity. 


Summary - The vast majority of farmers — 96 percent -- 
reported no losses due to TMI. Overall, only a small per- 
centage of the farmers experienced any immediate economic 
impact upon the occurrence of the accident -- only four 
percent of the respondents in the 25 mile radius reported 
they had experienced losses in sales of agricultural com- 
modities. Those losses took such forms as loss in milk 
sales, cancellation of orders, and expressions that business 
levels were below those of last year. Furthermore, at the 
time the data was collected (July-August) there were only 
three percent reporting any continued losses. A greater 
share (10 percent) of the fruit and vegetable farmers 
reported such continuing losses. 

It is significant that a larger share of the farmers in the 
10 mile radius reported that they had experienced losses, 
and continue to do so, than farmers in the 11-25 mile radius 
— generally three times as great. The individual reported 
losses ranged from $25 to several thousand dollars per farm. 

The study also indicated that consumer resistance to the 
buying of agricultural products was reported by only five 
percent of the farmers, but was markedly higher (13 percent) 
among farmers within a 10 mile radius of TMI than those 
beyond. Some farmers reported that previous customers did 
not show up at all to purchase products while other cus- 
tomers needed to be convinced of the products' safety before 
purchasing. What this means is that in spite of the declared 
safety for consumption there may be a small segment of the 
buying population which remains cautious and concerned over 
TMI ' s effects on food. In addition, this small residual 
resistance may be compounded by other factors such as the 
shortage of gasoline, changes in buying habits of the con- 
sumer, and decline of the family's buying power due to 
inflation which may be affecting the purchase of locally 
produced commodities. 


77 . 


Milk Juggers and Fresh Produce Farmers 


In reviewing the results on the study of TMI ' s impacts on 
farmers within a twenty five (25) radius of TMI, described 
above, it became apparent that farmers selling commodities 
directly to consumers may have been more susceptible to fin- 
ancial loss after the immediate accident period than those 
selling to a processor or food handler. Subsequently, the 
Department of Agriculture initiated another study in late 
October collecting data from over 100 farmers within 25 
miles of the TMI plant who sell agricultural products 
directly to the public. These farmers/Who comprise a small 
segment of the total farm community, include milk juggers 
(who process and sell milk on their farm) and those farmers 
who raise fruit, vegetables and other produce and sell at 
roadside stands and/or at farmers markets. The purpose was 
to measure any economic change as compared to previous years 
and determine contributory factors. 

By mid-November, 1979, a total of 32 responses had been 
received and analyzed. While the results of this effort are 
not yet complete, 44 percent who reported to date show an 
increase in sales (14) , 40 percent a decrease in sales (13) , 
and 16 percent no difference from prior years (5). The 
majority of those reporting a decrease in sales reported it 
to be between 11-25% in cash receipts. The majority of 
those reporting an increase in sales reported an increase of 
between 6-10% in cash receipts. 

Of the 13 who reported a decrease in sales this year as 
compared with prior years, only five attributed the decrease 
fully or partly to the Three Mile Island incident. (These 
five comprise 16 percent of the 32 total responses) . The 
total who reported either a decrease in sales (13) or a 
lack of increase in sales (i.e., the five with no difference) 
is 18. Taking into consideration the five who reported 
TMI as fully or partly responsible for decreases in sales, 
the relative ranking of all reported reasons for either a 
decrease or lack of increase among the 18 respondents are; 
the high cost and unavailability of gasoline (46%) , TMI 
(19%) , a drop in tourism (19%) and poor quality of fresh 
produce ( 16% ) . 

Milk Juggers - Of the 11 milk juggers reporting, five saw a 
decrease in sales this year. Four attributed the decrease 
to the Three Mile Island incident; these juggers are located 
within a fifteen mile radius from Three Mile Island and 
their total losses amounted to about $60,000. They reported 
their greatest economic loss occurred during the first four 
to five weeks following the Three Mile Island incident, 
and their sales are still lingering behind last years sales 
by approximately 10 percent. One farmer located fifteen 
miles from Three Mile Island felt that his sales 


78 . 


were increased as a result of Three Mile Island because 
people thought that he was located outside of the area that 
received radioactive contamination. All of the milk juggers 
located within ten miles of Three Mile Island and responding 
to the study reported decreased sales and consumer resistance 
as a result of Three Mile Island. Only one out of the seven 
located ten or more miles from Three Mile Island reported 
losses due to the accident. 


Fresh Produce Farmers - Of the twenty-one farmers selling 
fresh produce direct to consumers, 52 percent reported an 
increase in sales, 38 percent a decrease, the remaining 10 
percent said sales were similar to last year. Almost all 
those reporting a decrease in sales felt it was due to the 
gasoline situation and a drop in tourism, and/or the poor 
quality of produce. Only one respondent blamed TMI and he 
was located about fifteen miles from the plant. Other 
farmers selling fresh produce located closer to Three Mile 
Island did not feel that the Three Mile Island incident 
affected their sales of fresh produce. 


At first the difference between the reporting of milk juggers 
and fresh produce farmers may appear to be contradictory. 
However, fresh produce was not in season when the Three Mile 
Island incident occurred at the end of March. Very little 
locally grown fresh produce was available until June with 
the bulk being harvested in July, August and September and 
continuing into the fall. On the other hand, the milk 
jugger sells to consumers the whole year and his sales are 
normally relatively uniform throughout the year, and any 
increases or decreases are easily noticed. In addition, the 
news media coverage of the Iodine-131 content of milk 
immediately made the consumer aware of a possible danger, 
real or perceived which resulted in consumer resistance to a 
product. To those milk juggers located within about ten 
miles of Three Mile Island consumer resistance appears to 
have played a very important role in decreased milk sales, 
particularly during the first four to five weeks following 
the Three Mile Island incident. If the Three Mile Island 
incident had occurred during the summer or fall, a similar 
amount of consumer resistance probably would have been 
noticed by fresh produce farmers. The losses reported are 
small in comparison to the total dollar volume of agricultural 
commodities produced in the Three Mile Island area, but are 
very real to the individual farmers which were affected. 

With the information collected from both studies, it is dif- 
ficult to precisely determine the total economic loss which 
was incurred by farmers as a result of the Three Mile Island 
incident. However, as a estimate, it would appear that the 
total loss to farmers that can be directly attributed to the 


79 . 


Three Mile Island incident would be between $250,000 and 
$500,000. The above estimate does not include the increased 
cost of electric power to farmers in the area as a result of 
the shutdown of Unit II, and future decisions in allowing 
Unit I to be put back into operation. This increase in cost 
may in the long run be a greater economic loss to the farmer 
than the initial losses occurring from the Three Mile Island 
scare in March and April of this year. 


80 . 


IMPACTS ON STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 


The Three Mile Island incident and the fear, concern and 
stress it created affected both the Commonwealth of Pennsyl- 
vania and local governments within a wide radius of the 
plant site. This chapter provides a preliminary assessment 
of the impacts which the public sector experienced in the 
short term. 

State Government Impacts 


A measure of the TMI incident's cost to State government can 
be gained from data concerning salaries paid to personnel 
who were granted administrative leave or overtime and from 
additional non-personnel expenses for a period following the 
accident. The Office of Budget and Administration and 
others have determined this information for all state agencies 
which are under the Governor's jurisdiction, as well as for 
those not directly under his jurisdiction. 

Administrative Leave 


State agencies granted 23,395 hours of administrative leave 
at a cost of $173,131 for the period from March 30, 1979 to 
April 9, 1979. Administrative leave is time away from work 
with salary at the appropriate straight time rate of pay. 

The costs were based upon the pay rate in effect on the 
dates when the employees were on administrative leave, and 
do not include employee benefit costs. (If benefit costs 
were to be considered, the cost data would be higher by 
30%) . 

Because of the feelings of danger and concern generated by 
the TMI incident, administrative leave was granted to certain 
State employees during the period from March 30 through 
April 9, 1979. Those eligible for administrative leave 
were : 


- Pregnant employees who lived or worked within a 
five mile radius of Three Mile Island. 

- Employees with children five years of age and under 
who lived within five miles of Three Mile Island. 

- Employees who lived or worked within a 20 mile radius 
of TMI on March 30, 1979, and subsequently left 

work due to concerns arising from the Three Mile 
Island incident. 


81 . 


Overtime Pay Costs 


From March 30, 1979 through October, 1979, TMI related over- 
time pay for state employees totaled $124,910.* * Agencies 
incurring the largest overtime costs were the Pennsylvania 
Emergency Management Agency, Department of Environmental 
Resources, the State Police, the Justice Department, and the 
Governor's Office. 

Overtime work which was necessary to meet the special re- 
quirements of the accident also includes compensatory time. 
State personnel regulations applied to TMI related overtime. 
State employees covered by union representation are eligible 
for either overtime pay or compensatory time, depending upon 
a mutual agreement with their superiors. In either case, 
time and a half is granted with holidays exacting a premium. 
Supervisory employees are not normally granted overtime pay, 
but are eligible for compensatory time equal to the exact 
number of overtime hours worked. 


Additional Expenses 


Additional non-personnel expenses totaling $314,124 were 
incurred by many state agencies between March 30, 1979, and 
the end of October, 1979, as a result of the accident. 

The Departments of Health and Environmental Resources, the 
Emergency Management Agency and the Public Utility Commission 
incurred the majority of these additional expenses. In- 
cluded in these expenditures were Health Department contracts 
for population radiation dose assessments, TMI health related 
economic cost studies. Environmental Resource Department 
sampling and monitoring equipment, an Emergency Management 
Agency booklet about nuclear radiation for public distribution 
and Public Utility Commission legal expenses. 


* Overtime costs of $2,078 were incurred by the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission which operates solely on tolls, not 
taxes, and therefore this figure is not included as a state 
expense . 


82 . 


*Summary of State Government TMI Related 


Personnel and Expense Costs 


Overtime Pay 


$124,910 


Administrative Leave 


$173,131 


**National Guard Wages 


$ 17,291 


Total Personnel Cost 


$315,332 


Additional Expenses 


$314,419 


Total Personnel and Expenses 


$629,751 


*Overtime costs of $2,078 were incurred by the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike Commission, which operates solely on tolls not taxes, 
and therefore this figure was not included as a state expense. 

**The National Guard was paid straight time by the state - 
administrative leave and overtime are not applicable to the 
Guard . 


State Government Revenue 

Another possible measurement tool for assessing the potential 
impact of the accident as to investigate factoring out its 
effect if any, on state revenues. 

The only legitimate technique for determining the impact, if 
any, on state revenues of TMI is to compare the a priori 
projected revenue with the actual post event revenue. To be 
valied, the projected revenue must be based on historic 
experience with adjustments for changing circumstances. Com- 
paring one month in 1979 to one month in 1978 is not a legi- 
timate analytical exercise for many reasons, not the least 
important of which is that two points do not define a defendable 
trend. 

Certain difficulties in data collection and analysis stemming 
from timeliness, distribution and location, plus ongoing 
Revenue Department file evaluations resulting in reporting 
schedule changes as defined below make any definitive con- 
clusions premature at this time. 


83 . 


Personal Income 


The Department of Revenue receives personal income tax pay- 
ments from three sources at varying times throughout the year. 
The major portion of the PIT receipts is derived from the 
employers' withholding system and is remitted (like the sales 
tax) on three different schedules; semi-monthly, monthly and 
quarterly depending on the number of employees. The dis- 
tribution of filers in the personal income tax system, like 
that for the sales tax system, is unstable through time 
because of on-going efforts to correctly categorize tax- 
payers. This renders historic comparisons and allocations 
of the receipts to the proper earnings period impossible. 
Furthermore, the personal income tax employer's withholding 
reports, like those in the sales tax system are not location 
specific since receipts are recorded according to the address 
of the firm's headquarters. 

The remaining sources of personal income tax receipts are the 
individual remittances of estimated liability and final lia- 
bility. Clearly, final liability payments (due April 15th 
of the following year) which are based on 365 days of income 
are too general for use in assessing the possible effects of 
a four day abberation. The estimated payments are made 
quarterly by those individuals who expect to owe the Common- 
wealth more than $200 at the close of the year and by definition 
are not wholly accurate records of income. 

The 1979 income tax data for these two categories of taxpayers 
will not be available until April, 1980, but it will be 
impossible, even then, to separate the effects of inflation, 
unemployment and TMI on these receipts. 


Sales and Use Tax 


For a variety of reasons, the sales and use tax data is in- 
adequate for the type of analysis required here. 

1. Motor Vehicle Sales Tax collections are included 
in these figures. This is a problem because the 
behavior of the Motor Vehicle Sales Tax series 
is significantly different than that of other 
sales tax categories and its relative proportion 
of total collections is variable. Thus, aggregate 
sales tax comparisons from year-to-year are un- 
acceptable . 

2. Remittance of dales tax by vendors occurs in a 
three-tiered fashion. Vendor's are required to 
file on a semi-monthly, monthly or quarterly basis 
depending on the size of their remittance. Many 


84 . 


firms have been switched to different filing 
categories recently, making comparisons with 
previous years inappropriate since the filer dis- 
tribution has been irreconcilably altered. 

3. Pennsylvania sales tax excludes essential items, 
so in effect, we can only draw conclusions about 
purchases of non-essential commodities. In a 
period such as that surrounding the TMI incident, 
one might expect many non-essential purchases to 
be postponed or relocated but not necessarily 
foregone. Thus, to fully account for the sales 
tax impact of the incident, it would be necessary 
to fully account for the inter-temporal and geo- 
graphic shifts. For the reasons discussed above 
and below, such an accounting is impossible. 

4. Sales tax is reported from the firm's headquarters 
and not necessarily from the sales locale. For 
example, John Wanamaker's remits all its sales tax 
receipts from its Philadelphia headquarters, so 
despite the location of several Wanamaker's within 
the six county TMI impact area, no record of their 
economic activity is reflected in the reports for 
these six counties. Conversely, Giant Food Cor- 
poration is located within this area but does 
business throughout the Commonwealth. Thus, its 
reports would cause the actual sales activity in 
the area to be overstated. Finally, the tax 
remittances of firms headquartered outside of 
Pennsylvania, but doing business in the TMI impact 
area would also not be reflected in the reports 
for the six counties. 


Realty Transfer Tax 


Pennsylvania levies a 1% tax on the sale price of all resi- 
dential and commercial property payable at the settlement 
date. Thus, by analyzing trends in these tax receipts in 
the TMI region before and after the incident, it may be 
possible to discern the impact of the incident on the 
regional's property values. 

A first order auto regressive moving-average (ARMA) model 
was used to forecast the Realty Transfer Tax receipts for 
each month, January through June, of 1979 based on actual 
experience from 1972 through 1978. Separate forecasts were 
made for each county surrounding Three Mile Island (Dauphin, 
Cumberland, Lancaster, Lebanon, Perry and York) and total 
tax receipts and average tax per real estate transaction 
were predicted.* 

From these predicted values, the implicit predicted growth 
rates were calculated. 


85 . 


The results of these analyses are presented in Table 34 
and 34-A which compare the predicted and actual growth rates 
for total realty transfer tax receipts and average receipts 
per transaction, respectively. On average, there exists a 
two-month lag between the date a property is offered for 
sale and the date the realty transfer is recorded so only 
the June actual and forecasted growth rates reflect economic 
activity occurring after the Three Mile Island incident. 

However, the January through May comparisons are important 
as controls on the interpretation of the June results. 

Table 34 indicates that forecasted growth was uniformly 
positive for each county in June but actual growth was 
uniformally negative for each county in that month. Analyzed 
independently, this would suggest that the incident at Three 
Mile Island had a significant negative impact on the area's 
real estate market. However, in the April and May comparisons 
which reflect actual and predicted sales occurring before 
the Three Mile Island incident, the forecasts again generally 
had the opposite signs of the actual growth statistitics 
which suggests factors other than the nuclear accident were 
affecting the real estate market throughout this three-month 
period . 

Analysis of the results presented in Table 34-A in conjunction 
with those presented in Table 34 offers some limited insights 
into the dynamics of the area's real estate market shortly 
after the incident. Most importantly, no general trend in 
the average tax per sale (and therefore in the average sale 
price, in constant dollars) can be detected. However, in 
June in every county total tax receipts declined more than 
the average tax per transaction and, in at least one case 
(Lancaster County) , average tax per transaction rose while 
total tax receipts fell. This suggests that the decline in 
total receipts is attributable to reduced sales volume 
rather than reduced property values. In fact, it must be 
true that average sales price, measured in constant dollars 
were not declining or falling shortly after the incident but 
must actually have been rising. 

Since the incident apparently had no negative impact on pro- 
perty values, no case can be made for compensating those who 
owned property in the area at the time of the incident. In 
fact, it appears that the only dislocation to the real 
estate market occurring during this period was an increase 
in the average time required to consummate a property transfer. 

However, even this phenonenon cannot be attributed solely to 
the Three Mile incident. Analysis of Tables 34 and 34-A 
suggests that total receipts (i.e., sales volume was declining 
or equivalently, the sales period was lenthening) at least 
two months before the accident occurred. 

*In both cases, the data was corrected for inflation by dividing 
each monthly observation by the Pennsylvania housing price index. 


86 . 


A more plausible explanation for this trend might be the in- 
creasing unavailability of mortgages as evidenced by the 
increasing number of institutions refusing to even accept 
mortgage applications throughout this period. 

Thus, when analyzed in context with other events occurring 
in the region during this period, no definitive effect of 
the Three Mile Island incident on the value of property can 
be discerned. 


87 . 


Forecast and Actual Growth Rates for 1979 Total 
Real Estate Transfer Tax Receipts 



88 


Forecast and Actual Growth Rates for 1979 Average 
Real Estate Transfer Taxes per Transaction 



89 


Impacts on Local Government 


The TMI incident resulted in many communities sustaining 
expenditures above and beyond their normal budgets allocated 
for the provision of governmental services during the crisis 
period. For communities generally in close proximity to the 
TMI plant, substantial expenditures were necessary. 

The TMI event caused many local governments to respond to 
the voluntary evacuation of some of their residents and 
incur various emergency expenses. Many communities found it 
necessary to provide additional police protection to protect 
the property of those who left their homes unattended. For 
others, there were problems related to the evacuation of the 
elderly and the infirm. Local governments also made plans 
for the movement of institutionalized persons and school 
children in the event that an evacuation of their community 
became necessary. Some of the increased costs resulted from 
governmental employees working long overtime hours in order 
to be ready to participate in evacuation. 

The Department of Community Affairs in its inventory of 
local governments (data assembled from responses from 68 
governmental units up to mid-August) has examined the magnitude 
of the accident/related costs these bodies incurred. Three 
counties and 34 local communities reported that they had 
expenditures - reported dollars were $113,000. The range of 
these costs was quite large -- from a low figure of $16 to a 
high figure of almost $23,000. Five of these local communities 
reported that they had costs, but they were "minimal". 

The 29 local governments which reported expenditures indicated 
that they expended $71,311 as a result of TMI; this averages 
$2,459 per government. In addition, the three counties 
which reported additional TMI related costs (Cumberland, 

Dauphin and York) spent $41,848 -- an average of $13,949 for 
each county. 

A portion of the funds expended by local governments may be 
recovered via outstanding insurance claims payable by Metro- 
politan Edison or its insurance carriers. To date, 27 local 
municipalities and government related agencies have filed 
claims for a minimum of $70,151. As of December 10, 1979, 
Metropolitan Edison has made repayment to three municipalities 
for $10,417. These actions are discussed in more detail in 
the section on long range problems. 


90 . 


Community Programs 


The TMI incident could result in a series of inter-related 
problems which limit or frustrate the ability of local 
government to carry out community development programs. 

The federal government has numerous programs designed to 
help local governments overcome a wide range of problems. 

One very important activity extremely relevant to helping 
communities overcome problems and further their development - 
such as potential problems which may be affecting communities 
as a result of the incident - is the community development 
block grant provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. 

The community development block grant was considered to be 
particularly important because of the broad range of activities 
for which funds can be made available. Within in seven 
counties around TMI, there are 120 local communities having 
all or a portion of their area within the 20 mile radius. 

According to the Department of Community Affairs, only six 
of them are currently receiving block grants. (They are 
CDBG entitlement communities) . They are the cities of 
Harrisburg, York, and Lebanon, the boroughs of Middletown 
and Steelton, and Swatara Township (Dauphin County) . Only 
Middletown is within the 5 mile radius of the TMI plant. 

Lebanon and York lie outside the 10 mile radius. However, 
in reality, all the communities within the 20 mile radius 
are "potential" recipients of grants, if they apply to and 
participate under one of the various program categories such 
as the Entitlement Grants Program, Small Cities Program, or 
Urban Counties Program. Therefore, because all communities 
in the 20 mile radius have the potential to be "CDBG communities", 
the impacts felt by any of them are believed to be relevant. 

So even though the study is to focus on CDBG communities, 
knowledge of impacts on currently non-participating communities 
is helpful. 

The objectives of the community development block grants are 
to either develop or to assist viable communities, including 
provision of decent housing and a suitable living environment 
and to expand economic opportunities (principally) for 
persons of low and moderate income. Grants can be used for 
such purposes as neighborhood revitalization, economic 
development, and providing improved community facilities. 

Specific activities can include such projects as rehabilitation 
of public works or housing, code enforcement, and associated 
administrative costs. 


91 . 


Preliminary information indicates little to no community 
programs effect on local townships in the TMI area. In 
Swatara, Lower Swatara, and Londonderry Townships, the new 
1980 budgets do not reflect expenses or losses attributable 
to TMI. (Harrisburg Evening News , 11/15/79) . Further 
budget revelations from Cumberland County, Middletown, and 
Middle Paxton Township exhibit no TMI expenditure deficits. 
(Harrisburg Evening News, 12/4/79) . 


Community Development 


Of particular interest with regard to local government is 
the impact which TMI may have had on community development. 

This encompasses those impacts which may be affecting com- 
munity program and service expectations, such as those pro- 
vided through community development block grants. To ascertain 
this information, the problems which TMI caused local govern- 
ments need to be understood as well as their relevance to 
community development programs. 

The Department of Community Affairs initiated efforts to 
gather information in June, 1979 to determine problems which 
the 120 local governments and the counties lying partly or 
totally within the 20 mile radius encountered as a direct 
result of the incident. Sixty-eight units of government had 
provided responses by mid-August. 

Information was sought concerning six community development 
related areas - community development goals and priorities, 
commercial revitalization, municipal services, experience in 
the municipal bond market, anticipated future costs or 
reductions in revenues, and the need for federal or state 
grants to overcome TMI-related problems. The results indicate 
that the problems did not seem to involve many communities. 
Fifteen local communities indicated that they experienced or 
could perhaps expect to encounter one or more of the six 
problem areas. Three county responses also indicated probems . 

Except for two cases, each of the problem areas seem to 
affect only a few communities. Future revenue losses or 
future costs were anticipated or considered a possibility by 
six of the communities and one county; five communities felt 
there was some impact on planning activities, with emphasis 
on the need for upgrading emergency preparedness and evacuation 
plans. In addition, one county indicated that emergency 
preparedness has taken on a higher priority. 

In the area of problems related to commercial revitalization 
and experiences on the bond market, it appears that, at the 
time of data collection, it was too early to tell if such 
problems would be encountered. However, one county reported 
that since TMI, its bond rating has been downgraded from AAA 
to AA, which may have had as its contributing cause changes 
in tax base and budgetary outlook. 


92 . 


where impacts could be clearly ascertained from this early 
assessment, it appears that there was no perception of any 
singular widespread problem affecting a large number of 
communities. Because so few communities which responded 
listed problems, whatever impact or disruption TMI did have 
must have been mostly of a short terra nature. And, in 
almost all cases, neither federal nor state grants were 
anticipated to be needed to solve them. 

As a follow-up to this initial inventory, the Department of 
Community Affairs will be contacting communities again to 
determine any community development problems which may be 
surfacing as time progresses beyond the incident. And the 
communities within the 20 mile radius will be assisted by 
DCA and the Capitol Region Planning and Development Agency 
in identifying any impediments to implementing community 
development programs during the study period. 


Technical Assistance 


The Department of Community Affairs will provide technical 
assistance in a support role to any municipality with problems 
resulting from the TMI incident that cannot be handled 
locally. In order to identify areas where such help is 
needed, the Department's inventory of governmental problems 
stemming from TMI also asked for areas where DCA may be of 
assistance. This elicited 22 requests for technical assis- 
tance. Some communities requested assistance in areas which 
go beyond the six specific community development areas 
discussed earlier -- hence there were more requests for 
assistance than there were governmental units which identified 
community development related problems. The table on the 
next page shows what was requested. 

Most often communities requested assistance of the State in 
establishing or improving communication systems to improve 
civil defense emergency response capabilities. Of the 22 
requests, two communities requesting assistance were "CDBG 
participating" communities. One of the CDBG communities 
responding did not identify technical assistance needs. The 
two requesting assistance wanted help in economic and 
community development. The Department of Community Affairs, 
through its Harrisburg Regional Office and the Bureau of 
Local Government Services, will follow up in providing the 
technical assistance. 


93 . 


Table 35 


Technical Assistance Requested 

Communications Systems 8 

Revenue Sharing 7 

Economic Development 5 

Community Development 4 

Intergovernmental Cooperation 4 

Code Enforcement 4 

Capital Programming 3 

Budgeting 2 

Accounting 2 

Public Works Management 1 

Source: Department of Community Affairs 


94 . 



a : m .. 


LONG RANGE IMPACTS 


95 . 



LONG RANGE IMPACTS 


The accident at TMI Unit #2 coupled with the continued 
outage status of TMI Unit #1 (which was down at the time of 
the accident for routine refueling but has not been re- 
activated pending resolution of safety questions) carries 
significant long term economic impacts for Pennsylvania 
ratepayers served by Metropolitan Edison and its corporate 
sister, Pennsylvania Electric. Together the two utilities 
serve a wide geographic area of the Commonwealth stretching 
from Easton on the Delaware River to Erie in the north- 
western corner of the State. They serve almost 850,000 
customers encompassing a total population of over 2.3 
million people. 

The generating capacity of the two Three Mile Island nuclear 
reactors is more than 1600 megawatts - 880 megawatts from 
Unit #2 alone. Together this supplies 38 percent of all 
Metropolitan Edison's generated power and 13 percent of 
Pennsylvania Electric's. In order to make up the deficit 
caused by the shutdown, the two utilities have been purchasing 
power from other utilities. Costs have been estimated at 
$22 million per month or $264 million per year. If TMI Unit 
#1 goes back on line, the monthly cost is estimated to 
decline to approximately $10 million per month. 

The nonoperating status of both TMI units, portends a signi- 
ficant, adverse long term economic dislocation for residential, 
commercial and industrial users. A federal Department of 
Energy study has estimated that the monthly cost for the 
average residential customer of Metropolitan Edison has 
risen $7.50 due to the accident. Intensive energy using 
industries in the area served by Metropolitan Edison and 
Pennsylvania Electric have also expressed caution about 
expansion and new investment plans pending the outcome of 
decisions on both units. 

The outlook for the two TMI nuclear generators is strikingly 
different. TMI Unit #2, which was damaged in the accident, 
cannot be brought back onto line until January, 1983 at the 
absolute earliest. Costs for rehabilitation range from $300 
to $500 million and the operating utility is evaluating the 
possibility of converting TMI to a coal fire plant or completely 
replacing it either on the island or an entirely new site. 

Costs for these options range from an estimated $468 million 
to $1,176 million. TMI Unit #1 is in a unique situation 
prompted by the events which happened to its twin. Although 
it has been refueled and can begin functioning, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission has witheld permission for restart 
pending resolution of safety questions. It is presently 
unclear when these issues will be decided. In addition, the 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission has issued a draw 
clause on Unit #1 which could serve to remove the fixed 
costs for this unit from Metropolitan Edison's rate base. 

Such an action would have a very serious financial impact 
on the viability of the operating utility. 


96 . 


Paradoxically enough, the higher electricity costs are only 
being experienced by some of the residents within a twenty 
mile radius of the plant. Metropolitan Edison basically 
serves portions of eastern Pennsylvania, York and Lebanon 
Counties. Lancaster, Cumberland and Dauphin Counties, which 
hold the bulk of 20 mile radius population, are served by a 
nonaffected utility. Consequently, most of the residents in 
the area surrounding TMI have no vested economic interest in 
the reopening of either unit. In fact, there are indications 
that local public sentiments will be strongly opposed to the 
restart of Unit #1 as well as Unit #2. On the other hand. 
Metropolitan Edison/Pennsylvania Electric customers, most of 
whom live nowhere near TMI, and hence, are not affected by 
any real or perceived safety questions, can be expected to 
lobby for restart of Unit #1 to reduce their electricity 
cost. The impact on higher electricity costs for residential, 
commercial and industrial customers will be explored and 
reported in greater detail in the final consolidated report. 


Long Range Impacts on the Manufacturing Sector 

Expansion Plans of Manufacturing Establishments - In the 
study of TMI impacts on the manufacturing sector, conducted 
by the Department of Commerce, the effects of electricity 
price rate increases were examined for their impact on 
expansion plans. This study found that rate increases of 
up to 40 percent would affect the expansion plans of over 
40 percent of all manufacturing firms and over 50 percent 
of the food processing firms. Even an increase of 10 per- 
cent would affect the plans of one-third of all establish- 
ments. Some firms have stated that utility bills are 
already hurting their business, and some indicated that 
they would consider relocating if there are increased 
electricity costs. 

Without considering electricity prices, an estimated two- 
thirds of all manufacturing establishments were willing to 
expand in spite of TMI (if the need should arise) . This 
willingness to expand occurred among establishments of 
every employment size group. Given the unique and unsettling 
nature of this incident, this finding is rather amazing. 

The study found that over 21 percent of all manufacturing 
firms would not consider expanding within this area as a 
result of TMI, irrespective of whether they were actually 
considering expanding or not. It would seem that the 
experiences which some firms encountered - disruptions 
during the incident and declines in factory orders which 
may have been related to either an actual or perceived pro- 
duct image problem - resulted (by late May) in reservations 
concerning expansion on the part of an estimated 246 firms. 


97 . 


For example, about 25 percent of the firms in the employ- 
ment size group 1-99 expressed an unwillingness to expand. 
Nevertheless, while the smaller firms indicated a greater 
frequency of concern than the larger firms, there were 
expressions of reservation on the part of some larger firms 
as well, with the exception of the large food processors. 

The food processing industry would appear to have less 
reservations concerning expansion - almost 75 percent would 
consider expanding after the TMI experience. This reflects 
the manpower and geographic locational advantages which 
Central Pennsylvania affords the food industry. 

Industry's expansion plans may also be affected by what 
happens over the longer term. The degree to which Central 
Pennsylvania's "image" is restored as a safe place to live 
and work will play a major role in each individual firm's 
decision whether to expand or not. For those already located 
in the area, no problems in recruiting personnel to relocate 
in the greater TMI area have been reported. Additionally, 
there is a concern about increased electricity rates that 
may result from TMI. 

The future expansion activities of establishments presently 
in the TMI area and the degree to which these firms over- 
come the adversities created by TMI will serve as an economic 
indicator to other firms outside the area. Many of these 
may be considering a location here for their business activity 
or expansion. In summary, confidence as expressed in carrying 
out expansion by the existing business community will serve 
to engender interest and confidence on the part of others 
outside of the TMI area. 


98 . 


NONriANUFACTURING 


Long Range Effects 

Some of the long term effects of TMI can be inferred from 
information concerning opinions of respondents to Commerce's 
study of the impacts of TMI on expansion plans, as well as 
attitudes about potential increased electricity cost. If 
entities would elect not to remain or expand their business 
in the area because of TMI, this would be real significant 
economic impact. This decision could be based upon reluc- 
tance to remain or expand due to the fear of another accident 
or due to escalating costs of electricity. 


Impacts on Expansion Plans - An estimated 78 percent of the 
nonmanufacturing entities would be willing to expand (if 
their business were to merit expansion) , regardless of their 
experience with the accident at Three Mile Island. Only an 
estimated 14 percent would be unwilling to expand. By way 
of comparison the share of firms willing to expand is much 
higher within the nonmanufacturing sector than in manufact- 
uring. This finding is remarkable, given the fact that the 
immediate total losses sustained in nonmanufacturing were 
much higher. Many of the nonmanufacturing sectors had 
losses in values of business of well over $6,000 per entity. 

Among those that would not expand (the 14 percent) the 
wholesale and retail trade sectors each had 19 percent that 
were unwilling to expand. Other sectors with a "higher than 
average reluctance" to expand were finance, insurance, and 
real estate and services (15 and 16 percent respectively) . 

These four sectors sustained over 94 percent of the total 
business losses in the immediate period after the accident - 
and wholesale and retail trade and finance have not fared 
well due to the slackening economic conditions which have 
affected the area during 1979. 

Yet, it appears that the nonmanufacturing sector as a whole 
remains optimistic about the area, because only 14 percent 
of the entities seemed unwilling to expand, although 23 
percent of them felt their business levels were below 
normal in September, 1979. 


Possible Effects of Electricity Rate Increases - The Depart- 
ment of Commerce's study found that 36 percent of the 
nonmanufacturing entities' plans to expand or remain in the 
area would be affected by an increase in electricity rates 
as small as 10 percent. This is very similar to the effects 
that a 10 percent increase would be expected to have on the 


99 . 


manufacturing sector (where nearly 33 percent of the estab- 
lishments were estimated to have a similar unwillingness to 
expand or remain in the area with that size of electricity 
cost increase) . 

It is alarming that nearly 50 percent of the retail trade 
entities would be unwilling to expand in the light of only a 
10 percent increase. The mining sector would also be 
similarly sensitive to such an increase. (Of course, there 
are a great many more retail than mining establishments, so 
the effect on the area's growth would be much more devasta- 
ting, since over 3,000 retail establishments could be 
involved) . 

If the costs were to increase by 25 percent, there occurs a 
marked difference concerning the willingness to expand or 
remain in the area between manufacturing and nonmanufact- 
uring. The Commerce Department's study found that elec- 
tricity cost increases of this magnitude would result in 
two-thirds of the nonmanufacturing entities being unwilling 
to expand or remain in the area. 

An identical 25 percent increase would affect the plans of 
about 39 percent of the manufacturing establishments. In 
other words, a 25 percent increase would affect the plans of 
one out of every three manufacturing establishments and two 
out of every three nonmanufacturing entities (including four 
out of every five of those in the retail trade sector) . 

Beyond a 25 percent increase, the impacts would be devas- 
tating. Over three-fourths of all nonmanufacturing entities 
would be affected with the exception of the finance, insur- 
ance and real estate sectors. 

Table 36 on the next page summarizes the study's findings 
concerning effects of electricity cost increases on the 
expansion plans of both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing. 


100 . 


Table 36 


Estimated Impacts of Different Increased Electricity Costs 
Percent that Would Have Expansion Plans Affected 



10% 

25% 

35-40% 


Increase 

Increase 

Increase 

Manufacturing 


32.5 

38.7 

41.2 

SIC 20 

35.8 


52.7 

52.7 

All other SIC's 

32.0 


36.7 

39.5 

Nonmanufacturing 


35.8 

67.8 

77.6 

Agriculture, etc. 

5.1 


97.5 

97.5 

Mining 

53.8 


100.0 

100.0 

Construction 

30.0 


67.5 

68.4 

Transp. & Public 
Utilities 

21.1 


73.0 

76.7 

Wholesale Trade 

36.0 


43.0 

70.6 

Retail Trade 

48.6 


80.1 

86.8 

Finance, etc. 

32.2 


41.4 

43.2 

Services 

30.6 


66.4 

82.2 

Source: Pennsylvania 

Department 

of Commerce, 

Bureau of 

Statistics , 

Research and 

Planning . 



Pending Legal Actions 


Background - These two insurance pools were formed in 1956 
to provide both liability and physical property damage 
coverage for the operators of nuclear power plants. The 
utilities are regulated and limited by provisions of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1956 which allowed the private sector 
to develop atomic power for non-military purposes and the 
Price- Anderson . 

With the Congressional enactment of the Atomic Energy Act of 
1954 and the Price-Anderson Act of 1957, which permitted 
the private sector to develop nuclear power for peaceful 
purposes, the need for insurance to protect utilities and 
other users from liability suits was and is being met by 
pools of insurers who voluntarily agreed to provide the fin- 
ancial responsibility limits set by the then Atomic Energy 
Commission (now Nuclear Regulatory Commission) in accordance 
with the provisions of those Acts. Price-Anderson set the 
liability limit due to a nuclear accident at $560,000,000 
per site with congressional authority to provide additional 
funds if necessary. While initially the pools provided 


101 . 


$60,000,000 of the $560,000,000 Price-Anderson liability 
limit, their capacity has risen steadily to today's 
$160,000,000. The second layer is provided by assessing 
each nuclear reactor in the United States up to $5,000,000. 

With 68 reactors this would provide $340,000,000. The third 
and final layer of $80,000,000 is available through the 
Federal Government. As the pools capacity increases, the 
Federal Government's layer is similarly diminished. 

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission establishes the financial 
requirements for each nuclear site. TMI is required to provide 
$140,000,000 of financial responsibility limits, the maximum 
then available from the pools. In addition, the Nuclear 
Insurers provide property damage insurance for the site 
itself. TMI has $300,000,000 coverage for repairing the 
damaged reactor and other property at the island. 

Individual property owners near nuclear power plants cannot 
purchase insurance against a nuclear accident on their own. 

The reasons for this exclusion are; the catastrophic potential 
of a nuclear power plant failure is virtually unlimited; the 
cost to insure individual property owners most susceptible 
to a nuclear accident is considered to be astronomical; and, 
most importantly, the Price-Anderson Act requires nuclear 
power plant owners to maintain liability insurance against 
radioactive contamination, negating the need to insure 
innocent third parties from damages sustained in the event 
of a nuclear accident. 

Pending Claims Only the relocation and wage loss claims 
which were discussed earlier, have been settled to date by 
the nuclear insurers. These claims represent simple and 
straightforward damages easily decidable as a result of the 
Governor's advisory of March 30, 1979, that pregnant women 
and families with pre-school age children evacuate from within 
the five mile radius of TMI. 

The remainder of the lawsuits discussed below represent 
unique and difficult legal questions which will be addressed 
in a courtroom setting. Therefore, no conclusions or analysis 
beyond the most cursory level can be formulated regarding 
these claims. Given the status of federal court dockets, 
the substantial, unprecedented nature and amount of damage 
levels alleged, it is expected that it will take years to 
ultimately resolve these claims. 


102 . 


The following table summarizes paid and outstanding claims 
by type. 


! 


Table 37 

Insurance Actions by Type of Claim 
(as of October 26, 1979) 




Claims Paid 

Claims 

Outstanding 



No. 

Amount 

No. 


Amount 

Individual 

Relocation 

3,162 

$1,214,186 




Individual 

Wage Loss 

627 

$ 91,221 




Total 


3 , 789 

$1,305,407 




Government 

Agency Claims 



27 

$ 

70,151 

Business Interruption Claims 



115 

$ 

1,700,000 

Individual 

Lawsuits 



18 




Class Action Lawsuits 

(Consolidates 73 named plaintiffs and 
two other actions) 3 3 

^•^Includes 19 Governmental Units with disclosed amounts and 
four other government-related claims with disclosed amounts. 

2/At a minimum. 

2/Given a few successful claims, awards could exceed $560,000,000. 


Outstanding Insurance Claims 


Governments and government-related agencies have filed 27 
claims for a minimum of $70,151. Several of these which 
have filed claims to date have listed an undisclosed amount 
of damages, reserving the right to develop their claim in 
greater detail at a later date. 

Metropolitan Edison has made repayment to 21 municipalities 
to date for extraordinary costs incurred during the accident. 
For example, Middletown Borough received $8,352 from Met Ed, 
the full amount claimed, for extra police and communications 
costs during the crisis period. Londonderry Township, the 
municipality in which the TMI plant is located, received $1,972 
from Met Ed for maintenance and repair of township roads, 
while Harrisburg was reimbursed $4,653. 


103 . 


Twenty other municipalities and counties within a ten mile 
radius of the plant have also filed claims which are being 
processed by Met Ed. Volunteer fire companies will also be 
offered restitution. 

Middletown Borough also received $7,500 from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission and $1,362 from the Pennsylvania 
Health Department for the use of municipal facilities during 
and after the crisis period. 

Business interruption claims have been filed by 115 concerns 
for damages of at least $1,700,000. One firm alone, a major 
foodstuffs processor, has an alleged income loss of nearly 
$867,000. Many of the claims filed to date are for un- 
specified damages. 

Eighteen individual and one class action lawsuit against the 
General Public Utilities Corporation, Metropolitan Edison, 
and its equipment suppliers, have been filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania which 
sits in Harrisburg. The class action suit is a consolidated 
class action consisting of 73 named plaintiffs and seeks 
damages to $560 million - the Price-Anderson Act limitation. 
In addition to seeking damages, all parties included in this 
action ask for abatement of a nuisance (the Three Mile 
Island plant) creation of a trust to guarantee payments of 
future medical services and "such other relief as is just 
and proper." 

The 18 individual suits generally seek damages, where 
specified, in excess of $10,000 in compensatory, and in 
excess of $10,000 for punitive damages. 

For all suits a twenty year statute of limitations rule 
applies under Nuclear Regulatory Commission rules. 


104 . 


Agricultural Community Concern - The Agriculture Depart- 
ment's study indicated that the short term impacts concerning 
losses is not the major concern of the farmers. A far more 
prevalent concern is the long term implications associated 
with their proximity to the TMI nuclear facility. Its 
presence, they feel, poses a serious threat to their general 
health and livelihood. 

In regard to health factors, almost 50 percent of the farmers 
living within 10 miles either feel threatened or remain un- 
certain about potential health effects. Outside the 10 mile 
radius, one-third of the farmers expressed similar feelings. 

In addition, about one-fourth of the farmers participating 
in the Department's study felt that the TMI facility is a 
serious threat to their livelihood. This concern is almost 
uniformly distributed among farmers in the entire 25 mile 
radius . 

Related to the above concern is the fact that some farmers 
feel that the incident has affected the value of their farm. 
Nearly half of them feel that this is a long term effect. 

The results of the Department's study therefore indicate 
that there is a significant amount of apprehensiveness 
within the agricultural community regarding TMI as it could 
affect the health of the farm family, the farmer's livelihood, 
and farm real estate values. This concern is most keenly 
felt by those farmers living and farming close to the faci- 
lity. One of the reasons for this attitude, most certainly, 
is the farmers' dependence on an undisturbed land and water 
environment. A radiation free environment is essential to 
the farmer and his sense of well being. The farmer makes a 
large capital investment in his land, facilities and live- 
stock, and, of course, he also invests his time. For this 
reason, he is less able or less willing to evacuate his 
farmstead. While a farmer who grows fruits, vegetables, 
grain or forage can leave the area during a crisis, the 
livestock, dairy and poultry farmer finds it difficult to 
leave his animals unattended without suffering potential 
serious financial losses. Virtually none of the latter 
group made plans to evacuate their livestock during the TMI 
incident. Even for those farm families which evacuated, or 
made plans to do so, the higher incidence was associated 
with the grain and the fruit and vegetable farmers. 


105 . 



JErfCRSON 


COtO SPRING 


WAIIS 


J(rrtRS0N 


MIDDIE RUIOK 


C(MIS£ 


[AST HANGVCR 


CARROLL 


HAMROLI 


NORTH MIQDLEION 


SILKR SPRING 


MIODlESeR 


WfSTCOCAI/eO 


EllJABH)* 


CONLWACO 


UPPERALIEN 


LONDONOERRr 
THRU MILE ISLAND^' 


(PHRAIA 


SOUTH MIDDLETON 


DONEGAL 


CONOY 


CONEWAGO 


EAST HEMPFI 


UPPER LEACOCl 


) LANCASTER 


"i'AHEN 


S1RASSURG 


WEST HANCHESIER 


CONCSIOGA 


JACKSON 


eUIlER 


CHANCEfORD 


THREE MILE 


ISLAND AREA 


NORTH CODORUS 


LEGEND 


STRAOAN 




MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY 


COUNTY BOUNDARY 


DRAINAGE liAIURI 


IICIOELeERt 


SCALE 


OffICf Of POLICY AND PLANNING 



CONEWAGO 


FAIRVIEW 


LONDONDERRY 


THREE MILE ISLAND/' 


NEWBERRY 


EST DONEGAL 


CONOY 


EASTifONEGAL 


CONEWAGO 


YORA'r?, 


EAST MANCHESTER 


HELLAM 


DOVER 


SPRINGETTSBURY 


LOWER WINDSOR 


WEST MANCHESTER \ GARDEN 


JACKSON 


NORTH CODORUS 


SPRINGFIELD 


NORTH 

HOPEWELL 



v. 


'1 





WtKT 
BOOaiNDINC 

MiOOLtTOWN PA 

MAY 83